Μ Mu

non-sights

μὴ ὄψεις

Non-sights: what a sight of sights would also have to see · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe plural of ὄψις, “sight”, negated by μή: sights that are not sights, cases of not seeing.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, in the first of Socrates’ parallels: a sight “of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise” (167c–d).
  • In this edition“Non-sights”.
  • A place to read167b–d.
English renderings
μὴ ὄψεων, mē opseōn, “(of) non-sights”

Meaning

Ὄψις is the power of sight and an act of seeing. A “non-sight” is any case in which there is no seeing: not blindness as a condition, but the absence of sight where sight might be. The phrase gives the sense of sight the counterpart of the lack of knowledge, so that the parallel with Critias’ temperance can be complete.

Use in the book

Socrates has just put Critias’ claim in a single formula, one knowledge of itself, of the other kinds of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge (167b–c; see μία τις ἐπιστήμη). The first parallel copies it term for term: “Consider whether you think there is a kind of sight which is not sight of the things the other sights are of, but is sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise; and which, though it is sight, sees no color, but sees itself and the other sights. Do you think there is such a thing?” “By Zeus, I don’t” (167c–d; see μὰ Δία; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; χρῶμα). The knowledge becomes sight, the other kinds of knowledge the other sights, the subjects of learning colour (see μάθημα), and the lack of knowledge the non-sights.

The parallel makes visible what the claim requires. A sight of non-sights would see where there is nothing seen; the knowledge it models would know, of another man, the places where he knows nothing. That was the power credited to temperance at 167a, to examine others and find what a man “thinks he knows but does not” (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν), and it is the power the argument later denies: the temperate man could know only that another has some knowledge, not of what, and so could not tell the true doctor from the pretender (170d–171c; see ἀληθινός; γιγνώσκω; ᾗ ἰατρικός). The principle that tells against it is stated at 168d–e: sight, to see itself, “must have some color” (see ἄχρως; ὄψις); even so, Socrates grants that with sight and hearing it would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others (169a).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the principle that returns to it.

  1. 167c–dA sight of itself, of the other sights and of non-sights, which sees no colour.
  2. 168d–eSight, to see itself, would have to have a colour.

Translation in this edition

“Non-sights” renders μὴ ὄψεων (167c10), the reading of B and W; T has the singular μὴ ὄψεως, “non-sight”. “Sees no color” is χρῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ οὐδέν (167d1).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes each sense the judge of its object’s absence. Sight, he says, is of the visible and of the invisible, for darkness is invisible and sight discerns it too, and of what is too bright to be seen; and hearing likewise is of sound and of silence, one audible and the other not, and of sound too loud to be heard.1 Socrates’ “non-sights” can be set beside what Aristotle calls the invisible, though they are not the same: his invisible is darkness, an absence in what is seen, where a non-sight is an absence of seeing. On Aristotle’s account sight perceives darkness only as the absence of its proper object, colour, and is never a sight of other sights.

Source note

1. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.10, 422a20–24.