Π Pi

doing, action

πρᾶξις

Doing and action: the quiet actions of the first definition, the noun of Critias’ distinction, and every action of the temperate life · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordA doing, an action, a piece of business; also the way things go for a man, his fortune. The noun of πράττω.
  • In the CharmidesEight times: the “quiet actions in life” of the first definition (160b–c); the doing that Critias sets apart from making (163b–d); his formula, “temperance is the doing of good things” (163e); and the temperate life, whose members “must necessarily do finely and well in every action” (172a).
  • In this edition“Actions”, “doing”, “doings”, “action”.
  • A place to read163b–e.
English renderings
πράξεις, praxeis, “actions”, “doings”; πράξεων, praxeōn, “(the vigorous and quick) ones”; πράξεως, praxeōs, “doing”; πρᾶξιν, praxin, “the doing”; πράξει, praxei, “action”

Meaning

Πρᾶξις names the act of doing and the thing done, and, like its verb, the outcome: a man’s πράξεις can be his affairs or his fortunes. Greek used the word of any undertaking, a transaction, a campaign, a deed. Against ποίησις, “making”, it came to mean action as distinct from production, the doing whose point is in the doing (see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).

Use in the book

The noun comes at three turns of the argument. In the first, actions are counted. Socrates has shown that in writing, reading, music and exercise, and in learning, remembering and deliberating, the quick is finer than the quiet, and concludes that “quiet actions in life have appeared finer to us than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places”; and even supposing “the quiet actions which turn out finer are no fewer than the vigorous and quick ones”, temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly (160b–c; see οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ; τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν). Actions here are the units of a life, set side by side and compared.

In the second the noun is given a rank. Critias, defending “doing one’s own business”, says that Hesiod “held making to be something other than doing and working”, and that “things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings” (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). Socrates restates it, calling good what is one’s own and the makings of good things doings (163d; see οἰκεῖος; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). A doing, in Critias’ vocabulary, is a making that has turned out well, and the noun has become a title of honour. Socrates lets him assign the words as he likes, and Critias gives his definition with it: “temperance is the doing of good things” (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

In the third the noun recovers its whole range. In the life that knowledge of what one knows would make possible, “with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy” (172a; see εὖ πράττειν; ὀρθότης). “Every action” takes back what Critias had narrowed: a doing is again anything done, and the question is whether a knowledge could make all of them go well. The step from acting well to being happy rides on the double sense of εὖ πράττειν, “to act well” and “to fare well”, as the edition’s note at 172a observes; the dialogue spends its last pages showing that the step has not been earned (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 160b–c2Quiet actions in life have appeared finer than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places.
  2. 160cEven if the quiet actions that turn out finer were no fewer than the quick ones, temperance would not be acting quietly.
  3. 163bHesiod held making to be something other than doing and working.
  4. 163cMakings that are fine and beneficial he called workings and doings.
  5. 163dSocrates: Critias calls the makings of good things doings.
  6. 163eIs temperance the doing, or the making, of good things? Critias: temperance is the doing of good things.
  7. 172aWith error removed, those so disposed must do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy.

Translation in this edition

“Actions” for πράξεις (160c1), with the noun understood in “the vigorous and quick ones” for πράξεων (160c4); “doing” for πράξεως (163b9); “doings” for πράξεις (163c4, 163d3); “the doing” for πρᾶξιν (163e1, 163e10); “action” for πράξει (172a1). The Glossary pairs the noun with its verb and records the rule the English keeps: “do, πράττειν (prattein); doing, πρᾶξις. Kept apart from make and work: 161b–163e, 171d–172a.”

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Republic the noun separates justice from its image. The rule that the born shoemaker should cobble and do nothing else, and the carpenter build, was, Socrates tells Glaucon, a phantom of justice, and useful for that reason; justice in truth is not about a man’s outward doing of his own, τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ, but about the inward, about himself and what is truly his. He keeps each element in him to its own task and lets the kinds in his soul meddle in none of one another’s; he manages what is truly his own aright, governs and composes himself, becomes a friend to himself, and brings his three parts into accord like the three boundary notes of a scale, top, bottom and middle, binding them and whatever lies between until he is wholly one out of many, temperate and in tune. From that state, and not before, he turns to whatever he has to do, money-making, the care of his body, the city’s affairs or his private bargains, and in all of it he names just and fine the action, πρᾶξις, that keeps this condition and works with it to bring it about, and wisdom the knowledge that directs that action (4.443c–e). The Charmides’ boy offers “doing one’s own business” as temperance, and the argument takes the doing outward, to writing names and cobbling shoes (161d–162a; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν); the Republic turns it inward, and makes the action that counts the one that follows from an ordered soul.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle’s separation of action from production is told elsewhere (Nicomachean Ethics 6.4, 1140a1–6; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).