Better and best

Use in the book

The questions at 107d–109c234 deliberately repeat “better” across war, peace, wrestling, lyre-playing, and food. Alcibiades can agree that one should act at the better time or to the better extent without being able to say what makes it better. Socrates seeks the governing specification: gymnastic, musical, healthier, and finally more just. The repeated comparative is the instrument by which apparently acceptable advice is shown to lack content.

At 124b–e2 the aspiration becomes shared: how can Socrates and Alcibiades become as good as possible, and in what excellence? That question cannot be answered merely by ranking Alcibiades above uneducated rivals. The comparison must answer to the competence and virtue required by the work.

At 128b–e23 right care is characterized as making its object better. Different crafts improve shoes and feet, and one cannot identify the craft that improves oneself without knowing what oneself is. The comparative thus connects the early expertise test with the later inquiry into care.

Finally, at 135b someone without virtue does better to be ruled by a better person than to rule. What is better is also finer and more befitting. The argument reverses Alcibiades' preferred ranking: being in command is not necessarily the better condition for him now. Throughout, “better” is a question to be specified, not a self-explanatory synonym for whatever increases power.

Places to read

1. 107d–109c234Repeated comparison demands a domain-specific standard
2. 124b–125b23Becoming best requires identifying the desired excellence
3. 128b–128e23Care is assessed by improvement of its proper object
4. 135b–135cThe better, finer, and more befitting connect education to justified subordination

Translation in this edition

Both βέλτιον and ἄμεινον remain “better,” preserving the argument's repetition. “Best of men” in Socratic address should be interpreted with the local irony, especially when followed by an accusation of ignorance, rather than indexed as evidence of established goodness.

ἀμείνων / ἄριστος

Attested: ἄμεινον (ameinon; 107e); ἀρίστοις (aristois; 115e). At 107e: Better as the measure of how long war or peace should last. At 115e: Among the best things, the classification Alcibiades grants courage. Lexical identification: family label: ἀμείνων / ἄριστος. The attestation ἀρίστοις at 115e occurs in wording supplied by Burnet from Stobaeus; the preceding exchange already states the opposing values. See Better and best.

βελτίων / βέλτιστος

Attested: βέλτιον (beltion; 107d); βέλτιστοι (beltistoi; 124c); βελτίονος (beltionos; 135b). At 107d: Better as the as-yet-unspecified standard governing whom to fight. At 124c: As good as possible, the shared aim whose relevant excellence still needs identification. At 135b: A better person whose rule benefits someone who has not yet acquired virtue. Lexical identification: family label: βελτίων / βέλτιστος. See Better and best.

Use in the book

The first important qualification concerns appearance: the poet’s friends do and pray for what is not better although it seems so to them at 142e. Alcibiades assumes everyone can ask for the best for himself at 143b, but Socrates’ examples expose how a person can mistake the worst for the best. The repeated comparisons are claims under examination, not expressions whose use guarantees correct discrimination.

The crucial contrast is between what turns out better “according to that craft” at 145d and what is best for the city and oneself at 146a. A horseman or boxer can know the former and lack the latter. Nothing in the term “best” alone bridges the difference of scope. Indeed the ambitious expert who gives his own craft the largest civic share exemplifies that illicit transition.

The best also governs timing and personal improvement. The soldier must know how long war is better; Socrates considers quiet best for Alcibiades at 150c; Alcibiades wishes to become better at 150e and judges postponement best at 151a. These uses make practical improvement and restraint intelligible without resolving every question about the comprehensive knowledge of the best. The comparative requires an appropriate respect and occasion, rather than an automatic preference for doing more.

Places to read

1. 142e–143bWhat seems better and what is best for oneself are not securely known.
2. 143c; 144aIgnorance can be better in a specified case; the worst can be thought best.
3. 145b–dBetter specifies time, duration, object and a craft-relative achievement.
4. 146aCraft-relative best is distinguished from the best for city and self.
5. 150c; 150e; 151aQuiet, becoming better and postponement bring the comparison into Alcibiades’ present conduct.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s “best” also renders kratiston at 148e and 151a, and “fare best” renders arista at 142a. By contrast, kratistos is “strongest” in the adapted verse at 146a. These renderings should not be treated as evidence that every occurrence translates beltistos.