Ο Omicron

sight of itself and of the other sights

ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων

A sight of itself and of the other sights: the first of the parallels Socrates builds on Critias’ formula · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordὌψις with two genitives of object: of itself, ἑαυτῆς, and of the other sights.
  • In the CharmidesOnce: “a kind of sight which is not sight of the things the other sights are of, but is sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise” (167c).
  • In this edition“Sight of itself and of the other sights”.
  • A place to read166e–168a.
English renderings
ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων ὄψις, heautēs de kai tōn allōn opseōn opsis, “sight of itself and of the other sights”

Meaning

The phrase copies a formula. Critias had said that temperance “alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself” (166c; see ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν), and Socrates, having added that it would also be knowledge “of the lack of knowledge” (166e), makes the same shape out of sight: a sight of itself, of the other sights and of non-sights. The genitives are objective: they name what the sight is a sight of.

Use in the book

The phrase opens the procession of parallels by which Socrates tests whether such a knowledge is possible. “Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend. For if you look at this same thing in other cases, it will seem to you, I think, to be impossible” (167c; see ἄτοπος). Sight comes first, then hearing, the senses together, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion, each built on the same formula and each denied by Critias (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; μὴ ὄψεις). The negative part of the formula carries the absurdity, a sight that sees no colour (167d; see μὴ ὄψεις).

The order can be read as deliberate: Socrates begins with the sense whose object is most obvious, and so with the case in which the formula is most plainly absurd; by the end of the procession he reaches opinion and knowledge, where the object is hardest to point to. The phrase can be read as the dialogue’s way of making Critias’ abstraction visible: what sounds possible when said of knowledge sounds impossible when said of the eye.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the procession it begins.

  1. 167cA sight of itself and of the other sights and of non-sights.
  2. 167d–168a2Hearing, the senses, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion, each of itself and of the others.

Translation in this edition

“Sight of itself and of the other sights” renders ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων ὄψις (167c9–10), the English putting the noun first.

Elsewhere in Plato

The First Alcibiades’ eye that sees itself in the pupil of another’s eye is told elsewhere (132d–133b; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle’s question whether we perceive that we see by sight itself or by another sense is told elsewhere (On the Soul 3.2, 425b12–25; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς).