Τ Tau

crown

τέλος

The end, the crown: what Critias says nothing else supplies to doing well but “knowledgeably” · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe end, the completion, the fulfilment; the goal for whose sake a thing is done; also an office, a rite, a payment.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, in Critias’ defence of the dream: “you won’t easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight ‘knowledgeably’” (173d).
  • In this edition“Crowns”, the noun turned into a verb.
  • A place to read173a–174c.
English renderings
τέλος, telos, “(anything else that) crowns”

Meaning

Τέλος is the point at which a thing is complete: the end of a road, the fulfilment of a wish, the maturity of a living thing, and so the purpose for whose sake it acts. It is also what finishes something off as its crown: authority, a consecration, the rite of initiation, the death that completes a life. The word is both a limit and a perfection, and philosophers argued over the relation of the two.

Use in the book

Socrates has granted, in the dream, that if temperance ruled the human race would act and live knowledgeably, but not that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy (173a–d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; εὖ πράττειν). Critias protests: “And yet, … you won’t easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight ‘knowledgeably’” (173d; see ἀτιμάζω). The Greek says “any other τέλος of doing well”: no other end or completion for it. On Critias’ claim, knowing is what perfects acting, and a life done knowledgeably is a life done well.

Socrates’ reply takes the crown apart by asking what it is of. “Then teach me one small thing more. … Knowledgeably about what? About cutting leather?” (173d; see προσδιδάσκω; σκυτῶν τομή). Not leather, not bronze, not wool or wood: Socrates concludes that Critias marks off the man who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἀφορίζω), and then, asked which knowledge makes the man happy most of all, Critias names the one “by which he knows good … and bad” (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὰ μέλλοντα), the only one, Socrates concludes, that makes us do well and be happy (174c). The end of doing well proves not to be a manner of acting, “knowledgeably”, but an object of knowledge, the good. Critias’ τέλος was a form without a content; the argument supplies the content, and it is not temperance. Plato names the good as the end of all actions in the Gorgias (499e–500a; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν), and Diotima’s answer that the wish to be happy needs no further end is told under εὐδαίμων (Symposium 204e–205a).

The word can be read as the dialogue’s own unreached goal. Critias names a crown and cannot say what it crowns; the inquiry at its close, beaten on every side, does not reach its end either (175b; see πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα). Near its close the boy resolves to go on being charmed every day, until Socrates says it is enough (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι).

Places to read

The noun’s only place.

  1. 173dCritias: nothing else crowns doing well, if one slights “knowledgeably”.

Translation in this edition

“Anything else that crowns doing well” renders ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν at 173d6–7, turning the noun into a verb so that “crown” can carry both its senses, completion and honour.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle separates the end from the last thing. Nature is an end and that for whose sake, since in any continuous process with an end, the last stage is that for whose sake it happens; hence the poet’s comic slip, “he has reached the end for which he was born”, since what is last is not every time an end, only what is best.1 In the Metaphysics he records the same double sense from the other side: things are called complete, τέλειον, by having their end, when that end is good, and since the end is something last, death too is called an end by a transfer of meaning, because both are last; but the end is also that for the sake of which.2 Critias’ “knowledgeably” is a last step in the dream’s sequence, and Socrates’ question can be read as showing it to be no end in Aristotle’s sense. Aristotle’s own statement that doing well is itself the end of action is told elsewhere (Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b1–4; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).

Source note

1. Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 194a27–33.

2. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b23–1022a3.