From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The phraseThe neuter plural participle of μέλλω, “be about to”, with or without ἔσεσθαι, “be”: the things that are going to be, the future.
- In the CharmidesFour times, all in the dream and after: the true prophets “as foretellers of the future” (173c), “the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet” (174a), the man who, “besides the future”, knows past and present (174a), and the question which knowledge, “of the things that are and have been and are going to be”, makes him happy (174b).
- In this edition“The future”; “all that is going to be”; “are going to be”.
- A place to read173c–174b.
- English renderings
- τῶν μελλόντων, tōn mellontōn, “(of) the future”, “(are) going to be”; τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι, ta mellonta esesthai, “all that is going to be”; τοῖς μέλλουσιν, tois mellousin, “the future”
Meaning
Μέλλω is to be about to, to intend, to be destined; τὰ μέλλοντα are the things that lie ahead. Knowledge of them was the seer’s, and the poets described the seer by the triad of times: Homer’s Calchas knew what is, what will be and what was before, and Hesiod’s Muses tell the same (Iliad 1.70; Theogony 38; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος).
Use in the book
The future enters the dialogue as a doubt about the crafts. A doctor, Critias allows, perhaps need not know when his treatment is beneficial, nor each craftsman “when he is going to profit from the work he is doing” (164b; see τὰ δέοντα). The craftsman knows how to make, not what will come of it.
In the dream the future becomes a knowledge of its own: prophecy is granted to be knowledge of what is going to be, and temperance, presiding over it, sets up the true prophets “as foretellers of the future” (173c; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; μαντική; προφήτης). Then, having concluded that Critias marks off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἀφορίζω), Socrates offers him the prophet: “perhaps you mean the one I was speaking of just now, the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet. Do you mean him, or someone else?” “Him … and another as well.” Socrates guesses the other: “Can it be the sort of man who, besides the future, knew everything that has happened and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose there is such a man. For I don’t think you would say that anyone lived still more knowledgeably than he” (173e–174a; see μάντις; τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα).
Socrates supposes the man of total knowledge only to question him. “Then this is what I still long to know: which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do they all, alike?” “Not alike at all.” “Then which, most of all? The one by which he knows what, of the things that are and have been and are going to be? Is it perhaps the one by which he knows draughts?” Not draughts, not calculation, more so health, and most of all the one “by which he knows good … and bad” (174a–b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; λογιστική; τὸ πεττευτικόν). The future, the prophet’s whole field, is one object among many, and knowing it does not make its knower happy. The dialogue’s question was never what will happen, but whether what happens will be good for us, and that question the prophet’s knowledge cannot answer.
Places to read
Every passage in which the participle stands for the things to come.
- 173cTemperance sets up the true prophets as foretellers of the future.
- 174aThe prophet is the one who knows all that is going to be.
- 174aBesides the future, the man Socrates imagines knows all that has happened and all that is now.
- 174bWhich knowledge, of the things that are and have been and are going to be, makes him happy?
Translation in this edition
“Foretellers of the future” for προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων at 173c6–7, “all that is going to be” at 174a1, “the future” at 174a5 and “are going to be” at 174b2. At 174a6 Schanz would read φῶμεν, “let us say”, for θῶμεν, “let us suppose”, and H. Richards proposed τοιοῦτον, “such a man”, for αὐτόν (apparatus).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Theaetetus the future is where expertise shows. Socrates turns Protagoras’ doctrine that man is the measure of all things to the things that are going to be: when a layman thinks he will have a fever and a doctor thinks he will not, whose opinion will the future follow? The farmer, not the lyre-player, will judge whether a wine will be sweet or harsh; the musician, not the trainer, whether a tune will be in tune; and at a feast being prepared, the cook’s judgement of the pleasure to come is worth more than a guest’s. Laws too are laid down for the future, as going to be beneficial, and about what is beneficial to come some judge better than others (178a–e). The Theaetetus’ experts know the future of their own fields; the Charmides’ prophet knows all of it, and still the question of benefit is not his.