From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe numeral “one” with the indefinite τις: a single knowledge of a certain kind.
- In the CharmidesOnce: “Well, wouldn’t all this amount to the following … if what you were just saying is right: that there is one single knowledge which is knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge, and that this same knowledge is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge?” (167b–c).
- In this edition“One single knowledge”.
- A place to read167b–c.
- English renderings
- μία τις ἐπιστήμη, mia tis epistēmē, “one single knowledge”
Meaning
The emphasis falls on “one”. Critias had said that temperance alone of the kinds of knowledge is knowledge both of itself and of the others (166c, 166e; see ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν), and Socrates had added, with his assent, that it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge (166e; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης). Socrates now gathers the three objects into one knowledge, and says that “this same knowledge”, ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη, is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge.
Use in the book
The formula comes just after Socrates has confessed that he can find no way through (167b; see ἀπορέω; εὔπορος), and it is his statement of where he is stuck. What makes it strange can be read as its unity: “Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend” (167c; see ἄτοπος). The parallels that follow test it piece by piece, a sight of itself and the other sights and the non-sights (see μὴ ὄψεις), a hearing of the same kind (see μὴ ἀκοαί), and so on to opinion (167c–168a), and each parallel is one capacity turned on itself and on its kind.
The word “one” returns at the end with another object. When Critias at last names the knowledge that makes men happy, Socrates says that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well, “not even with all the other kinds of knowledge together, but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad” (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The argument has two candidates for the single knowledge that would stand above the rest: Critias’ knowledge of knowledge, which it shows to be of no benefit, and the knowledge of good and bad, which is beneficial but is not temperance as Critias defined it (174d).
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs.
Translation in this edition
“One single knowledge” renders μία τις ἐπιστήμη (167b11), and “this same knowledge” ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη (167c2). “If what you were just saying is right” renders εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες (167b10–11), where εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σύ is the reading of a later hand in T; T has it without σύ, and B has εἴη ἔστιν ὃ σύ.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Statesman the visitor from Elea finds one knowledge where the Charmides hoped to find temperance. The true king’s art, the statesman’s and the household manager’s differ only in the size of what they rule, for a large house and a small city differ in nothing that matters to ruling; and so, he concludes, it is plain that there is one knowledge concerned with all these, and whether one calls it kingly or statesmanlike or the art of household management, there is no need to quarrel about the name (259b–c). That can be read as the knowledge the Charmides imagined guiding the management of household and city (172d; see διοίκησις). In the Symposium Diotima’s lover, near the top of the ascent, catches sight of “a single knowledge” whose object is the beautiful itself (210d; see λόγοι καλοί). The doctrine that one knowledge is of contraries is told elsewhere (Republic 333e–334a; Phaedo 97c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle states the rule that makes a single knowledge possible: of each one kind there is one perception and one knowledge, as grammar, being one, studies all the spoken sounds; and he adds in the same chapter that opposites, negation and privation included, fall to one knowledge.1 On those rules the lack of knowledge can be read as falling to the knowledge it is the lack of; what the Charmides finds strange is a knowledge that is also its own object (167c–169a).
Source note
1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b19–21 and 1004a9–16.