From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordHealthy, what makes or belongs to health: the adjective of ὑγίεια, “health”, used with the article for the object of medicine.
- In the CharmidesTen times, from 165c to 174b: medicine is “knowledge of the healthy” (165c), it knows “the healthy and the diseased” (170e), and at the end Socrates asks whether the knowledge that makes a man happy is “the one by which he knows what is healthy” (174b).
- In this edition“The healthy”; “what is healthy”.
- A place to read170a–171b.
- English renderings
- τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ, tou hygieinou, “(of) the healthy”; ὑγιεινοῦ, hygieinou, “(of) the healthy”; τὸ ὑγιεινόν, to hygieinon, “the healthy”, “what is healthy”; ὑγιεινοῖς, hygieinois, “(in what is) healthy”
Meaning
Ὑγιεινός is healthy in the sense of what makes for health: a healthy food, a healthy place, a healthy regimen. With the article it names a field of knowledge, everything that bears on health. The Glossary keeps it apart from health itself: “The healthy, what is healthy, τὸ ὑγιεινόν (to hygieinon), the object of medicine: 165c, 170a–171b, 174b. The two are kept apart: medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health.” The distinction is the argument’s: a knowledge has an object it is of and a work it produces, and in medicine they differ (see ὑγίεια).
Use in the book
The word enters as the first example of a knowledge with an object. When Critias defines temperance as knowledge of oneself, Socrates asks: “And medicine … is knowledge of the healthy?” “Certainly.” If Critias asked what medicine, being knowledge of the healthy, is useful for and produces, Socrates would answer health (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι; ἐπιστήμη τινός). The word marks what medicine is about; health marks what it makes.
In the second half of the argument the word becomes the test of the knowledge of knowledge. Is knowledge of knowledge the same as knowledge and lack of knowledge “of the healthy”? No: that is medicine (170a–b). So a man who “does not also know what is healthy and what is just, but knows only knowledge”, will know that he knows something, but not what: “For he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance” (170b–c; see προσεπίσταμαι). The doctor understands “nothing but the healthy and the diseased”, and the examiner must test him “in what is healthy and diseased”, which he cannot do without medicine (170e–171b; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; τὸ νοσῶδες). The healthy is now the clearest case of what temperance, as Critias defines it, cannot reach: a field with its own knowledge, closed to a knowledge of knowledge.
At 174b the word returns in the sequence of the all-knowing man’s kinds of knowledge. “The one by which he knows what is healthy?” “More so” (174b; see τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ πεττευτικόν). Critias ranks the knowledge of the healthy above draughts and calculation, and the reason can be read as that health is a good; but it is not that knowledge, since without the knowledge of good and bad medicine still heals and nothing is done well (174c–d; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). The dialogue can be read as using the healthy as its standard example of a knowledge of a good thing that is not knowledge of the good.
Places to read
Every passage in which the word occurs.
- 165c–dMedicine is knowledge of the healthy, and produces health.
- 170a–bKnowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy is medicine, not the knowledge of knowledge.
- 170b–c2He who knows only knowledge does not know what is healthy; he knows the healthy by medicine, not by temperance.
- 170eThe doctor understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased.
- 171a–bMedicine was defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased, and the doctor must be examined in what is healthy and diseased.
- 174bThe knowledge by which the all-knowing man knows what is healthy makes him happy “more so” than draughts or calculation.
Translation in this edition
“The healthy” renders τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ (165c8, 171a9), ὑγιεινοῦ (165c10, 170a10) and τὸ ὑγιεινόν (170c1, 170c7, 170e7); “what is healthy” renders τὸ ὑγιεινόν (170b6, 174b7) and ὑγιεινοῖς (171b4). “The healthy” is kept from 165c on, so that 171a’s reference back to the definition at 165c finds its words (see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους). At 170a10 Burnet prints Bonitz’s datives, ἐπιστήμῃ … ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, which make knowledge of knowledge the subject of the question; the manuscripts have nominatives (apparatus).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Crito uses the pair to set the expert against the many. Socrates asks whether, if we ruin what is made better by the healthy and destroyed by the diseased, by obeying an opinion that is not that of those who understand, life is worth living with it ruined; that thing, Crito agrees, is the body, and life is not worth living with a body ruined and wretched. Then is it worth living with that ruined which the unjust maims and the just benefits (47d–e)? The Crito’s healthy is known by the one expert, as the Charmides’ is known by medicine alone; and the Crito goes on to the soul, as the Charmides goes on to good and bad.