From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- English renderings
- φέρῃς τοὔνομα, pherēis tounoma, “you are applying … word”
Meaning
Greek spoke of carrying a name onto a thing, ἐπί with the accusative, as English speaks of applying a word to it. The picture is of a label brought to a thing and set on it. Where τίθεσθαι, “set”, names the act of giving a name (see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων), φέρειν names its direction: the word goes onto something, and the question is what.
Use in the book
The phrase is the condition attached to Socrates’ permission. Critias may assign words as he pleases; “only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to” (163d; see δηλόω; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων). The sentence turns from the word to its object. Critias has been distinguishing making from working and doing, and refusing cobbling the names of work and doing (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν); Socrates does not care which name he uses, only what he carries it onto. Critias answers by naming the thing: “temperance is the doing of good things” (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).
The condition can be read as the rule the rest of the dialogue keeps. Later definitions are tested the same way: knowing oneself is a knowledge, and a knowledge of something (165c; see ἐπιστήμη τινός); and a knowledge of knowledge, asked what it is of, has no subject of learning of its own, while each kind of knowledge is defined by what it is of (166a–c, 171a; see τῷ τινῶν εἶναι). The end shows the condition unmet. The inquirers cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave the name (175b; see νομοθέτης; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων): they have the word, and cannot say what it is carried onto.
Places to read
The phrase’s place.
- 163dSocrates lets Critias assign words as he pleases, if he makes clear what he applies each to.
Translation in this edition
“What you are applying whatever word you use to” renders ἐφ’ ὅτι ἂν φέρῃς τοὔνομα ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς (163d6–7). At 163d6 Burnet prints ἂν φέρῃς with B and T; other manuscripts have ἂν φέροις, and H. Richards conjectured δὴ φέρεις (apparatus).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Cratylus explains why the condition matters. A name, Socrates gets Hermogenes to agree, is a tool, and what we do with it in naming is to instruct one another and to sort things out as they are; so a name is an implement for instruction and for sorting out what is, as the shuttle is for parting the tangled threads on the loom (388b–c). On that account a word applied to nothing in particular would be a shuttle that parts nothing, and the Charmides’ knowledge of knowledge, which could not tell what another knowledge is of, can be read as the case (170c–171c).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle uses a neighbouring picture to explain how arguments deceive. Since in argument we cannot carry the things themselves along, he says, we use their names as tokens in their stead, and take whatever holds of the names to hold of the things too, as reckoners do with their counting-pebbles; but names and phrases are limited in number and things numberless, so that one phrase and one name must mean several things, and those who do not know what names can do are led into false reasoning by them.1 Socrates’ condition at 163d can be read as the precaution against that error: before the argument goes on, say what the word is carried onto.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 1, 165a6–17.