From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe headword states in the genitive, “a wish of itself and of the other wishes”, what Plato says with a verb and its objects: a wish that “wishes for itself and for the other wishes”.
- In the Charmides“Nor, I imagine, a wish which wishes for no good, but wishes for itself and for the other wishes.” “Of course not” (167e).
- In this edition“Wishes for itself and for the other wishes”.
- A place to read167c–168a.
- English renderings
- αὑτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις βούλεται, hautēn de kai tas allas boulēseis bouletai, “but wishes for itself and for the other wishes”
Meaning
The phrase is one of a series built on Critias’ definition of temperance as a knowledge “of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge” (166e; see ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). Each member takes a power, removes its proper object, and gives it instead itself and its fellows: a sight of sights, a desire of desires, a love of loves (see ἐπιθυμία αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἔρως αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων). In the wish the removed object is the good.
Use in the book
The wish stands at the centre of the procession, after desire and before love (167e), and the procession as a whole is told under αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς. What the wish adds is the plainest case of emptiness. A sight that saw no colour would at least be a sight; a wish that wished nothing good, on the assumption that wish is of the good (see βούλησις), would not be a wish at all. Critias answers at once: “Of course not.”
The principle Socrates states a little later explains why. Whatever “has its own power in relation to itself” must “also have the character toward which its power was directed”: a hearing that hears itself must have a sound (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Socrates does not apply the principle to the wish; applied, it would require a wish that wished itself to be itself a good. The dialogue’s knowledge of knowledge, on the same principle, would have to be itself a subject of learning, and it was defined at 168a as “knowledge of no subject of learning” (see μάθημα). The case of the wish can be read as showing in small what the dialogue’s whole argument shows: a power is made what it is by what it is for.
Places to read
The passage in which the wish is named, within the procession.
- 167eNo wish which wishes for no good, but for itself and for the other wishes.
Translation in this edition
“A wish which wishes for no good, but wishes for itself and for the other wishes” (167e4–5). The English adds “for” to mark the objects of the verb, and the sentence is built like its neighbour, “a desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires”, so that the series can be read across.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Lysis follows a chain of things wanted for the sake of others to its end. Medicine is dear for the sake of health, and health for the sake of something dear; must we not either give up or arrive at a first principle that refers to no further dear thing, the first dear, for whose sake all the others are dear and of which they are like images (219c–d)? A wish that wished only wishes would be a chain with no first link.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle puts the same point at the head of his Ethics: if there is an end of action that we wish for its own sake, and the rest for its sake, and not everything is chosen for the sake of another thing, since otherwise the series runs on without end and our reaching after anything is hollow and pointless, that end will be the good.1 The wish of 167e, which wishes only other wishes, can be read as a reaching of the kind Aristotle calls hollow.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094a18–22.