From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe plural of ἀκοή, “hearing”, negated by μή: hearings that are not hearings, cases of not hearing.
- In the CharmidesOnce: “And a hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings?” “Not that either” (167d).
- In this edition“Non-hearings”.
- A place to read167c–168a.
- English renderings
- τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν, tōn mē akoōn, “the non-hearings”
Meaning
Ἀκοή is the sense of hearing, an act of hearing, and what is heard, a report. Greek forms a negative of any noun by putting μή before it with the article, and “the non-hearings” is made on the pattern of the word Critias has just accepted, ἀνεπιστημοσύνη, “lack of knowledge” (166e; see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη). If temperance is a knowledge of the other kinds of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, a hearing of the same kind would hear the other hearings and the cases where there is no hearing.
Use in the book
The example is the second of Socrates’ parallels, after sight, and it is built on the same plan: a capacity that hears no sound, its proper object, but hears itself, the other hearings and the non-hearings (167d; see ἀκοή; φωνή). Critias’ answer is short, “Not that either”. With hearing the negative member ends: the senses taken together, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion are all put to Critias as of themselves and of the others, but none as of its own absence (167d–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). The negative member was the strangest part of Critias’ claim, a knowledge of where knowledge is not, and Socrates puts it only to the two senses he will use again. At 168d hearing returns to state the principle, that a hearing which heard itself would have to hear itself as having a sound (see ἀκοή; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). A hearing of non-hearings would have to hear what has no sound at all.
As the note at 167d says, the problem underneath the comedy is “serious and long-lived”. The non-hearings are its sharpest point: the examiner of 167a was to find out what another man thinks he knows but does not, and his knowledge would have to hear the silence where knowledge is missing (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the principle that returns to it.
Translation in this edition
“The non-hearings” renders τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν (167d5), with “hears no sound” for φωνῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀκούει (167d4).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle gives hearing the object Socrates’ question implies: it is of sound and of silence, as sight is of the visible and of darkness (On the Soul 2.10, 422a20–24; see μὴ ὄψεις). His further question, whether it is by sight that we perceive that we see, is told elsewhere (On the Soul 3.2, 425b12–25; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς).