From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →- English renderings
- ἕκαστος, hekastos, “every one”; ἕκαστον, hekaston, “each man”, “each word”, “each”; ἑκάστῳ, hekastōi, “each”; ἑκάστη, hekastē, “each”; ἕκαστοι, hekastoi, “each of us”; ἕκαστα, hekasta, “each of these things”
Meaning
Attested: ἕκαστος (hekastos; 155c), ἕκαστον (hekaston; 161e, 162a, 163d, 166d), ἑκάστῳ (hekastōi; 164b, 172b), ἑκάστη (hekastē; 166a, 171a, 174e), ἕκαστοι (hekastoi; 172d), ἕκαστα (hekasta; 174c). Each, every one taken singly. In the bench comedy “Every one of us who were sitting there squeezed up” to make room for the boy (155c). Then the word carries two principles. The first is the division of labour: the law the boy is asked about would order “each man to weave and wash his own cloak” (161e–162a; see ἑαυτοῦ), and the benefit Critias and Socrates once agreed on would come “if each of us did what we knew” (172d; see διοίκησις). The second is the division of knowledge: Socrates can point out “what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of” (166a), and asks whether “each kind of knowledge” is not defined “by its being of particular things” (171a); each of the crafts does “its own work” (174e; see τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). The argument against Critias’ temperance rests on the second principle, which a knowledge of knowledge would break. The common good of 166d is that each thing that is should become plain as it really is (166d; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). Socrates also allows Critias to assign “each word” as he pleases (163d; see δίδωμι), asks whether each of the craftsmen must know when he will profit from his work (164b), gives the temperate learner a view of the knowledge beside each thing he learns (172b), and says that each thing done well would be lost without the knowledge of good and bad (174c–d).