From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΑἰσθάνεσθαι is to perceive by the senses, and so to notice, to become aware.
- In the CharmidesTwice. Socrates asks Charmides whether he has noticed what good doctors say and that it is so (156c); and he asks Critias whether there is a sense of senses that “senses none of the things the other senses sense” (167d).
- In this edition“Notice” at 156c, “sense” at 167d, so that verb and noun, “senses … sense”, keep their family there.
- A place to read167c–d.
- English renderings
- ᾔσθησαι, ēisthēsai, “haven’t you noticed”; αἰσθάνονται, aisthanontai, “sense”; αἰσθανομένη, aisthanomenē, “senses”
Meaning
Αἰσθάνεσθαι (aisthanesthai) is the verb of αἴσθησις (aisthēsis), “perception, sense” (see αἴσθησις). It covers seeing, hearing and the other senses, and their extension to any becoming aware: one perceives a sound, and one perceives that one has been deceived. The perfect ᾔσθησαι, “you have perceived”, is “you have noticed”.
Use in the book
The first use belongs to the charm. Socrates has explained that good doctors treat the part with the whole, and asks, “Haven’t you noticed that this is what they say, and that it is so?” “Certainly,” he said (156c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός). Two things are asked: whether the boy has heard what doctors say, and whether he has seen that it is true. His assent lets Socrates take heart and go on (156d).
The second belongs to the argument against knowledge of knowledge. After a sight that sees no colour and a hearing that hears no sound, Socrates asks whether any sense is a sense of senses and of itself “which senses none of the things the other senses sense”, and Critias thinks not (167d; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). The verb names the work that the impossible sense would lack: to sense is to sense something, a colour, a sound, and a sense that sensed only senses would sense nothing.
The two uses can be read together. At 159a Socrates assumed that temperance, if present, “must give rise to some sense” in the boy, from which he could form an opinion of it (see αἴσθησις). Charmides could notice the doctors’ rule as one notices anything outside him; whether temperance can be noticed within oneself in the same way is the question that Critias’ definition raises and that the parallel at 167d makes hard.
Places to read
Both passages in which the verb occurs.
Translation in this edition
At 156c the perfect ᾔσθησαι, in the question ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι, is “Haven’t you noticed”, the negative carrying Socrates’ expectation of assent. At 167d the participle αἰσθανομένη and the finite αἰσθάνονται are “senses” and “sense”, beside “a sense of senses” for αἰσθήσεων … αἴσθησις, so that the English keeps the single family of the Greek through the sentence.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Theaetetus can be read as giving the reason that no sense can be a sense of senses. Socrates gets Theaetetus to agree that what we perceive through one power we cannot perceive through another, what we perceive through hearing through sight, or the reverse; so whatever we think about both, sound and colour together, we cannot perceive through either organ (184e–185a). Thinking that both exist, that each is different from the other and the same as itself, is, in Theaetetus’ answer, which Socrates welcomes, the work of “the soul itself through itself” (185d–e). On that account a perception of perceptions can be read as no perception at all, but thought.