Ο Omicron

just in proportion as

ὅσῳπερ … τοσούτῳ

In just that proportion: the measure Socrates sets between the boy’s temperance and his happiness · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordA correlative of measure: ὅσῳ, “by as much as”, with the intensive -περ, answered by τοσούτῳ, “by so much”; with two comparatives, “the more … the more”.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, in Socrates’ last advice to the boy: “I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler … and yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate” (176a).
  • In this edition“Just in proportion as”.
  • A place to read175d–176a.
English renderings
ὅσῳπερ … τοσούτῳ, hosōiper … tosoutōi, “just in proportion as”

Meaning

The datives ὅσῳ and τοσούτῳ are datives of the measure of difference, used with comparatives: by how much one thing exceeds, by so much the other. The pair makes one quantity the measure of another, and the strengthened ὅσῳπερ insists on the exactness of the match.

Use in the book

The phrase comes in Socrates’ answer to his own failure. The argument has made temperance, as defined, of no benefit (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής); Socrates refuses the result, blames himself as a poor inquirer, and declares that temperance is a great good and that if the boy has it he is blessed (175e–176a; see μακάριος; ζητητής). Then the advice: “For if you have it, I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument, and yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate” (176a; see λῆρος). The sentence sets the two comparatives, σωφρονέστερος and εὐδαιμονέστερον (see εὐδαίμων), in exact proportion, as if temperance and happiness rose together.

That proportion is what the dialogue’s argument could not establish. The dream ended in “that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this … we cannot yet learn” (173d; see ὄναρ), and the inquiry found that only the knowledge of good and bad makes us happy (174b–c). The phrase can be read as Socrates’ conviction outrunning his argument: what he could not prove, he states as a measure, and he offers it to the one person present who might show it true by living it.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with Socrates’ refusal that leads to it.

  1. 175eSocrates does not think temperance worthless; he is a poor inquirer, and temperance a great good.
  2. 176aIf the boy has temperance, he should think himself happier just in proportion as he is more temperate.

Translation in this edition

“Yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate” renders σεαυτὸν δέ, ὅσῳπερ σωφρονέστερος εἶ, τοσούτῳ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερον (176a4–5), where “just” renders the -περ of ὅσῳπερ and καί, “also”, is left unexpressed. Ὅσῳπερ is the reading of T and W; B has ὃς ὥσπερ.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic can be read as making the proportion its verdict. When the five kinds of men have been described, Socrates asks Glaucon to give his verdict, as the judge who decides among all the competitors gives his, on which comes first in happiness and which second; Glaucon answers that he judges them as one judges choruses, in the order in which they came on, for virtue and vice and for happiness and its opposite. Socrates proposes to hire a herald, or to make the announcement himself: Ariston’s son, Glaucon, has found the best and justest man the happiest, and that man the most kingly, who reigns over himself, and the worst and most unjust the most wretched, and that man the one who, being most tyrannical, is most a tyrant over himself and over his city (9.580b–c). The Charmides’ proportion between temperance and happiness is a single sentence of advice; the Republic argues for its own over a book.