Common good

Use in the book

Joint inquiry is first offered as a way out of a difficulty of reputation. Charmides, the young son of Glaucon, cannot deny that he is temperate without showing up Critias, his cousin and guardian, nor affirm it without praising himself (158c–d2; see Belief and opinion). Socrates answers, "And it seems to me … that we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about, so that you won't be forced to say what you don't want to, and I in turn won't set about my doctoring without looking into things" (158d–e). The offer, "I am willing to look into it with you" (158e), comes back twice with Critias: "I would much rather look into it with you" (162e), and "I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know" (165b–c2; see Inquiry).

The second time, the good itself is common. Critias complains, "You are trying to refute me, and letting go of what the argument is about" (166c). Socrates answers that he refutes him only for the reason for which he would scrutinize even himself, for fear of thinking, without noticing, that he knows what he does not (166c–d; see Attention), and goes on: "this is what I am doing: examining the argument for my own sake above all, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends. Or is it not a common good, do you think, for practically all men, that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is?" "Very much so, Socrates," Critias answers (166d). The good widens from Socrates himself to his friends and then to practically all men. "Then take heart, my dear fellow," Socrates replies, "answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted" (166d–e2; see Refutation). A good that is common can be read as one the man refuted shares as fully as the man who refutes him. Critias does not hold to this long: in Socrates' telling he is soon "ashamed in front of the company" and keeps "covering up his perplexity" (169c–d; see Reputation and ambition).

Later Socrates recalls a larger shared good: if temperance were what they first supposed, "we would live our lives without error, both we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us", and households and cities would be well run (171d–172a). He withdraws the agreement that this would be a great good (172d–173a2; see Benefit). The good once hoped for household and city is left in doubt; the common good of 166d is never withdrawn.

Places to read

1. 158c–e2Charmides can neither affirm nor deny that he is temperate; Socrates proposes that they look into it together, if the boy is willing.
2. 162eSocrates would much rather look into the definition with Critias, who takes the argument over.
3. 165b–c2Socrates inquires with Critias each time, because he does not himself know.
4. 166c–e2Accused of trying to refute Critias, Socrates examines the argument for his own sake above all and perhaps for his friends', and asks whether it is not a common good for practically all men that each thing should become plain; it does not matter who is refuted.
5. 171d–172aIf temperance were what they supposed, the temperate and all they ruled would live without error, and household and city would be well run.

Translation in this edition

Κοινῇ is "together" (158d), and the "with you" that follows renders μετὰ σοῦ (meta sou; 158e), as in "look into it with you" (162e) and "I inquire with you" (165b). Κοινὸν … ἀγαθόν is "a common good" (166d), and γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς … ὅπῃ ἔχει (gignesthai kataphanes … hopēi echei) "should become plain, as it really is". Σχεδόν τι (schedon ti) is "practically" at 166d, "nearly" in "nearly everyone of that age" (154b) and "almost" in "I would almost say" (164d); σχεδόν alone is "almost" (163d). "My other friends" renders τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων (tōn allōn epitēdeiōn), those close to him.

κοινῇ

Attested: κοινῇ (koinēi; 158d), κοινόν (koinon; 166d). Common, shared; the dative κοινῇ, used as an adverb, is "together". It gives the manner of inquiry at 158d, where Socrates and Charmides are to look into the boy's temperance "together", and its aim at 166d, that each thing should become plain, "a common good … for practically all men". Lemma: κοινός.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Gorgias has the same phrase, and the thought behind it. Socrates hesitates to refute Gorgias of Leontini, the Sicilian teacher of rhetoric, for fear that Gorgias may suppose him to be contending not about the matter, that it should become plain (καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, kataphanes genesthai, nearly the words of Charmides 166d), but against Gorgias himself (457e). He is one of those, he says, who would gladly be refuted if they said something untrue and gladly refute anyone else who did, and would be refuted no less gladly than refute; for he holds being refuted the greater good, by as much as it is a greater good to be rid of the greatest evil oneself than to rid another of it, and no evil is as great for a man as a false opinion about what they are discussing (458a–b). Later, when Callicles, the Athenian at whose house Gorgias is staying, refuses to answer and Socrates must carry the argument alone, Socrates says that all of them should vie with one another to know what is true and what is false in what they discuss, "for it is a common good for all that it should become plain" (φανερὸν γενέσθαι, phaneron genesthai, 505e); and he adds, "I do not say what I say as one who knows, but I inquire together with you" (506a): Socrates' "I inquire with you" of Charmides 165b, with the κοινῇ, "together", of 158d.

In the Phaedo, on the day of his death, Socrates warns his friends against misology, the hatred of arguments (89d), and fears that on the question before them he may argue not as a philosopher but contentiously, like the wholly uneducated, who in a dispute give no thought to how the matter stands, ὅπῃ ἔχει (hopēi echei, the "as it really is" of Charmides 166d), but care only that their own positions should seem true to those present (91a). He will be eager, he says, not that what he says should seem true to those present, except incidentally, but that it should seem so above all to himself; and Simmias and Cebes, his two Theban friends, are, if they will take his advice, to give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth (91a–c). As at 166d, Socrates examines for his own sake above all, and the person of the speaker gives way to the truth.