From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordTo bound, to mark out by a boundary, ὅρος; to determine, to define.
- In the CharmidesSix times, with two compounds: “define it more plainly” (163d); “I give you a plain definition” (163e); each kind of knowledge “defined … by its being of particular things” (171a); temperance “being such as we are now defining it” (173a); and Critias “marking off the happy man” (173e).
- In this edition“Define”, “definition”; “marking off” at 173e.
- A place to read170e–171b.
- English renderings
- ὅρισαι, horisai, “define”; διορίζομαι, diorizomai, “I give … a definition”; ὥρισται, hōristai, “is defined”; ὡρίσθη, hōristhē, “was defined”; ὁριζόμεθα, horizometha, “we are … defining”; ἀφορίζεσθαι, aphorizesthai, “marking off”
Meaning
An ὅρος was a boundary stone, set up to mark where one man’s land ended and another’s began. Ὁρίζω is to set such bounds, and from that to determine a thing’s limits in speech: to define it, saying what it is and so what it is not. Διορίζω is to draw a line between, to distinguish; ἀφορίζω to mark off a part from the rest.
Use in the book
The verb marks two kinds of boundary. The first is the boundary of a word. Socrates has let Critias assign words as he pleases, provided he makes clear what each applies to (see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων; ὄνομα), and asks: “So now go back to the beginning and define it more plainly” (163d). Critias answers with the compound, and defines temperance as the doing of good things (163e; see διορίζομαι; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). A definition here is a word fixed to a thing.
The second is the boundary of a knowledge. To test what knowledge a doctor has, the temperate man must ask what it is of: “isn’t each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?” “By that, yes.” “And medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased” (171a; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ἐπιστήμη τινός). Every knowledge is bounded by its object, and this principle is what defeats temperance as Critias defines it: a knowledge of knowledge has no field of its own, and so cannot enter the fields of the others (171b–c; see ὁμότεχνος).
The last two uses look back on the definition. The dream supposes temperance “being such as we are now defining it” (173a; see ὄναρ), and when Critias denies that the cobbler and the bronze-worker, who live knowledgeably, are happy, Socrates says that he seems to be “marking off the happy man” as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν), and asks which. The inquiry that began by asking Critias to define a word ends by asking him where, within knowledge, the boundary of happiness lies, and the answer, the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c), is one that the definition did not contain.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb or its compounds occur.
- 163dSocrates asks Critias to go back to the beginning and define it more plainly.
- 163eCritias gives a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things.
- 171aEach knowledge is defined by its being of particular things; medicine was defined by the healthy and diseased.
- 173aThe dream supposes temperance as they are now defining it.
- 173eCritias seems to Socrates to mark off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things.
Translation in this edition
“Define it more plainly” renders σαφέστερον ὅρισαι (163d7), whose echo in Critias’ answer is told elsewhere (see διορίζομαι); “defined” renders ὥρισται (171a5) and ὡρίσθη (171a9), “defining” ὁριζόμεθα (173a9), and “marking off” ἀφορίζεσθαι (173e9).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the first speech Socrates makes in the Phaedrus, spoken in the person of a crafty lover who pretends not to be in love, the speaker begins with method. About everything, my boy, there is one starting point for those who mean to deliberate well: they must know what the deliberation is about, or they will miss it altogether. Most people fail to notice that they do not know the essence of each thing; as if they knew, they do not agree on it at the start of the inquiry, and as they go on they pay the price one would expect, agreeing neither with themselves nor with each other. So let us not suffer what we blame in others, but agree on a definition, ὅρος, of love, what it is and what power it has, and look to it and refer to it as we inquire whether it brings benefit or harm (237b–d). The Charmides starts without such a definition, and the inquiry is its search.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle’s judgement that Socrates was the first to fix thought on definitions, and that he did not set the definitions apart from things, is told elsewhere (Metaphysics 1.6, 987b1–10; 13.4, 1078b27–32; see εἶδος).