From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordFinely and beneficially: well made of its kind, and of profit to its user.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in Critias’ reading of Hesiod: “For things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings” (163c).
- In this edition“Finely and beneficially”.
- A place to read163b–164c.
- English renderings
- καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, kalōs te kai ōphelimōs, “finely and beneficially”
Meaning
The two adverbs name the two standards by which a Greek judged a product. Καλῶς says that it is finely made, a good thing of its kind; ὠφελίμως, that it profits whoever uses it. Greek usage often lets the two coincide, since a thing is called fine for being fit for its use, but they can come apart: a thing may be well made and do harm. The edition’s Key Words list the phrase among the family of “benefit”, rendered so throughout “so that the verdict answers the question in its own terms” (Key Words, “Benefit”).
Use in the book
The phrase is Critias’ standard for what deserves the name of work. Defending the definition “doing one’s own business” with Hesiod’s line, he says that a thing made may become a disgrace when it does not come about with what is fine, but that work never does (163b–c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ): “For things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings” (163c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν). What is made in this way is one’s own, and “everything harmful” belongs to others (163c; see ἀλλότριος; βλαβερός). Socrates restates the pair as a single word, good: what Critias calls doings are the makings of good things (163d; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).
The argument then pulls the adverbs apart. Socrates takes the second alone: a doctor who has acted “beneficially or harmfully” may not know how he has acted (164b–c; see ὠφελίμως). At the end the pair returns in another form, “each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us”, if the knowledge of good and bad is absent (174c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Critias’ two marks can be read as going together there: the crafts still produce health, shoes and clothing, but the “well and beneficially” belongs to another knowledge.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the place that takes it apart and the place where it returns.
Translation in this edition
“Finely and beneficially” for καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως (163c3). At 174c9–d1 the pair εὖ … καὶ ὠφελίμως, with εὖ in place of καλῶς, is “well and beneficially”.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Hippias Major tries the pair as a definition of the beautiful. Socrates proposes that the beautiful is the useful: we call eyes beautiful that can see, and a body beautiful for running or for wrestling, and so with animals, utensils, ships, instruments, practices and laws, looking to how and for what each is useful; the powerful is therefore beautiful and impotence ugly. But men do far more bad than good, and power useful for doing bad is not beautiful; so the beautiful would be the useful and powerful for doing some good, and that is the beneficial (295c–296e). What becomes of the definition is told elsewhere (296e–297c; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν).
Other ancient sources
Xenophon’s Socrates makes fine and good the same, relative to use. Aristippus of Cyrene, a companion of Socrates who later taught that pleasure is the good, asks whether a dung-basket is then a fine thing. “Yes, by Zeus,” Socrates answers, “and a golden shield an ugly one, if for their own work the one is finely made and the other badly”; things are fine and good for what they serve well, and bad and ugly for what they serve badly, so that what is fine for running is often ugly for wrestling.1 Critias’ Hesiod can be read as judging works by the same two standards.
Source note
1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.8.5–7.