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deliberate, plot, take counsel

βουλεύομαι

Deliberation praised for its speed, and plotting already done · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΒουλεύεσθαι, to take counsel, deliberate about what to do; with an object, to plan or plot; in the perfect, to have resolved.
  • In the CharmidesIn the argument against quietness, deliberation is praised in the one who does it “most easily and most quickly” (160a–b). In the last lines Socrates asks the pair what they are plotting, the boy answers, “We’ve finished plotting”, and tells Socrates to take counsel himself (176c).
  • In this edition“Deliberation”, “deliberates” (160a); “plotting”, “finished plotting”, “take counsel” (176c).
  • A place to read176c–d.
English renderings
τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, tōi bouleuesthai, “deliberation”; βουλευόμενος, bouleuomenos, “deliberates”; βουλεύεσθον, bouleuesthon, “are you plotting”; βεβουλεύμεθα, bebouleumetha, “We’ve finished plotting”; βουλεύου, bouleuou, “take counsel”

Meaning

The middle of βουλεύω, a verb that belongs both to the council, the βουλή, which prepared business for the assembly, and to any man thinking out what to do. It is deliberation about action: what is up to us, and how to do it. Its range runs from honest counsel to conspiracy, and the dialogue uses both ends.

Use in the book

In the argument against quietness, deliberation stands with inquiry among the soul’s activities: “And again, in the soul’s inquiries and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, the one who deliberates and finds things out with difficulty, who is thought to deserve praise, but the one who does it most easily and most quickly” (160a–b; see ἀνευρίσκω; ζήτησις; μόγις). The boy agrees. The claim is the weakest in the sequence, for deliberation is the activity in which slowness is commonly praised: Aristotle reports the saying that one should act quickly on what has been deliberated but deliberate slowly (see ἀγχίνοια). The edition’s note at 159b observes that the refutation may trade on the shift from “quietly” to “slowly” (see βραδέως).

At the end the verb returns in its other sense. Socrates asks, “You two … what are you plotting to do?” “Nothing,” said Charmides. “We’ve finished plotting” (176c). The question is in the dual, βουλεύεσθον, the two of them as one party; the answer in the perfect. The edition’s note at 176c explains the range of the verb, “to deliberate, to take counsel, and so to plot”, and the change of tense: “the plotting is done.” Then the boy turns the verb on Socrates: “You, for your part, take counsel what you’ll do about it,” and Socrates answers with the noun: “There’s no counsel left” (176c–d; see βιάζομαι; βουλή). The deliberation praised at 160a for its speed has become a resolution reached before anyone asked, and the man who is told to deliberate has nothing left to deliberate about. The family runs through the closing page: Socrates would sooner “advise” the boy to think himself happier the more temperate he is (176a; see συμβουλεύω), and earlier Critias had dismissed the later Delphic maxims as men’s “useful advice” (165a; see συμβουλή).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs; the compound συμβουλεύω (176a) and the noun συμβουλή (165a) have their own entries.

  1. 160a–bIn the soul’s inquiries and in deliberation, praise goes to the one who deliberates most easily and quickly.
  2. 176cSocrates asks the pair what they are plotting; the boy: we have finished plotting; you take counsel what you will do about it.

Translation in this edition

At 160a9–10 τῷ βουλεύεσθαι is “deliberation” and βουλευόμενος “the one who deliberates”. At 176c the edition moves with the verb’s sense: βουλεύεσθον (176c5) is “are you plotting”, βεβουλεύμεθα (176c6) “We’ve finished plotting”, and βουλεύου (176c9) “take counsel”, which leads into “counsel” for the noun βουλή at 176d1. The English cannot keep one word through the passage without losing either the plot or the counsel.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Crito has the same turn from present to perfect. Crito comes to the prison with a plan of escape and urges him: “Deliberate—or rather it is no longer the time to deliberate but to have deliberated, and there is one plan”: everything must be done the coming night (46a). Socrates answers by deliberating, at length, and decides to stay.

In the Laches Socrates insists that deliberation needs knowledge, not numbers: the question to ask first is whether any of them is expert in the matter they are deliberating about (184e–185a). In the Protagoras the sophist states what he teaches as good counsel, εὐβουλία, about one’s own affairs, how best to manage one’s household, and about the city’s, how to be most able in its affairs in act and word; Socrates takes him to mean the art of politics (318e–319a). The Charmides’ picture of a household and a city run by temperance (171e–172a) can be read as claiming the same field for a different knowledge.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle’s account of deliberation can be set beside Socrates’ examples. We do not deliberate, he says, about the exact and self-sufficient sciences, such as writing, for we do not hesitate how to write a letter (copying out letters is Socrates’ first example of what is finer done quickly, 159c); we deliberate about medicine, money-making and piloting, and call in counsellors on great matters, distrusting our own ability to judge. What we deliberate about is never the end itself but what leads to it, and the man who deliberates seems to inquire and analyse as a geometer analyses a figure: not all inquiry is deliberation, but all deliberation is inquiry.1 Socrates’ pairing at 160a, “in the soul’s inquiries and in deliberation”, can be read as the same one.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112a34–b24.