Κ Kappa

in your opinion

κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν

The rule of the examination: say what you yourself think · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordIn accordance with your opinion: what you yourself think.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, at the start of the examination: “Then, so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me … what you say temperance is, in your opinion” (159a).
  • In this edition“In your opinion”.
  • A place to read158e–159b.
English renderings
κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν, kata tēn sēn doxan, “in your opinion”

Meaning

Δόξα is what seems to one, an opinion or belief (see δόξα); with the possessive, the view that is one’s own. In Socratic conversation the phrase expresses a rule: the answerer is to say what he himself thinks, so that what is examined is his belief and not a position taken up for the sake of argument.

Use in the book

The phrase makes the boy’s own opinion the evidence for his temperance. Socrates reasons that if temperance is present in him, it must give rise to some sense, and from it he would have some opinion about what it is (159a; see αἴσθησις; δόξα; ἔνειμι); since he knows how to speak Greek, he could tell them what it seems to him to be (159a; see ἑλληνίζω). “Then, so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me,” Socrates says, “what you say temperance is, in your opinion” (159a). The test is twofold: what the boy thinks temperance is, and, from that, whether he has it.

The rule returns at the turns of the conversation. After quietness fails, Socrates sends the boy to look within himself: “tell me, properly and like a man, what it seems to you to be” (160d–e; see ἀνδρικῶς; ἐμβλέπω). When the boy offers a formula he has heard, Socrates catches it at once as someone else’s (161b–c; see ἀκούω), and the boy soon wants Critias to answer for it (162c–d). When Critias asks for Socrates’ view, Socrates refuses the exchange: “Let’s not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now” (163e; see ἐάω). And when Critias fears being refuted, Socrates tells him: “answer the question as it seems to you” (166d–e; see θαρρέω). The first two answers the dialogue examines are the boy’s own, and the second, modesty, can be read as what his blush had already shown (158c, 160e; see αἰσχυντηλός); the third is a formula he has heard (161b).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs.

  1. 159aIf temperance is in the boy, he has an opinion of it; let him say what temperance is, in his opinion.

Translation in this edition

“In your opinion” for κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν (159a10). Δόξα is “opinion” at 159a2 too, “from which you would have some opinion about it”; the English also says “opinion” for the verbs, “you have some opinion about it” for ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν (159a1) and “this opinion of yours” for ὃ οἴει (159a6).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Crito makes the rule a condition of common counsel. Having led Crito to agree that one must never do wrong, nor return wrong for wrong, Socrates warns him: “see, Crito, that in agreeing to this you do not agree contrary to your opinion”, since few believe it, and between those who do and those who do not there is no common counsel (49c–d).

In the Gorgias Callicles says that pleasure and the good are the same, so that his argument will not be inconsistent, and Socrates answers that Callicles is ruining their first arguments, and that they could no longer examine the truth adequately together if he is going to speak contrary to what he thinks (495a). In the Protagoras, when Protagoras offers to grant a point “if you like”, Socrates refuses: he does not need “if you like” and “if you think so” to be examined, but “you and me” (331c). The rule is given to Thrasymachus in the Republic too (346a; see ἀποκρίνομαι).