Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame

Use in the book

The encounter between the returning Aristides and Socrates begins with another man’s quarrel. Thucydides had fallen out with Socrates “in certain arguments”. Aristides interprets the young man’s behaviour as self-importance, “as if he amounted to something”. He then disparages his earlier condition as that of a slave. The account does not reproduce the disputed arguments, establish who was right, or show that indignation itself proves Thucydides has ceased to benefit.

Aristides quickly admits that his own situation is ridiculous. The evidence he gives is precise but limited: formerly he could talk with anyone and appear worse than no one in argument; consequently he sought the company of the most cultivated men. Now he avoids someone as soon as he recognises education and feels ashamed of his own poor quality. The movement is from confident engagement to ashamed withdrawal. It is reported as a change in his power, but its principal measure is comparative argumentative standing.

“Appear worse than no one” is not identical with “know the truth about every subject” or “have become morally excellent”. Likewise, the cultivated company he once sought does not constitute an independently certified tribunal of wisdom. The dialogue allows the impressive social effects of association to remain entangled with competition, reputation and self-estimation. Aristides’ confidence might accompany real improvement, yet this testimony does not specify its content well enough to identify the two without remainder.

His shame also differs from a demonstrated ethical conversion. He feels exposed as inferior and flees educated interlocutors. No confession of injustice, settled commitment to a better life or programme of renewed study is reported. The emotional change shows how valuable his lost condition was to him.

Places to read

1. 130bδι’ ἀπεχθείας ἐν λόγοις τισίν — Thucydides’ quarrel is located in discussion
2. 130bσεμνύνεσθαι … καὶ χαλεπαίνειν ὡς τὶ ὄντα — Aristides characterises his airs and anger
3. 130cδιαλέγεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι — former competence is described through conversation and apparent rank
4. 130cτῶν χαριεστάτων ἀνθρώπων — Aristides once sought highly cultivated company
5. 130cφεύγω … πεπαιδευμένον — he now avoids the educated
6. 130cαἰσχύνομαι … τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ φαυλότητι — shame attaches to his own perceived poor quality

Translation in this edition

“Appear”, “giving himself airs”, “cultivated” and “poor quality” maintain the testimonial and social texture. Translating the passage simply as “he gained and lost virtue” would erase its actual criteria. The story does not use aretē as the name of Aristides’ gained condition.

Feel shame — αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai)

αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai)

Feel shame. To be ashamed; Aristides’ emotion concerns his present poor quality and inability to face educated people. Attested: αἰσχύνομαι (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Argument; discussion — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

Argument; discussion. Conversational or argumentative exchanges in which Aristides formerly seemed inferior to no one. Attested: λόγοις (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Be angry — χαλεπαίνειν

Be angry. To be resentful or irritated; the emotion attributed to Thucydides in his quarrel. Attested: χαλεπαίνειν (130b). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Converse; discuss — διαλέγεσθαι

Converse; discuss. To speak with another in discussion; Aristides names his former ability to engage anyone, without defining a technical method. Attested: διαλέγεσθαι (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Cultivated; refined — χαρίεις

Cultivated; refined. The superlative describes the socially and intellectually polished people whose company Aristides once sought. Attested: χαριεστάτων (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Educated — παιδεύειν (paideuein) · πεπαιδευμένον (130c).

παιδεύειν (paideuein)

Educated. The perfect passive participle marks someone who has received education, whose presence now makes Aristides withdraw. Attested: πεπαιδευμένον (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Give oneself airs — σεμνύνεσθαι

Give oneself airs. To assume a grand or self-important manner; Aristides’ description of Thucydides’ attitude towards Socrates. Attested: σεμνύνεσθαι (130b). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Hostility; falling-out — ἀπέχθεια

Hostility; falling-out. An antagonistic relation; the phrase describes the dispute between Thucydides and Socrates in certain arguments. Attested: ἀπεχθείας (130b). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Appear; seem — φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

Appear; seem. To present a certain appearance; Aristides’ remembered standing is expressed as appearing no worse than others. Attested: φαίνεσθαι (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Laughably — καταγελάστως

Laughably. In a ridiculous condition; Aristides turns from ridiculing Thucydides to admitting his own loss of ability. Attested: καταγελάστως (130b–c2). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Poor quality; inferiority — φαυλότης

Poor quality; inferiority. The deficiency for which Aristides feels shame; the passage does not specify a particular moral vice. Attested: φαυλότητι (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Pursue; seek — διώκειν

Pursue; seek. To seek out eagerly; Aristides formerly pursued association with cultivated men. Attested: ἐδίωκον (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Slave, as an insult — ἀνδράποδον

Slave, as an insult. A word for an enslaved person used disparagingly of Thucydides’ former condition, not evidence of his legal status. Attested: ἀνδράποδον (130b). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame.

Arguments people say Socrates makes (contextual phrase)

126d: οὕς σέ φασιν λέγειν τοὺς λόγους. Theages reports arguments attributed to Socrates. Phasin, “they say”, preserves the mediation of the report. Logos elsewhere can name the peers' memorized arguments (121d), the conversation now addressed to Socrates (127c) and Aristides' performance in discussion (130c). It is neither always a technical proof nor one invariant abstract “Reason”. See Statesmen's sons and Rivalry.