From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- English renderings
- ἐπιτάττει, epitattei, “gives the orders”
Meaning
Τάττειν is to set in order, to post, to assign; ἐπιτάττειν, with ἐπί, is to set a task upon someone, and so to command. It is a stronger word than κελεύειν, “to bid, to tell”, which can be a request: the ἐπίταγμα is an injunction, and the ἐπιτακτική is the art of commanding. The verb implies a relation of authority between the one who orders and the one who must do what he is told.
Use in the book
The verb closes a sequence of orders. Charmides has said that he very much needs the charm and will let Socrates charm him every day; Critias makes this the proof of the boy’s temperance, and Charmides answers in the language of a ward, that he would be doing something terrible if he did not obey his guardian and do what he ordered; “Well, I do order it,” says Critias (176b–c; see ἐπίτροπος; πείθω). Critias’ verb there is κελεύειν. When Socrates asks Charmides whether he means to use force, Charmides answers with the stronger word: “Count on force … since this man here gives the orders” (176c; see βιάζομαι). The joke is that Socrates is to be compelled to do what he would gladly do, and the boy hides behind his guardian’s command.
The order also ends a theme that runs through the opening pages. The Thracian forbade Socrates to let anyone persuade him to treat a head without the soul, and Socrates, bound by his oath, will obey (157b–c; see ἐντέλλομαι; πείθω). At the close Charmides is “not altogether persuaded” by Socrates (176b), and obeys his guardian instead. The edition’s note at 176b records that the play on persuading and obeying closes here, “just as persuasion gives way to force”. The last order of the dialogue can be read as the point at which command replaces argument.
Places to read
The passage in which the verb occurs.
- 176b–dCharmides will obey his guardian and do what he orders; Critias orders it; the boy will use force, since Critias gives the orders, and Socrates promises not to oppose him.
Translation in this edition
“Since this man here gives the orders” for ἐπειδήπερ ὅδε γε ἐπιτάττει (176c8). Critias’ verb a few lines earlier is κελεύειν, “what you order”, “I do order it” (176c2–3).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Statesman divides the knowledge that does not work with its hands into a judging part and a commanding part, τὸ ἐπιτακτικόν, and places the king in the commanding art, as a master, not as a spectator who only judges; the commanding art is then divided again, as the retailer’s art is divided from the art of the man who sells his own produce, into the art of the herald, who passes on another’s orders, and the art of the one who gives his own orders, which the visitor calls “self-commanding” and assigns to kings (260b–e). In the first book of the Republic Socrates argues that no kind of knowledge looks to what profits the stronger or makes it the content of its orders, ἐπιτάττει, but looks to what profits the weaker, the party it governs: the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, looks to and orders what profits the sick man, not himself, and the true pilot what profits his sailors (342c–e; see ᾗ ἰατρικός). On that account a command is justified by the good of the one commanded. The command that ends the Charmides can be read as serving the one who gives it as much as the one who receives it.