Π Pi

make, do

ποιέω

To make, to do, to cause: the verb of the craftsman, of the virtue that makes men good, and of the last plot of the boy and his guardian · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo make, produce, bring about; to do, act; to cause something to be so, to make someone such.
  • In the CharmidesThroughout the dialogue: of craftsmen who make things (162e–164b), of temperance that makes men good (160d–161a), of medicine that makes us healthy (164b, 174c), and at the end of the boy’s resolve, “Then I’ll do it” (176c).
  • In this edition“Make” in the argument of 161b–164c; elsewhere “do”, “make”.
  • A place to read160d–161b and 162e–164c.
English renderings
ποιεῖ, poiei, “makes”; ποιεῖν, poiein, “make”, “making”, “do”; ποιῶν, poiōn, “in making”; ποιοίην, poioiēn, “do”; ποιήσω, poiēsō, “I’ll do it”; ποιήσει, poiēsei, “will … make”

Meaning

Ποιέω covers what English divides between “make” and “do”, and adds “cause” and “treat as”. Plato and Aristotle narrowed it: in the Sophist making is bringing into being what was not there before (219b), and for Aristotle the end of making is something other than the making (Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b6–7).

Use in the book

The verb carries three arguments. In the refutation of modesty it is the verb of a virtue’s effect: Socrates asks the boy to consider “what sort of person temperance makes you by being present” (160d; see σωφροσύνη παροῦσα), and temperance is good “if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad” (161a; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ). A virtue is known by what it makes of its possessor.

In the argument with Critias it is the craftsman’s verb. All craftsmen make something; they make other people’s things as well as their own; may they be temperate even so? (162e–163a; see δημιουργός). The doctor “in making someone healthy” makes something beneficial for himself and for his patient (164a–b; see ὀνίνημι). Between these, Critias separates making from doing (163b; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). The verb returns in the last argument, where Socrates asks whether, if the knowledge of good and bad is taken away, medicine will “make us any less healthy” (174c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; οὐχ ἧττον).

At the end the verb is simply “do”. The boy, who would not disobey his guardian, says, “Then I’ll do it” (176c; see πείθω); and Socrates asks, “You two … what are you plotting to do?” (176c; see βουλεύομαι; πείθω). The verb that measured virtues and crafts ends as the verb of a decision made without argument.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb carries the argument; its ordinary uses are not listed.

  1. 160dWhat sort of person does temperance make the boy by being present?
  2. 161aTemperance is good if it makes good those it is present with.
  3. 160eThe boy: temperance makes a person feel shame.
  4. 162e–163a2All craftsmen make something, and other people’s things as well as their own.
  5. 163b–e2Critias separates making from doing; temperance is the doing of good things.
  6. 164a–b2The doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial.
  7. 174aWhich of the kinds of knowledge makes the man happy?
  8. 174cWithout the knowledge of good and bad, will medicine make us any less healthy?
  9. 174eWould temperance make us healthy, and not medicine?
  10. 176cThe boy will do what his guardian orders; what are the two plotting to do?

Translation in this edition

“Make” renders ποιεῖν and its forms through the argument of 161b–164c, as the Key Words record, so that “make”, “do” and “work” render ποιεῖν, πράττειν and ἐργάζεσθαι apart; elsewhere the English follows the sense: “makes you” at 160d7, “makes good” at 161a8, “make us … healthy” at 174c5, and “do” at 176c1–5.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Sophist the visitor from Elea defines making for the first division of the arts. Farming and the care of every mortal body, the making of things put together and fashioned, which we call equipment, and imitation, can all be called by one name, since whatever was not before and someone brings into being afterwards, we say that the one who brings it makes, ποιεῖν, and the thing brought is made; so all these arts are productive, ποιητική (219a–b). The definition can be read as the one the Charmides’ craftsmen fit, and Critias’ distinction as an attempt to raise doing above it.