From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordDiseased, unhealthy, what causes or belongs to disease: an adjective from νόσος, “disease”, with the suffix of likeness and fullness.
- In the CharmidesThree times, always beside the healthy: “the doctor … understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased” (170e), medicine “defined … by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased” (171a), and the doctor examined “in what is healthy and diseased” (171b).
- In this edition“The diseased”; “diseased”.
- A place to read170e–171c.
- English renderings
- τὸ νοσῶδες, to nosōdes, “the diseased”; νοσώδους, nosōdous, “(of) the diseased”; νοσώδεσιν, nosōdesin, “(in what is) diseased”
Meaning
Νοσώδης is what has the character of disease: a sickly body, an unwholesome place or food, whatever brings illness or belongs to it. Greek used it as the plain opposite of ὑγιεινός, “healthy”, and the pair named the whole field of a doctor’s judgement (see τὸ ὑγιεινόν). A knowledge of one is a knowledge of the other, since telling what makes a man sick is part of telling what makes him well.
Use in the book
The word enters when medicine’s object is completed. Medicine had been “knowledge of the healthy” (165c, 170a); in the test of the doctor it becomes knowledge of the healthy and the diseased. The temperate man, if he is to tell the true doctor from the false, “will surely not discuss medicine with him—for the doctor, as we said, understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased” (170e; see ἐπαΐω; ἰατρός). Each knowledge is defined by its objects, and medicine “was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased” (171a; see τῷ τινῶν εἶναι). So the man who would examine a doctor must examine him “in what is healthy and diseased” (171b; see ἐπισκοπέω), and only a doctor can do that (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). The passage as a whole is told under ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους.
The second word changes nothing in the argument and much in the picture. A knowledge of the healthy alone looks like a knowledge of a good; a knowledge of the healthy and the diseased is a knowledge of a pair of opposites, as calculation was of the odd and the even and weighing of the heavier and the lighter (166a–b). The completed pair can be read as preparing the last step, where a knowledge of another pair, good and bad, proves to be the one that makes us happy (174b; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν). The doctor knows the diseased; he does not always know, as 164b–c showed, when his treatment benefits.
Places to read
Every passage in which the word occurs.
Translation in this edition
“The diseased” renders τὸ νοσῶδες (170e7) and νοσώδους (171a9), and “diseased” νοσώδεσιν (171b4), each time beside “healthy”. The noun νόσημα, “disease”, comes once, in the Thracian’s report (156e; see νόσημα).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Laches draws the limit of the doctor’s knowledge with the same pair. Nicias’ answer to Laches, that doctors can say no more about the sick than what is healthy and what is diseased, and cannot tell whether health or sickness is the more to be feared for a given man, is told elsewhere (195b–d; see ἰατρός). The doctor’s knowledge of the diseased stops short of knowing whether the disease is, for this man, a harm; Nicias gives that knowledge to the brave man, the Charmides to the knowledge of good and bad (174c–d; see τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι).