Becoming better

Use in the book

At 124b–d2 Socrates proposes joint deliberation about becoming as good as possible. The question immediately becomes “in what virtue?” because an unspecified desire to improve has no determinate standard. Alcibiades' attempted political specification then fails to produce a coherent account of civic friendship.

At 128b Socrates restarts from the modest criterion of right care: making something better. Shoes become better through one craft, feet and body through another. The point is not that improvement has a single physical measure. Each object has the kind of good relevant to it, and the appropriate craft must be identified in relation to that object.

The transition to self is consequently conditional. To know which practice improves oneself one must know what one is. The soul argument supplies an adequate working object, and the eye analogy directs attention to soul's excellence, wisdom. The final discussion translates improvement into acquiring justice and temperance rather than expanding one's license to act.

At 131d the lover of soul stays so long as the soul moves toward the better. That condition prevents Socrates' fidelity from being read as unconditional endorsement of whatever Alcibiades becomes. The dialogue ends with the same temporal problem: a beginning in care must be carried through despite civic pressure. Becoming better is a sustained direction, not an achievement guaranteed by one persuasive conversation.

Places to read

1. 124b–125a23Joint improvement requires specifying the excellence sought
2. 128b–129a23Making the object better defines right care and requires knowing the object
3. 131c–131dThe soul’s movement toward the better conditions the lover’s continued presence
4. 134c–135e234Improvement means acquiring virtue and sustaining care for justice

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “better” for both βέλτιον and ἄμεινον in the larger dialogue. This entry concentrates on the improvement construction rather than treating every comparative as a definition of self-care.

βέλτιστος

Attested: βέλτιστοι γενοίμεθα (beltistoi genoimetha; 124c). At 124c: Become as good as possible, the shared aim that immediately requires specification of the excellence intended. Lexical identification: superlative corresponding to βελτίων: βέλτιστος. See Becoming better.

βελτίων

Attested: βέλτιον ποιῇ (beltion poiēi; 128b). At 128b: Make a thing better, the operational condition for calling care of it right. Lexical identification: comparative of ἀγαθός: βελτίων. See Becoming better.

Use in the book

The new inquiry starts by assigning right correction to the people capable of making animals best. This gives the craft an end against which correction can be assessed. If an intervention is to improve a horse or dog rather than damage it, its agent must know what good quality in that kind of animal involves. The next question adds that the same craft recognizes the decent and worthless.

The extension to people is philosophically ambitious. A competence that makes human beings best must discriminate human quality and punish rightly. Socrates calls the civic version judicial knowledge and justice. What counts as best for a human being, however, is not specified through an independent account of human flourishing. The animal model supplies the form of the argument, while the interlocutor’s assents carry it into ethics.

The final identification with temperance and governing knowledge depends on this initial concentration of capacities. If making best, correcting and discriminating belonged to separable kinds of knowledge, the later unification would require further argument. The dialogue instead presents their common ownership as something sufficiently plausible to accept quickly.

The phrase also answers the earlier problem of usefulness by changing the relevant goal. The cultivated generalist sought reputation and breadth; the final sequence introduces improving and ordering human affairs. That contrast supports an interpretation of the ending’s direction, but the text does not explicitly state that “making people best” is the complete definition of philosophy.

Places to read

1. 137cΟἵπερ βελτίστους — The competent correctors are the very people who make the animals best.
2. 137dἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ — The improvement claim is explicitly extended to human beings.

Translation in this edition

The apparatus records alternatives involving the comparative beltious, “better,” at several points, while the running text and translation choose the superlative “best.” A lexicon should explain that chosen reading rather than silently weaken it to “improve.” “Improvement” is a convenient description of the argument’s role, not an exact replacement for every occurrence.

Use in the book

The father's earnestness aims at making his son as good as possible; Socrates then specifies the question as benefit toward becoming a good citizen (127d). That is a more determinate educational goal than the unqualified wish to become wise, yet the conversation does not define good citizenship. Demodocus' experience, offices and civic honor are offered as reasons to question why Socrates is preferred, not as a sufficient analysis of the good citizen.

The word “better” also figures in Theages' criticism of the statesmen. Their sons, he has heard, are no better than shoemakers' sons (126d). The comparison calls their educational success into question; it does not establish that manual workers or their children are bad. Soon afterward Theages says acquaintances who had been worthless appear better than everyone to whom they were previously inferior (128c). Here comparative standing supports his confidence in Socrates.

These assessments must be held apart. Theages reports an appearance and offers no independent measure. Aristides later speaks specifically of his confidence and ability in discussion, while describing his diminished condition as wretched and shameful (130b–e2). The dramatic trajectory connects educational hopes with observable conversational effects without proving that those effects amount to moral goodness or excellent citizenship. “Improvement” in an article about the final story should therefore remain broad unless the stated evidence warrants a narrower sense.

Places to read

1. 126dοὐδὲν βελτίους — The statesmen's sons are reported to be no better
2. 127dὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται — The father wants his son to become as good as possible
3. 127dπολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι — The outcome is formulated as good citizenship
4. 128cπάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὧν πρότερον χείρους — Theages describes a reversal of apparent comparative standing

Translation in this edition

The translation keeps “appear” in the last statement. Omitting it would turn a speaker's evidential report into the lexicon's own assessment. “Good” in “good painter” at 126e is occupational excellence; “fine and good” at 127a is a different evaluative expression. These senses should not be collapsed merely because their English shares a word.

Best — βέλτιστος (beltistos) · βέλτιστος (127d).

βέλτιστος (beltistos)

Best. The superlative in a father's hope that his son become as good as possible. Attested: βέλτιστος (127d). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement.

Citizen — πολίτης (politēs)

πολίτης (politēs)

Citizen. Member of the civic community; the beneficiary's desired quality is expressly civic here. Attested: πολίτην (127d). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement.

Good — ἀγαθός (agathos)

ἀγαθός (agathos)

Good. Qualifies the citizen Theages is to become; the passage does not define civic goodness exhaustively. Attested: ἀγαθὸν (127d). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement.

Appear — φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

Appear. Marks Theages' observation of improved comparative standing; preserves its status as a report of appearance. Attested: φαίνονται (128c). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement.

Worse — χείρων (cheirōn)

χείρων (cheirōn)

Worse. The earlier comparative position of acquaintances who now appear superior after association with Socrates. Attested: χείρους (128c). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement.

Worth — ἄξιος (axios)

ἄξιος (axios)

Worth. In οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, “worth nothing”, Theages' strong appraisal of acquaintances before their association with Socrates. Attested: ἄξιοι (128c). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement.

Better than those formerly above them (contextual phrase)

128c: πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὧν πρότερον χείρους. The relative clause identifies the comparison group: those to whom the young men were previously inferior. Phainontai retains Theages' report of appearance. The claim is not “better than all human beings in every respect”. The nature and stability of this apparent improvement are precisely what Socrates goes on to qualify. See Good citizenship.