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knowledge of the lack of knowledge

ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης

The step from knowing knowledge to knowing its absence · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordA knowledge whose object is the absence of knowledge, in oneself or in others.
  • In the CharmidesDrawn by Socrates from Critias’ definition: “Then … if it is knowledge of knowledge, it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge?” “Certainly” (166e). It stays in the definition to the end (167c, 169b, 171c, 174d, 174e).
  • In this edition“Knowledge of the lack of knowledge”.
  • A place to read166e–167a.
English renderings
ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, anepistēmosynēs epistēmē, “knowledge of the lack of knowledge”

Meaning

The phrase depends on a principle that the dialogue uses without stating: a knowledge of something is also a knowledge of its opposite or of its absence. Medicine knows disease as well as health, and the doctor “understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased” (170e; see ἐπαΐω). So, Socrates infers, a knowledge of knowledge would be a knowledge of the lack of knowledge too.

Use in the book

Critias grants the step at once, and it gives temperance its use: the temperate man alone will examine what he knows and does not, and inspect others (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκοπέω). Without the lack of knowledge among its objects, the knowledge of knowledge could not find out anyone who thinks he knows and does not. With it, temperance becomes a detector of ignorance. The course of the pair, knowledge and lack of knowledge, through the argument is told under ἀνεπιστημοσύνη.

The principle that licensed the step is also what ruins it. It holds for each craft: medicine knows the lack of medicine, and only a doctor can tell a doctor from a pretender (170e–171c; see ἀληθινός). It does not hold for knowledge in general. A knowledge of the lack of knowledge would know that something is lacking, not what; and at the end Socrates names the absurdity hidden in the formula, that one should know, of what one does not know at all, that one does not know it (175c; see ἄλογος). The step of 166e can be read as the one that most needed looking into and was granted with “Certainly”.

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase occurs.

  1. 166eIf temperance is knowledge of knowledge, it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge.
  2. 167cThe one knowledge is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge.
  3. 169bCritias lays it down that temperance is knowledge of knowledge and indeed of the lack of knowledge.
  4. 171cIf temperance is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, it cannot tell a doctor from a pretender.
  5. 174dThe knowledge that benefits is knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge, but of good and bad.
  6. 174eThey declared it knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else.

Translation in this edition

“Knowledge of the lack of knowledge” for ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη (166e7), with “lack of knowledge” kept for ἀνεπιστημοσύνη at every place, as the Key Words explain (see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη). At 171c5 Burnet prints ἀνεπιστημοσύνης with B and W; T adds ἐπιστήμη.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato states the principle elsewhere, and turns it to paradox. In the first book of the Republic Socrates leads Polemarchus to agree that the man cleverest at guarding against a disease is cleverest at producing it undetected, that the good guard of an army is the man who can steal the enemy’s plans, and so that of whatever a man is a clever guard, he is a clever thief; the just man, who guards money, turns out a thief (333e–334a). In the Hippias Minor Hippias agrees that the man wise in calculation is the one best able to lie about numbers, since the ignorant man trying to lie may tell the truth by mistake (366e–367a). In the Phaedo Socrates recalls how, on hearing that the philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomenae made mind the cause that orders all things, he reasoned that a man should then look for nothing but what is best, and that the same man must also know the worse, since the same knowledge is of both; and so he thought he had found in Anaxagoras a teacher (97c–d). The Charmides applies the principle to knowledge itself.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle gives the reason for the principle. Powers that go with reason are of contraries, as medicine is of disease and health (see δύναμις); the cause, he says, is that knowledge is an account, and the same account makes plain both the thing and its privation, though not in the same way, so that such knowledges are of contraries, but of the one in virtue of themselves and of the other not in virtue of themselves.1 On this account the lack of knowledge would be known only incidentally, through the knowledge of which it is the lack; this can be read as the reason why only a doctor can tell whether another man lacks medicine (170e–171c).

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.2, 1046b7–15.