Ο Omicron

be able

οἷός τε εἰμί

To be able: the phrase in which the argument measures what temperance could do, and finds it cannot · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΟἷος, “such as”, with τε and the verb “to be”: to be such as to do something, to be able; impersonal, οἷόν τε, “it is possible”.
  • In the CharmidesEleven times, from the doctors who “cannot undertake to cure the eyes on their own” (156b) to Socrates’ surrender: “no man alive will be able to oppose you” (176d).
  • In this edition“Be able”, “can”; at 162c “could contain himself no longer”.
  • A place to read170d–171c.
English renderings
οὐχ οἷόν τε, ouch hoion te, “cannot”; οἷόν τέ ἐστιν, hoion te estin, “make … able”; οἷός τε ἔσται, hoios te estai, “will be able”; οἷός τ’ ἔσται, hoios t’ estai, “will be able”; οἵα τ’ ἔσται, hoia t’ estai, “will it be able”; οἵα τε ἔσται, hoia te estai, “it will be able”; οἷός τ’ ἦν, hoios t’ ēn, “were able”; οἷοί τέ ἐστε, hoioi te este, “are able”; οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο, ouch hoios te egeneto, “could contain himself no longer”

Meaning

The phrase is ordinary Greek idiom for capacity, and covers both ability and possibility: a man is οἷός τε, “the kind to”, when he can do a thing, and a thing is οἷόν τε when it can be done. It says nothing about knowledge or art; it measures only what is in one’s power.

Use in the book

Before Critias takes over the argument, the phrase marks his own incapacity: he had held himself back with difficulty, “but now he could contain himself no longer” (162c; see μόγις; φιλοτίμως), and he took the argument over. The phrase then measures the claims made for temperance and takes them back. At 167a Socrates states Critias’ position: “only the temperate man will know himself, and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not” (see ἐξετάζω; μόνος). Two pages later he asks of knowledge of knowledge, “how does it make one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not?” (169d), and then, “Knowledge that is knowledge of knowledge: will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?” (170a; see διαιρέω). The answer reverses 167a point by point: “Nor, then, will this man be able to examine someone else who claims to know something” (170d), and “Then he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is” (170e; see ἀληθινός; διακρίνω), and temperance, if it is only knowledge of knowledge, “will be able to tell” no knower from a pretender except a fellow craftsman (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). At 171d the power of examination survives only in a counterfactual: if the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, “and were able to examine another man in the same situation”, it would be of enormous benefit (see ἐπισκοπέω).

At the end the phrase turns on the speakers. The boy cannot say whether he has temperance, “For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?” (176a–b; see ἐξευρίσκω), and Socrates, outvoted, says, “When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you” (176d; see βιάζομαι; ἐναντιόομαι). The dialogue that began with what doctors cannot do ends with a run of incapacities: Critias cannot contain himself, the temperate man cannot examine, the inquirers cannot discover, and Socrates cannot resist.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

  1. 156bGood doctors say they cannot cure the eyes on their own.
  2. 162cCritias could contain himself no longer.
  3. 167aThe temperate man alone will be able to examine what he knows and does not know.
  4. 169dHow does knowledge of knowledge make one any more able to know what one knows and does not?
  5. 170aCan knowledge of knowledge distinguish anything more than that this is knowledge and that is not?
  6. 170dThe temperate man will not be able to examine another who claims to know.
  7. 170eHe will not be able to distinguish the pretended doctor from the true.
  8. 171cTemperance will be able to tell no knower from a pretender, except the temperate man’s own fellow craftsman, as the other craftsmen can.
  9. 171dIf the temperate man were able to examine another, it would be of enormous benefit.
  10. 176aThe boy: not even Socrates and Critias are able to discover what temperance is.
  11. 176dSocrates: no man alive will be able to oppose Charmides when he uses force.

Translation in this edition

“Cannot” renders οὐχ οἷόν τε (156b6–7), and “make one any more able to know” the impersonal τί μᾶλλον οἷόν τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι (169d6), literally “what more is it possible to know”; elsewhere “be able”, with “will it be able” for the feminine οἵα τ’ ἔσται (170a7), whose subject is the knowledge itself, as is that of οἵα τε ἔσται at 171c5, “it will be able to tell”; “could contain himself no longer” renders οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο (162c3–4), the reflexive supplied from the preceding ἑαυτὸν … κατέχων.