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benefit

ὠφελία

The question Socrates puts to temperance, and the word of the answer it receives · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordBenefit, help, advantage; the noun of ὠφελέω, “benefit”. It is also spelled ὠφέλεια, as in Xenophon and Aristotle, in Plato’s Theaetetus (186c), and regularly in later Greek.
  • In the CharmidesFive times: medicine produces “No small benefit” (165d); the question “what benefit there would be for us in knowing it” (167b) and “Then what benefit … would we still get from temperance, if it is like this?” (171d); and twice at 175a, “Nor of benefit either” and “the craftsman of no benefit”.
  • In this edition“Benefit”.
  • A place to read165c–d, 167a–b, 171d–172a and 174e–175a.
English renderings
ὠφελίαν, ōphelian, “benefit”; ὠφελία, ōphelia, “benefit”; ὠφελίας, ōphelias, “(of) benefit”

Meaning

A benefit is always someone’s: the good a thing does to the person who has or uses it. To ask the benefit of a knowledge is to ask whom it helps and in what, and in the dialogues the question tests whether a supposed good is one.

Use in the book

The noun enters with medicine as the model. Asked what use medicine is and what it produces, Socrates would answer, “‘No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us’” (165d; see καλὸν ἔργον; ὑγίεια). Benefit is the work’s value to the people it serves, and temperance is asked for a work of the same kind (165e).

At 167b the question becomes the second of the two that govern the rest of the dialogue: after whether such a knowledge is possible (see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν), “even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it” (167b). The first question takes the long argument of the parallels (167c–169c); the second returns at 171d, when knowledge of knowledge has shrunk to knowing that one knows, not what. “Then what benefit, Critias … would we still get from temperance, if it is like this?” (171d). Socrates recalls the life they had supposed it would give, lived without error by its possessors and by everyone they ruled (171d–172a; see ἀναμάρτητος; μεγαλωστί), and the reduced temperance cannot give it.

At the end the noun is given to another craft and denied to temperance. Health belongs to medicine, and benefit too belongs elsewhere: “Nor of benefit either, then, my friend”, Socrates says, since that work had just been assigned to another craft (175a; see ἀποδίδωμι; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). Then the verdict: temperance is “the craftsman of no benefit” (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The word begins as the thing medicine plainly provides, and ends as the thing Critias’ temperance cannot provide at all. The question of 167b is answered in its own word.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 165dMedicine produces no small benefit: health, a fine work for us.
  2. 167bThe second question: what benefit there would be in knowing what one knows and does not know.
  3. 171dWhat benefit would we still get from temperance, if it knows only that one knows?
  4. 175aBenefit was assigned to another craft; temperance is the craftsman of no benefit.

Translation in this edition

“Benefit” at 165d1, 167b3, 171d1, 175a3 and 175a6–7. The edition’s Key Words keep “benefit” for the whole family, so that the verdict of 175a answers the question of 167b in its own terms, and keep “use” and “useful” for other words (see χρήσιμος; χρηστός).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Euthyphro puts the same question to another virtue defined as a kind of care. All tending, Socrates says, is done for the good and benefit of what is tended: horses in the horseman’s charge gain by it and grow better, and so do dogs in the huntsman’s and cattle in the herdsman’s. Is piety, then, being the tending of the gods, a benefit to the gods, and does a pious act improve one of them? Euthyphro swears it does not (13b–c). What work the gods’ servants help to produce, Socrates’ next question, is told elsewhere (13d–14a; see καλὸν ἔργον). The Euthyphro asks of piety what the Charmides asks of temperance at 165c–d: its benefit and its work. The Republic’s argument that each art provides its own benefit is told elsewhere (1.346a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).

Other ancient sources

The Stoics’ account of the good, as Diogenes Laertius reports it, can be read as making the question of 167b impossible to ask of a virtue. The good, they said, is in general that which is of some use, and in the proper sense it is either the same as benefit or not other than benefit; and so virtue itself is a good, and so are the action done from virtue and the good man who shares in it.1 On their terms temperance, being a virtue, is a benefit, and a temperance that benefits no one would not be a virtue at all.

Source note

1. Diogenes Laertius 7.94.