From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈγνοεῖν is not to know, to be unaware: from the negative prefix and the root of γιγνώσκειν, “to know”.
- In the CharmidesThe verb measures whose not knowing is forgivable. The boy may be excused “at his age” (162e); Critias will not allow that a temperate man could be unaware of his temperance (164a–d); the man who has only knowledge of knowledge is “ignorant of” what the crafts know (170c); and Socrates imagines a man “ignorant of nothing” and asks which of his kinds of knowledge makes him happy (174a–b).
- In this edition“Not know” where the English can keep the verb of knowing (162e, 164a–d), and “be ignorant” at 170c and 174a, the only places where “ignorant” stands in the English.
- A place to read170c–d, where the man with knowledge of knowledge turns out to be ignorant of what he knows.
- English renderings
- ἀγνοεῖν, agnoein, “not know”; ἀγνοῶν, agnoōn, “the man who is ignorant”; ἀγνοοῖ, agnooi, “was ignorant of”
Meaning
Ἀγνοεῖν (agnoein) is the plain verb of unawareness: to miss a fact, not to recognize a person, not to know a thing one might have known. It differs from ἀνεπιστημοσύνη (anepistēmosynē), the “lack of knowledge” that the argument sets beside knowledge from 166e, which names the absence of a body of knowledge, and which the edition keeps tied to its root rather than calling it ignorance (Key Words). The English of the Charmides has no noun “ignorance”: ἀνεπιστημοσύνη, the one Greek noun that might take it, is kept as “lack of knowledge”, and the verb does the rest.
Use in the book
The first use excuses. When Critias turns on Charmides for not knowing what the author of “doing one’s own business” meant, Socrates intervenes: “it is no wonder that he doesn’t know, at his age. You, though, may reasonably be expected to know, both because of your age and because of the study you have given it” (162e; see ἐπιμέλεια). Not knowing is fitting in a boy and a reproach in a man of study.
The second use is the one Critias will not grant. Socrates asks whether he thinks “that people who are temperate do not know that they are temperate”, and a doctor who benefits without knowing it brings the question home (164a–c). Critias would rather retract than concede “that a man who does not know himself is temperate” (164d; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).
The third use turns Critias’ own definition against him. If temperance is only knowledge of knowledge, its owner knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, and cannot know by temperance “that he knows the healthy”; so “the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows” (170c). The ignorance here is of the objects of the crafts, and it is built into the definition: the man whom Critias made temperate by self-knowledge turns out ignorant of everything except that he knows something.
The last use is a supposition. Socrates asks whether the happy man is the one who knows everything, “the sort of man who, besides the future, knew everything that has happened and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing” (174a). Even of him Socrates asks which knowledge makes him happy, and Critias answers, the knowledge of good and bad (174b). The man ignorant of nothing is not made happy by the extent of his knowledge, but by one knowledge in it.
Taken together, the four uses can be read as setting out the dialogue’s view of not knowing. The boy’s ignorance is no fault; Critias’ horror of being thought ignorant of himself drives him to a definition he cannot defend; the definition produces an ignorance it cannot see; and to be ignorant of nothing would not be enough. What matters is not how much one knows, but which knowledge one has.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 162eIt is no wonder that Charmides does not know, at his age; Critias may be expected to know.
- 164aSocrates wonders whether Critias thinks the temperate do not know that they are temperate.
- 164cThe doctor who acts beneficially is temperate, but does not know himself, that he is temperate.
- 164dCritias will not concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.
- 170cThe man who has only knowledge of knowledge is ignorant of what the crafts know, and will know not what he knows, but only that he knows.
- 174aSocrates imagines a man who knows past, present and future and is ignorant of nothing, and asks which knowledge makes him happy.
Translation in this edition
Ἀγνοεῖν is “not know” at 162e, 164a and 164c–d, where the English needs the same verb as the “know” around it, and “be ignorant” at 170c (“the man who is ignorant of these”) and 174a (“was ignorant of nothing”). At 170c the Greek has the singular object, ὁ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, “the one ignorant of this”, which the English makes plural to cover the healthy and what belongs to house-building just named.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Philebus Socrates makes not knowing oneself the root of the ridiculous. The ridiculous is a kind of badness, he tells Protarchus, one of the young men present, “the opposite of what the inscription at Delphi says”; and when Protarchus asks whether he means “Know thyself”, Socrates says that its opposite would be “not knowing oneself at all”. Those who do not know themselves fail in three ways: they think themselves richer than they are, or bigger and handsomer, or, most often, better in soul, above all in wisdom, so that most people are “full of quarrels and of a false opinion of their own wisdom” (48c–49a). Critias, “used to being admired on every occasion” (169c), can be read as an instance of the commonest of the three.
Other ancient sources
Xenophon gives Socrates the verb in a conversation with Charmides himself, who is able but shy of speaking to the people (see αἰδώς). Socrates ends, “My good man, do not be ignorant of yourself”, and urges him to turn from examining the affairs of others to examining himself.1
Source note
1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.7.9; Charmides’ plea is at 3.7.5.