From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- English renderings
- διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι, dia to mē autos eidenai, “because I myself do not know”
Meaning
Διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι gives a reason: because of not knowing. Socrates’ ignorance, which in other dialogues is a confession or an irony, is here a cause. He inquires because he does not know, and the inquiry is the consequence of the ignorance, not a display of it.
Use in the book
Critias has read the Delphic inscription as the god’s greeting, “Be temperate”, and has given up everything he said before; now he offers Socrates an account of temperance as knowing oneself, “if you do not agree” (164d–165b; see ἀφίημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διδόναι λόγον). Socrates refuses the role the offer gives him: “But Critias … you are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask, and as though I will agree with you if only I want to. That is not how it is. I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know. So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait until I have” (165b–c; see εἴτε … εἴτε μή; ζητέω; ὁμολογέω; φάσκω).
Critias has assumed that a questioner knows the answers and is keeping them back, and that his agreement is a favour to grant or withhold. Socrates answers with the order of things: first the inquiry, then the agreement, and the inquiry because of the not knowing. The phrase can be read as the dialogue’s turning point in the treatment of knowledge. Critias has just defined temperance as knowing oneself, and will defend it as a knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, which Socrates spells out, with his assent, as knowing what one knows and what one does not (166e–167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). The man who will be asked to examine that knowledge has just stated, as his reason for asking, that he does not know. Whatever the knowledge of knowledge turns out to be, Socrates has already shown its plainer form: knowing that he does not know, and acting on it by asking.
The reason returns a page later, when Critias accuses him of trying only to refute. Socrates answers that he refutes Critias for the same reason he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking, without noticing, that he knows what he does not (166d; see διερευνάω; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; φοβέομαι). At 165b–c the not knowing is the ground of the inquiry; at 166d the danger of not noticing it is the ground of the refutation. Between them they give the method of the whole dialogue, and the definitions Critias goes on to offer are tested by a man who has said, twice, why he cannot simply accept them.
Places to read
The phrase’s place.
Translation in this edition
“Because I myself do not know” renders διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι (165b8–c1); “whatever is proposed” renders τὸ προτιθέμενον, from προτίθημι, “set before” (see προτίθημι). At 165b7 “as though I will agree with you” renders Heusde’s conjecture, told elsewhere (see ὁμολογέω).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Theaetetus gives the same reason in the figure of the midwife. Socrates says that he has what midwives have: he is barren of wisdom, and the reproach many have made against him, that he questions others but declares nothing about anything himself because he has nothing wise in him, is true; the god compels him to deliver others and has prevented him from giving birth (150c–d). The Theaetetus’ “because he has nothing wise”, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, is built like the Charmides’ phrase, and turns the same ignorance into the same method. Aristotle’s account of why Socrates asked questions and did not answer them, because he confessed that he did not know, is told elsewhere (Sophistical Refutations 34, 183b7–8; see ἐλέγχω).