From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΑἰνίττεσθαι is to speak in riddles, to hint at a meaning without saying it.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in Socrates’ conclusion that the author of “doing one’s own business”, being no simpleton, was speaking in riddles (162a–b).
- In this edition“Was speaking in riddles”, for the imperfect ᾐνίττετο.
- A place to read162a–b.
- English renderings
- αἰνίττεσθαι, ainittesthai, “speak in riddles”
Meaning
Αἰνίττεσθαι (ainittesthai) is a deponent verb from αἶνος (ainos), a tale with a point, and stands behind αἴνιγμα, “riddle” (see αἴνιγμα). It is used of oracles and poets, and of anyone who says one thing and means another; it implies that the speaker knows his meaning and hides it.
Use in the book
Socrates has shown that “doing one’s own business”, taken at the sound of its words, is refuted by every craft that works for others (161d–162a). He draws the conclusion in the form of an inference about the speaker: “Then, as it seems, the man who said that temperance was doing one’s own business was speaking in riddles, as I said just now; for surely he was not such a simpleton” (162a–b; see εὐήθης). The reason given is the speaker’s standing, not the saying’s content. A wise man would not say something so plainly false; therefore he meant something else. When Charmides confirms that the man “was thought to be very wise indeed”, Socrates is “quite certain” (162b).
The verb carries a double irony. Socrates suspects, and the narrator soon says he thinks it “entirely true”, that the speaker is Critias, sitting on the boy’s other side (155c, 161b–c, 162c); the charity he extends to an absent sage is extended to a man in the room who must now justify it. And Charmides, by suggesting that the speaker may not have known what he meant (162b), questions the assumption on which the verb rests, that whoever speaks in riddles knows the answer.
Places to read
The one passage in which the verb occurs, with its frame.
Translation in this edition
Ἠινίττετο (ēinitteto, 162a) is the imperfect, the capital Η carrying its iota beside it rather than beneath, as Burnet prints it at the head of a sentence; the English gives the continuous sense, “was speaking in riddles”. The Glossary lists it under “riddle” with αἴνιγμα (161c, 162a–b, 164e).
Elsewhere in Plato
The same inference, from the speaker’s standing to a hidden sense, recurs at important moments. In the Apology Socrates, told that the god at Delphi had said no one was wiser than he, asks himself, “What can the god be saying, and what is he hinting at in riddles?”, since he knows he is not wise, and yet the god surely does not lie, “for that is not lawful for him” (21b). In the Republic the saying of Simonides, the lyric poet of Ceos, that justice is giving back to each what is owed cannot mean returning a weapon to a madman; so “Simonides, it seems, was speaking in riddles, poetically, about what justice is”, meaning that it is giving each what is fitting (332b–c). In the Theaetetus Socrates suggests that Protagoras, wise as he was, spoke in riddles to the crowd of us and told the truth to his pupils in secret (152c); and in the Phaedo he grants that the founders of the mystery rites were perhaps hinting in riddles long ago that the uninitiated will lie in mud in Hades (69c). In each the verb marks a charitable reading of a respected source. Unlike the god, Simonides, Protagoras and the founders of the rites, the source in the Charmides is in the room and can be asked.