Ο Omicron

what it is, and what sort of thing

ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι

What it is, and what sort of thing: the two questions the boy’s opinion of temperance is to answer · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTwo indirect questions: ὅτι ἐστίν, “what it is”, and ὁποῖόν τι, “of what sort”, the question of a thing’s being and the question of its qualities.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, at the start of the boy’s examination: if temperance is in him, it must give rise to some sense, “from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is” (159a).
  • In this edition“What it is, and what sort of thing”.
  • A place to read158e–159a.
English renderings
ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι, hoti estin kai hopoion ti, “what it is, and what sort of thing”

Meaning

Plato’s Socrates separates the question τί ἐστι, “what is it?”, from ποῖόν τι, “what is it like?”. The first asks for the thing itself, the second for its qualities: whether it is fine, teachable, beneficial. He holds that the first comes before the second.

Use in the book

Socrates proposes to look into whether the boy has temperance by asking what he thinks it is. The reasoning is in steps: if temperance is present in him, “it must give rise to some sense, from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is” (159a; see αἴσθησις; δόξα; ἔνειμι). The boy, who knows how to speak Greek, should be able to say it (see ἑλληνίζω). The two questions, put together here, come apart in what follows. The boy answers the first, what temperance is: a kind of quietness, then modesty, then a definition he once heard, doing one’s own business (159b, 160e, 161b). Socrates tests the answers by the second, what sort of thing temperance is: it is one of the fine things (159c), and it is good as well as fine (160e; see οὐ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί); and when Critias has taken over, it must also be beneficial (169b). Each definition falls because the thing it names lacks the qualities temperance must have.

The order of the questions can be read as the dialogue’s method in small. The boy is not asked to prove that temperance is fine; that is agreed. He is asked what it is, and what he says is measured against what all agree it is like. The method assumes that the second question can be answered without the first, and the dialogue does not say outright whether that assumption is sound, though the boy’s last word on temperance comes near it (176a–b; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the proposal it serves.

  1. 158e–159aIf temperance is present, it gives rise to some sense, and from it an opinion of what temperance is and what sort of thing it is; the boy should say what he thinks.

Translation in this edition

“What it is, and what sort of thing temperance is” renders ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη (159a3), the subject held back to the end as in the Greek.

Elsewhere in Plato

Socrates faults Polus, asked what Gorgias’ art is, for saying what sort it is (Gorgias 448e), and the first book of the Republic closes with his admission that, not knowing what justice is, he can hardly know whether it is a virtue or whether its possessor is happy (1.354b–c). In the Meno Socrates makes the order a rule. Meno asks whether virtue can be taught; Socrates answers that far from knowing whether it can be taught, he does not know at all what virtue is, “and what I do not know the what of, how could I know what sort of thing it is?” Could a man with no idea at all who Meno is tell whether he is good-looking, wealthy or nobly born, or the contrary of these? Meno thinks not (70a, 71a–b). The Charmides puts the two questions side by side as things an opinion would contain; the Meno makes the first the condition of the second.