Δ Delta

draw distinctions, determine, distinguish

διαιρέω

Prodicus’ distinctions between words, and the distinctions Critias cannot make · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΔιαιρέω, to take apart, divide; in the middle, to distinguish, to define by dividing, to decide.
  • In the CharmidesSocrates has heard Prodicus “draw countless distinctions between words” (163d); “it needs a great man” to determine for all cases whether anything can have its power in relation to itself, and Socrates does not trust himself to make “these distinctions” (169a); Critias will not admit that he cannot make the distinctions he is challenged to make (169c); and knowledge of knowledge can “distinguish” only that this is knowledge and that is not (170a).
  • In this edition“Draw … distinctions”, “determine”, “making these distinctions”, “make the distinctions”, “distinguish”.
  • A place to read168e–170a.
English renderings
διαιροῦντος, diairountos, “draw … distinctions”; διαιρήσεται, diairēsetai, “to determine”; διελέσθαι, dielesthai, “making these distinctions”, “make the distinctions”; διαιρεῖν, diairein, “to distinguish”

Meaning

The verb is αἱρεῖν, “to take”, with διά, “apart”: to take a thing to pieces, to divide a whole into its parts. It is the verb of analysis in every field, from dividing booty to dividing words by their senses, and in Plato’s later dialogues the name of a method, the division of kinds by which a thing is defined. The Charmides uses it of words, of things, and of the one distinction knowledge of knowledge could make.

Use in the book

The first distinctions are verbal. When Critias sets making apart from doing and working, Socrates recognizes the school: “After all, I have heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words”, and he lets Critias assign each word as he pleases, so long as he makes clear what he applies it to (163d; see δηλόω; Πρόδικος). The edition’s note at 163d suggests the joke that Critias, “aristocrat and poet, is splitting words like a paid sophist”. Distinctions between words cost nothing; Socrates asks for the thing.

The next are distinctions in things, and they are hard. Having sorted the reflexive cases into the impossible and the doubted, Socrates says: “It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases: whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself … I, for my part, don’t trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions” (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ). Critias, caught by Socrates’ perplexity, would not admit it; in Socrates’ words, “he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make” (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; προκαλέομαι). The man who split words at 163b–d cannot divide things, and will not say so.

The last use measures his definition. “Knowledge that is knowledge of knowledge: will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?” “No, only that much” (170a; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). The one division such a knowledge could make is the one that tells nothing about the thing known. The verb runs through the dialogue from the easy distinctions of names to the impossible one Critias’ temperance would need, between this knowledge and that.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 163dSocrates has heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words; let Critias name as he pleases, but make clear what he names.
  2. 169aIt needs a great man to determine whether anything can have its power in relation to itself; Socrates does not trust himself to make these distinctions.
  3. 169cCritias will not concede that he cannot make the distinctions Socrates challenges him to make.
  4. 170aKnowledge of knowledge can distinguish only that this is knowledge and that is not.

Translation in this edition

“Draw … distinctions” for διαιροῦντος (163d4), “determine” for διαιρήσεται (169a3), “making these distinctions” and “make the distinctions” for the aorist middle διελέσθαι (169a8, 169c8), and “distinguish” for διαιρεῖν (170a7). The English varies with the object: words are distinguished, a question determined. At 170a7 διαιρεῖν is a correction by a second hand in T; B, T and W have διευρεῖν, “to find out” (apparatus, a7). At 172a1 B has the participle διῃρημένης, “divided off”, where Burnet prints ἐξῃρημένης with T and W (apparatus, a1; see ἁμαρτία). The perfect διεληλύθαμεν at 168e3, “we have gone through”, belongs to διέρχομαι, not to this verb.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Phaedrus Socrates describes the second of two procedures in speaking: to be able to cut a thing up again kind by kind, at the joints where it naturally divides, without trying to smash any part in the manner of a clumsy carver; he calls himself a lover of these divisions and collections, so as to be able to speak and to think (265e–266b). In the Sophist the visitor from Elea gives the work to dialectic: to divide by kinds and not to take the same form for a different one or a different one for the same belongs to the knowledge of dialectic, and it belongs only to the man who does philosophy purely and justly (253d–e). The great man whom the Charmides says is needed can be read as drawn, in these later dialogues, as the dialectician.

Other ancient sources

Diogenes Laertius reports, on Aristotle’s authority, that Plato divided things in a set manner, and gives the divisions: goods are in the soul, in the body or outside it, justice, wisdom, courage and temperance being in the soul.1 Xenophon’s Socrates derived the name of conversation itself from sorting things by kinds (Memorabilia 4.5.12; see διαλέγομαι).

Source note

1. Diogenes Laertius 3.80.