Τ Tau

the beautiful

τὸ καλόν

The beautiful as the object of love: the condition that makes a love of nothing beautiful impossible · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseThe beautiful, as what love is of: the neuter of καλός, here in the genitive after ἔρως, “love”.
  • In the CharmidesAt 167e: “And would you say there is a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves?”
  • In this edition“Of nothing beautiful”.
  • A place to read167c–168a.
English renderings
καλοῦ … οὐδενός, kalou … oudenos, “of nothing beautiful”

Meaning

Καλός is beautiful to look at and fine to praise (see καλός). With love the first sense governs: the beloved is beautiful, and love is love of beauty. The Glossary lists the word “of persons, of the object of love, and of the charm’s words”, and the Charmides uses all three. The phrase at 167e takes the second as a rule: whatever love there is must have something beautiful for its object.

Use in the book

The phrase belongs to Socrates’ survey of self-related states. He is testing whether a knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, with no object of its own, could exist, and he looks for its like among the soul’s powers. There is no seeing that sees no colour but only itself and the other sights, no hearing that hears no sound but only itself and the other hearings (167c–d; see ἀκοή; ὄψις). Then the desires: there is no desire for no pleasure, but for itself and the other desires, and no wish for no good, but for itself and the other wishes (167e; see βούλησις; ἐπιθυμία αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν). “And would you say there is a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves?” “No … I wouldn’t” (167e; see ἔρως αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων). Fear and opinion follow (168a; see φόβος).

Each power has its object, and the beautiful is love’s, as pleasure is desire’s and the good wish’s. The edition’s note at 167e records the assumption and adds a judgement: “A love of no beautiful thing is a contradiction as well as a joke; after the prologue, perhaps a pointed one.” The prologue was a story about the beautiful: Critias’ promise that Socrates would soon know “the beautiful ones” (154a), Socrates’ confession that “nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me” (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη), and the moment when he saw inside the boy’s cloak and remembered Cydias’ warning, “speaking of a beautiful boy” (155d; see Κυδίας; τὰ ἐρωτικά). The lover who could not look away from the beautiful boy now asks whether a love could look at nothing beautiful, and Critias says it could not.

The joke carries the argument. A love that loved only itself and other loves would be the image of what Critias proposes for knowledge, and no one present can believe in it, least of all after the scene in the wrestling-school. The dialogue can be read as testing the abstract definition against the experience it began with, and finding that the experience does not allow it.

Places to read

The phrase’s place, with the prologue’s beautiful young men that it recalls.

  1. 154aCritias: as for the beautiful ones, Socrates will know in a moment.
  2. 154bSocrates is a white line on white stone where the beautiful are concerned.
  3. 155dCydias, speaking of a beautiful boy, warned the fawn against the lion.
  4. 167eThere is no love that is love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and the other loves.

Translation in this edition

“Of nothing beautiful” renders καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός (167e8). The Glossary lists καλός as “beautiful” of persons and of the object of love, “fine” of acts, works and things (see καλός); here the object of love takes “beautiful”, as in the prologue. At 167e8 καλοῦ μὲν is the reading of T and W; B runs the letters together as καλοῦμεν, “we call”. In the reply that follows, “he said”, ἔφη, is the reading of later manuscripts, where B, T and W have ἔφην, “I said”, which would give the answer to Socrates (apparatus).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Symposium starts from the same assumption, as the edition’s note at 167e says, and then refines it. Socrates’ argument with Agathon, that love is of beauty, that one loves what one lacks, and so that love lacks beauty and, since good things are beautiful, lacks good things too, is told elsewhere (201a–c; see ἔρως); so is Diotima’s correction, that love is not of the beautiful but of begetting in the beautiful (206e; see γεννάω). The Charmides uses only the first step, love’s object, and its question is whether any power could do without one.