From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΜετά with the genitive, “together with”, and τὸ καλόν, “the fine”: a making accompanied by the fine.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in Critias’ reading of Hesiod: Hesiod “held that a thing made may sometimes become a disgrace, when it does not come about with what is fine, but that work is never any disgrace” (163c).
- In this edition“With what is fine”.
- A place to read163b–e.
- English renderings
- μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ, meta tou kalou, “with what is fine”
Meaning
The phrase states a condition, not a kind. A thing made, ποίημα, is not fine or shameful in itself: it becomes a disgrace “when it does not come about with what is fine”, and a work, ἔργον, is a making that does. The same product, on this account, may be made with the fine or without it, and the difference lies in something that accompanies the making rather than in what is made.
Use in the book
Critias needs the condition to rescue his formula. He has granted that craftsmen make other people’s things and may still be temperate, and Socrates has asked how that squares with doing one’s own business (162e–163a; see δημιουργός). Critias answers that making is not doing, and that he learned this from Hesiod, who said that work is no disgrace; Hesiod could not have meant that cobbling, selling salt fish or sitting in a brothel are “works” (163b; see ἐπ’ οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ταριχοπωλέω). So he distinguishes: a thing made may be a disgrace “when it does not come about with what is fine”; “things made finely and beneficially he called works” (163c; see καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως); and only such things are one’s own, while everything harmful belongs to others (163c; see ἀλλότριος; οἰκεῖος). Socrates translates the condition at once into his own terms, calling the appropriate and one’s own good and the makings of good things doings (163d; see ἀγαθός; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν), and Critias accepts the result, “temperance is the doing of good things” (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).
The phrase can be read as the first statement of the dialogue’s last result. At 174c–d Socrates argues that if the knowledge of good and bad is taken away, medicine will still make us healthy and cobbling shod, but “each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us” (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). That is Critias’ condition again: the crafts make their products, and something else must accompany the making if it is to come about with what is fine. Critias named the condition at 163c, and the argument ends by showing that the temperance he defined could not supply it.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with Critias’ distinction around it.
- 163bCritias: making is not doing or working; Hesiod said work is no disgrace.
- 163cA thing made may be a disgrace when it does not come about with what is fine; things made finely and beneficially Hesiod called works.
- 163d–eSocrates restates it: Critias calls the makings of good things doings; temperance is the doing of good things.
Translation in this edition
“With what is fine” renders μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ (163c2), with “come about” for γίγνηται; the English keeps “fine” for the neuter καλόν, as the Glossary does for acts, works and things.
Elsewhere in Plato
The doctrine that an action is neither fine nor shameful in itself, but becomes one or the other according to how it is done, is Pausanias’ in the Symposium (180e–181a; see ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ), and the Euthydemus’ argument that health, wealth and the rest are neither good nor bad in themselves, but good when wisdom leads them, is told elsewhere (281d–e; see ἀγαθός). Both make the fine or the good something that accompanies the thing, as Critias’ phrase does.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle puts the fine at the end rather than beside the act. Actions in accordance with virtue, he says, are fine and done for the sake of the fine, and so the liberal man will give for the sake of the fine and rightly: to the right people, in the right amounts, at the right time.1 Critias’ “with” and Aristotle’s “for the sake of” can be read as two answers to the same question, what makes a making fine: Critias attaches the fine to the making, Aristotle to the agent’s aim.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.1, 1120a23–26.