From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordStraightness; so correctness, rightness, of a road, a name, an opinion or an action.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in the picture of the life temperance would give: “For with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy” (172a).
- In this edition“Rightness”.
- A place to read171d–172a.
- English renderings
- ὀρθότητος, orthotētos, “rightness”
Meaning
Ὀρθός is straight, upright, and so correct: a straight road is the right one, a straight answer the true one. Ὀρθότης, the abstract noun, is the quality of being right, and Plato’s speakers ask after the rightness of names (Cratylus 383a), of opinion (Philebus 37d) and of action (Meno 97b). Its opposite in the dialogue’s sentence is ἁμαρτία, error, from the verb for missing the mark: the straight line and the missed target belong to the same picture.
Use in the book
The noun comes at the end of a chain. If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, and could examine others, we would live without error; we would do only what we knew and hand over the rest to those who knew; a household and a city run by temperance would be run well; “For with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy” (171d–172a; see ἀναμάρτητος; ἐξαιρέω; ἡγέομαι). The genitive absolute pairs the two nouns, ἁμαρτίας … ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης: error taken away, rightness at the head.
The chain moves in steps, and the one the dialogue questions runs from rightness to doing well. Rightness is what knowledge of a craft secures: the doctor’s acts are judged by whether they are done rightly (171b), and the ruled would do only what they would do correctly, that is, what they had knowledge of (171e; see ὀρθῶς). The dream grants all of this, everything done according to the kinds of knowledge and no impostor anywhere, and still Socrates cannot learn “that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy” (173d; see εὖ πράττειν; ὄναρ). The edition’s note at 172a observes that the step from doing well to being happy “rides on” the double sense of εὖ πράττειν, to act well and to fare well. Rightness can be read as the most that the knowledge of what one knows could give, a life of correct performances, and the dialogue’s question as whether a life of correct performances is a good one.
Places to read
The passage in which the noun occurs, with the chain it ends.
Translation in this edition
“With error removed and rightness leading” renders ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης (171e7–172a1), keeping the two genitives absolute.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Meno’s judgement that true opinion is no worse a guide than wisdom to rightness of action, ὀρθότης πράξεως, is told elsewhere (97a–c; see ἡγέομαι). The Charmides puts knowledge at the head of right action without asking, as the Meno does, whether something less than knowledge might lead as well; it asks instead whether rightness is enough.