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assign each word

τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων

Socrates’ permission to Critias to assign the words as he pleases, on one condition: that he makes clear what each word is applied to · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseTo assign words: the middle of τίθημι, “set”, “lay down”, used of giving names, with a partitive genitive, literally “to set each of the names”.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, at 163d: “Well, I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to.”
  • In this edition“Assign each word”.
  • A place to read163b–e.
English renderings
τίθεσθαι … τῶν ὀνομάτων … ἕκαστον, tithesthai … tōn onomatōn … hekaston, “assign each word”

Meaning

Τίθεσθαι ὄνομα, to set a name, was ordinary Greek for naming; Plato’s Cratylus imagines the first namer as a setter of names, a lawgiver, and the Charmides recalls his act at its end (see νομοθέτης; ὄνομα). The middle voice gives the setting to the speaker for his own use. In the late fifth century the question was whether a name was right by nature or by agreement, and Prodicus made a profession of the proper use of each word (see Πρόδικος). Socrates’ phrase sets the question aside without answering it: let the speaker set the words, so long as he says what they are set on.

Use in the book

Critias has defended his definition by separating making from doing, with Hesiod for his authority: cobbling and selling salt fish are makings, and only what is made finely and beneficially counts as work (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). Socrates recognizes the school at once: “After all, I have heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words” (163d; see διαιρέω; Πρόδικος). Then comes the permission: “Well, I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to. So now go back to the beginning and define it more plainly” (163d; see δηλόω; δίδωμι; ὁρίζω).

The sentence has two halves, and they do opposite work. The first gives up the quarrel over words: Critias may call good doings “doings” and refuse the name to the cobbler, and Socrates will not dispute it. The second keeps what the quarrel was hiding, the thing each word picks out (see φέρειν τοὔνομα). Socrates uses the permission in his very next question: “Is it the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things that you say temperance is?” (163e; see ὀνομάζω). The distinction Critias drew from Hesiod falls away without being refuted, and what is left is “a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things” (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

The permission can be read as the dialogue’s method in small: words are free, things are not. It costs Socrates nothing to let Critias name as he likes, because the argument does not turn on names. The end reverses the situation. There the name is fixed and the thing escapes: “we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance” (175b; see νομοθέτης; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα). The lawgiver’s verb is the same, ἔθετο, “set” (see τίθημι). The name was set long ago, and no one present can say what it was set on.

Places to read

The phrase’s place, with Socrates’ use of the permission that follows.

  1. 163dSocrates allows Critias to assign each word as he pleases, if he makes clear what he applies it to.
  2. 163e“The doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it”: the permission used, and Critias’ plain definition.

Translation in this edition

“Assign each word” renders τίθεσθαι … τῶν ὀνομάτων … ἕκαστον (163d5–6); ὄνομα is “word” here and in Prodicus’ “distinctions between words” (163d4), “name” elsewhere (see ὄνομα). The simple verb is “lay down”, “suppose” and, of the lawgiver, “gave” (see τίθημι). At 163d5 “as you please” renders ἂν βούλῃ, the reading of W; B has ἂν θέλῃ, T βούλει, and Hermann conjectured ἂν ἕλῃ, “as you choose” (apparatus).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Cratylus turns the permission into a theory and puts it in Hermogenes’ mouth. He cannot be persuaded, he says, that the rightness of a name is anything but agreement and convention: whatever name someone sets on a thing, θῆται, is right, and if he sets another in its place and stops using the first, the second is right no less than the first, just as we rename our household slaves; for nothing has its name by nature, but by the convention and usage of those who have made it customary and who call things so (384d). The Statesman praises the attitude without the theory. When young Socrates says that either of two names will do, the visitor from Elea tells him that if he keeps from being serious about names, he will be found richer in wisdom in his old age (261e). The Charmides’ permission is the Statesman’s, not Hermogenes’: it claims nothing about how names are right, only that the argument can go on without settling it.