From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΕἴτε … εἴτε, “whether … or”, in an indirect question, with μή for the negative alternative: an open question that does not presume its answer.
- In the CharmidesEight pairs, six of them with μή. Its fullest form is Socrates’ offer to look into Critias’ definition with him, “to see whether what was said is true or not” (162e).
- In this edition“Whether or not”, “whether … or not”; “whether it is Critias or Socrates”; “whether … or”.
- A place to read162c–163a.
- English renderings
- εἴτ’ ἀληθὲς εἴτε μή, eit’ alēthes eite mē, “whether what was said is true or not”; εἴτε … εἴτε μή, eite … eite mē, “whether or not”, “whether … or not”
Use in the book
The construction gives the inquiry its form. Socrates proposes to look into the boy’s temperance with him: “we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about” (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι), so that they can guess “whether it is in you or not” (159a; see τοπάζω). When Critias takes over the definition, Socrates would rather look into it with him, “to see whether what was said is true or not” (162e). He tells Critias, “So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not” (165c), and he cannot accept knowledge of knowledge as temperance until he has looked into whether it “would benefit us or not” (169b). The grant of 169d is made on the same terms: they will look again “whether it is so or not” (169d; see αὖθις).
In each place the second alternative is left standing. Socrates’ εἴτε … εἴτε μή refuses to presume the answer, and his partners keep presuming it: Critias answers the offer of 162e with “I agree entirely … and I take it over” (162e), and at 165b offers to defend his thesis before it has been examined (see διδόναι λόγον). The open question repeats 161c, where Socrates put the same thought to the boy with another construction, πότερον … ἢ οὔ (161c; see ἀληθής).
Two pairs name persons and things instead of yes and no. The question which of the two, Critias or Socrates, is being refuted is to be dismissed (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν), and the dream comes “through horn or through ivory” (173a; see εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι’ ἐλέφαντος). The dialogue ends with the disjunction turned into perplexity: the boy does not know, he says, whether he has temperance or whether he does not (176a), οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω.
Places to read
Every passage in which the construction occurs.
- 158d–eTo look together whether or not the boy possesses temperance.
- 159aTo guess whether it is in him or not.
- 162eTo look into whether what was said is true or not.
- 165cSocrates will say whether he agrees or not once he has looked.
- 166d–e2Say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted.
- 169bWhether a thing of that kind would benefit us or not.
- 169dTo look again another time whether it is so or not.
- 173aWhether the dream has come through horn or through ivory.
Translation in this edition
Εἴτ’ ἀληθὲς εἴτε μὴ τὸ λεχθέν (162e4–5) is “whether what was said is true or not”. The English keeps the open “or not” for εἴτε μή at 158e1, 159a9, 165c1–2, 169b3 and 169d5, and uses “whether … or” where both members are named (166d9–e1, 173a7–8). At 176a7 Burnet prints οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω from a later hand in T; T itself has εἴτ’ εἰ ἔχω, and B εἴτι ἔχω (apparatus, a7).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Gorgias Socrates states the attitude the construction carries: all of us, he says, ought to be eager to know what is true about the things they are speaking of and what is false, since it is a common good for all that this should become plain (505e; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). In the Republic Glaucon uses the construction to state why the just man must be stripped of his reputation: if he seems just, it will be unclear whether he is so for justice’s sake or for the honours and gifts (361c; see δοκέω).