From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordSwiftness, speed, quickness, of body or of mind.
- In the CharmidesTwice: at the end of the refutation of quietness, where “what belongs to quickness and sharpness” appears finer than what belongs to slowness and quietness (160b), and in Critias’ principle, “Just as when someone has speed he is fast” (169e).
- In this edition“Quickness” at 160b, “speed” at 169e.
- A place to read159c–160d and 169d–e.
- English renderings
- τάχους, tachous, “(of) quickness”; τάχος, tachos, “speed”
Meaning
Τάχος is the noun of ταχύς, “quick”, as βραδυτής is of βραδύς, “slow”. It is a quality one has, in running, in speaking, in learning, and the Greek can say of a man that he has it, ἔχει τάχος, as he has beauty or strength.
Use in the book
The noun gathers the refutation of quietness into a single quality. Socrates has run through the body’s actions, writing, reading, the lyre, wrestling, boxing, running, jumping, and the soul’s, learning, teaching, remembering, understanding, inquiring and deliberating, and in each the quick is finer than the quiet (159c–160b; see ἡσυχῇ; ταχέως). Then he names what all of them share: “So in everything, Charmides, … in the soul and in the body alike, what belongs to quickness and sharpness appears finer to us than what belongs to slowness and quietness?” (160b; see βραδυτής; ὀξύτης). Quickness and sharpness are one side, slowness and quietness the other, and since temperance is fine, it cannot be on the quiet side (160b–d; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι).
The noun returns at 169e in a new use, as the first of Critias’ three examples of a quality that makes its possessor what it is: “when someone has speed he is fast”, and so, he argues, whoever has knowledge that knows itself will know himself (169d–e; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; κάλλος). The first of his examples is the quality that had defeated the boy’s quietness.
The two uses can be read together. Speed is the plainest case of a quality that is simply had: a man with speed is fast, and nothing more need be known. It served against quietness because it could be seen in every action, and it serves Critias because having it is being it. Socrates grants the principle and denies that it helps: a man who has knowledge of itself will know himself, but that is not the same as knowing what he knows and what he does not (169e–170a; see ἀμφισβητέω; ταὐτόν). Knowledge, unlike speed, is of something, and having it makes one knowing only of its object.
Places to read
Every passage in which the noun occurs.
Translation in this edition
“Quickness” at 160b4, beside “sharpness”, and “speed” at 169e2, where the English needs the adjective “fast” to follow from it. The adjective has its own entry (see ταχύς), and the abstract noun ταχυτής, “quickness”, at 159d (see ταχυτής).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Laches defines the quality the Charmides argues from, and with some of the same examples. Socrates asks Laches to say what courage is that is the same in all its cases, and gives a model. If someone asked what quickness is, which we find in running and in playing the lyre, in speaking and in learning, and in the actions of hands and legs and mouth and voice and mind, he would answer that he calls quickness “the power that accomplishes much in a short time”, in voice and in running and in everything else (192a–b). The Charmides takes quickness to be fine in all these cases without defining it; the Laches defines it in order to show what a definition of courage should look like, and Laches’ answer, endurance, then falls to the premise that courage is fine (192c–d; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι).