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beneficial

ὠφέλιμος

Socrates’ prophetic hunch about temperance, which the argument fails to make good and he refuses to give up · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordBeneficial, helpful, profitable; the adjective of ὠφελέω, “benefit”.
  • In the CharmidesSeven times, one of them in words Burnet brackets: a doctor makes “something beneficial” (164b); Socrates’ hunch that temperance is “something beneficial and good” (169b), and his demand that Critias show it “beneficial too” (169c); “of enormous benefit” (171d); “if this is what benefits us” (174d); and “How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?” (175a).
  • In this edition“Beneficial”, with “of benefit” and “what benefits” where the English needs them.
  • A place to read169b–c and 174d–175a.
English renderings
ὠφέλιμα, ōphelima, “something beneficial”; ὠφέλιμον, ōphelimon, “beneficial”; ὠφέλιμος, ōphelimos, “beneficial”, “what benefits”

Meaning

Ὠφέλιμος is said of whatever does someone good: food, a remedy, advice, a friend, a craft. Socrates’ hunch at 169b joins the good and the beneficial in one phrase.

Use in the book

The adjective first appears in the doctor’s case. Socrates asks Critias “whether you think a doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating”, and Critias agrees (164a–b; see ἰατρός). The beneficial is here the product of a craft, and the next step shows that the craftsman may produce it without knowing that he has (164b–c; see ὠφελίμως).

At 169b it becomes Socrates’ own claim, the reason he asks whether such a knowledge would benefit us (see ὠφελέω): “For I have a prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good” (169b; see ἀγαθός; μαντεύομαι). So Critias must first show that such a knowledge is possible, “and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial too” (169b–c; see ἀποπληρόω; δυνατός). The hunch is the one thing Socrates claims for temperance in his own person while Critias’ definitions are on trial, and he claims it as a prophet, not as one who knows. It becomes the test Critias’ account must pass.

The adjective then marks the stages of the failure: on their first supposition “it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate” (171d; see μεγαλωστί; ὠφελία). At 174d the benefit passes to the knowledge of good and bad: “So if this is what benefits us, temperance would be something else for us” (174d; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). And the last step uses the hunch’s own word: “How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?” “It seems it can’t be, Socrates, in any way” (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The argument has tested Critias’ temperance against Socrates’ hunch and found it wanting. Socrates draws the conclusion against the definition, not against the hunch. He is a poor inquirer, he says, “For I do think that temperance is a great good” (175e; see ἀγαθός). The hunch of 169b survives the argument that was meant to confirm it.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs, with the words Burnet brackets at 174d.

  1. 164bA doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial for himself and for his patient.
  2. 169bSocrates’ prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good.
  3. 169cCritias must show that such a knowledge is possible and beneficial too.
  4. 171dIf the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, it would be of enormous benefit to be temperate.
  5. 174dIf the knowledge of good and bad is what benefits us, temperance is something else; Burnet brackets the words ἡ ὠφελίμη that follow.
  6. 175aHow will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?

Translation in this edition

“Something beneficial” renders ὠφέλιμα (164b1) and ὠφέλιμόν τι (169b4); “beneficial” ὠφέλιμον (169c1) and ὠφέλιμος (175a6). At 171d5–6 μεγαλωστὶ … ὠφέλιμον ἦν is “it would be of enormous benefit”, and at 174d6 εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος is “if this is what benefits us”. At 174d7 B reads ἡ ὠφελίμη between ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη, “would be something else”, and ἡμῖν, “for us”, and T ὠφελίμη without the article; Schleiermacher proposed ἢ ὠφελίμη, so that temperance “would be something other than beneficial to us”; Burnet brackets the words, and the English does not translate them.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic makes the step from good to beneficial in a few lines. The god is good in reality, Socrates tells Adeimantus, and nothing good is harmful; what is not harmful does no harm, and what does no harm does no evil, nor is it the cause of any. “Is the good beneficial?” “Yes.” “Then it is the cause of faring well?” “Yes.” So the good is not the cause of all things, but only of those that are well, and is not the cause of evils (2.379b). The Republic can be read as inferring benefit from goodness because it begins from a god whose goodness is granted. The Charmides begins from a definition, and when the benefit cannot be found, it is the definition that falls. The Meno’s inference, that if virtue makes us good it is beneficial, is told elsewhere (87e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon’s Socrates defines the good by the beneficial and makes both relative to the person. He asks the young Euthydemus whether the same thing seems to him beneficial to everyone. No, he answers, and he agrees that what is beneficial to one man is sometimes harmful to another. Would he call the good anything other than the beneficial? He would not. “Then the beneficial is good for whomever it is beneficial to?” “I think so.”1 The Charmides asks more than once whether temperance would benefit “us” (169b, 171d, 174d–e), and Xenophon’s Socrates can be read as stating the relation the question assumes.

Source note

1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.6.8.