Praise and blame

Use in the book

Charmides' approval of the doctors' principle restores Socrates' confidence after his erotic discomposure (156d). Socrates then rehearses the poets' praise of the boy's lineage (157e–158a2), magnifying the public expectations already surrounding him. Asked whether he is temperate, Charmides recognises a social trap: admitting it would be praising himself and might appear offensive; denying it would contradict his guardian and other admirers (158d). Socrates replaces this demand for self-advertisement with cooperative inquiry.

Praise also supplies an ordinary criterion within the first refutation. Rapid and easy success in inquiry and deliberation is thought worthy of praise (160a–b). It is one accepted judgment among the examples, not proof that whatever the audience praises is morally best.

At 175a Socrates says he rightly blamed himself for an inquiry that has produced no useful result. The direction is noteworthy: he does not blame the boy for the failure or conclude that temperance deserves condemnation. Praise and blame are thus redistributed by the examination. Public acclaim becomes a starting point requiring scrutiny, while self-criticism can keep inquiry open when reputation would encourage concealment.

Places to read

1. 156dCharmides’ approval restores Socrates’ confidence
2. 157e–158a2Poetic encomium establishes the family’s inherited reputation
3. 158dThe boy fears that self-praise will be offensive
4. 160a–bEfficient deliberation is said to merit praise
5. 175a–e2Socrates blames his inquiry while preserving his estimate of temperance

Translation in this edition

“Praise” and “approval” may represent the same ἐπαιν- family in different settings. The final “blame myself” is ᾐτιώμην, whereas “disgrace” in the Hesiod passage is ὄνειδος. Those distinct terms should not be collapsed into one moral vocabulary.

αἰτιάομαι

Attested: ᾐτιώμην (ēitiōmēn). Blamed or reproached; Socrates says he rightly blamed himself for conducting an inquiry into temperance that has proved fruitless. References: 175a. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰτιάομαι. See Praise and blame.

ἐγκωμιάζω

Attested: ἐγκεκωμιασμένη (enkekōmiasmenē). Celebrated in encomium or praise; the ancestry is presented through poets' commendation. References: 157e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐγκωμιάζω. See Praise and blame.

ἐπαινέω

Attested: ἐπαινῶ (epainō). Praise; Charmides would risk self-praise by agreeing that he is temperate. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπαινέω. See Praise and blame.

ἔπαινος

Attested: ἐπαίνου (epainou). Praise; quick mental performances are said to deserve approval when quiet ones do not. References: 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔπαινος. See Praise and blame.

Use in the book

Before presenting his poetic evidence, Socrates warns the companion against joining the many in impiety (318e–319a). Offence against gods comes first, then against divine human beings. The danger is explicitly both verbal and practical: one can go wrong in word as well as deed. Repeating an inherited story is therefore not ethically weightless.

The practical demand is forethought before either censure or praise, so that one does not speak wrongly. The symmetry is important. The warning is not merely “never criticize a revered figure”; it also prohibits praising someone opposed to the god's goodness. To avoid both mistakes one must learn to distinguish decent people from base ones. The passage places religious caution together with a demand for discrimination, although the present identification of Minos as one of the good remains something Socrates is about to argue.

The god is said to be indignant when someone censures a person like himself or praises someone contrary to himself. The reference of “himself” and the explanation that follows are best understood through the stated ethical likeness: the good person is like the god. The comparison with stones, wood, birds and snakes then extends sacred standing to human beings and gives the good human being the highest place among the examples; the base person is correspondingly most polluted (319a). This is an evaluative hierarchy, not a claim that all human conduct deserves religious exemption from inquiry.

A reader should also distinguish different forms of praise. The careful assessment urged here is one thing; Homer's supposed supreme eulogy of Minos is evidence Socrates develops; and the poets' capacity to manufacture good or bad reputation is a further problem (320e). Praise is neither dismissed wholesale nor trusted indiscriminately. Its justice depends upon the character of its object and the reliability of its grounds.

The language of caution returns when Socrates warns against provoking poets if one cares about reputation. The recurrence moves from the moral-religious danger of false evaluation to the practical danger of becoming its target. That shift makes the warning at the end more pointed than a generic instruction to respect artists.

Places to read

1. 318eκαὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν — Error or offence can occur in speech and in action
2. 318e–319aπρομήθειαν ποιεῖσθαι; ψέξειν ἢ ἐπαινέσεσθαι — Both blame and praise require forethought
3. 319aμανθάνειν διαγιγνώσκειν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας — The required learning is discrimination between kinds of character
4. 319aνεμεσᾷ γὰρ ὁ θεός — Socrates invokes the god's indignation
5. 319aἱερώτατόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀγαθός — The good human being is called most sacred among the stated examples
6. 319aμιαρώτατον ὁ πονηρός — The base person occupies the opposite pole

Translation in this edition

“Censure,” “praise,” “impious,” “forethought,” “sacred,” and “polluted” preserve the speech's different registers. Chrēstos and ponēros remain “decent” and “base,” while agathos is “good”; the religious setting does not erase those lexical distinctions.

Be about to — μέλλειν (mellein)

μέλλειν (mellein)

Be about to. Marks prospective praise or blame: the speaker should exercise forethought when about to evaluate a man, before potentially mistaken words are spoken. Attested: μέλλῃς (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Be impious — ἀσεβεῖν (asebein)

ἀσεβεῖν (asebein)

Be impious. To act impiously; Socrates presents careless hostile speech about divine human beings as a religious as well as evaluative danger. Attested: ἀσεβῇς (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Be wary — εὐλαβεῖσθαι (eulabeisthai)

εὐλαβεῖσθαι (eulabeisthai)

Be wary. To take care or guard against a danger; the warning concerns offence in speech and action, before its later application to provoking poets. Attested: εὐλαβεῖσθαι (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Birds — ὄρνεον (orneon)

ὄρνεον (orneon)

Birds. Birds, one class in Socrates' list of things people acknowledge as sacred; the comparison then extends to human goodness. Attested: ὄρνεα (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Censure — ψέγειν (psegein)

ψέγειν (psegein)

Censure. To blame or criticize; Socrates urges forethought before censuring a person, just as before praising one. Attested: ψέξειν (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Deed — ἔργον (ergon)

ἔργον (ergon)

Deed. An action or deed, paired with word to show that the warned-against offense is possible in conduct as well as speech. Attested: ἔργῳ (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Distinguish — διαγιγνώσκειν (diagignōskein)

διαγιγνώσκειν (diagignōskein)

Distinguish. To discern the difference between things, here decent and base people; the demanded learning supports responsible evaluation. Attested: διαγιγνώσκειν (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Forethought — προμήθεια (promētheia)

προμήθεια (promētheia)

Forethought. Care taken in advance; necessary before praising or censuring someone so that the judgment is not wrong. Attested: προμήθειαν (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Is indignant — νεμεσᾶν (nemesan)

νεμεσᾶν (nemesan)

Is indignant. To feel righteous indignation; Socrates says the god resents blame of the good and praise of the contrary kind. Attested: νεμεσᾷ (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Like — ὅμοιος (homoios)

ὅμοιος (homoios)

Like. Similar; the good person is described as like the god, explaining why unjust censure provokes divine indignation. Attested: ὅμοιον (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

More impious — ἀσεβής (asebēs)

ἀσεβής (asebēs)

More impious. The comparative adjective intensifies Socrates’ warning about wrongs against gods and divine human beings; it is distinct from the verb describing acting impiously. Attested: ἀσεβέστερόν (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Divine human beings — θεῖος (theios)

θεῖος (theios)

Divine human beings. Qualifies human beings against whom wrongful speech and action are warned against after wrongs against gods; the argument immediately connects sacred human standing with goodness. Attested: θείους (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Most polluted — μιαρός (miaros)

μιαρός (miaros)

Most polluted. Polluted or foul; the superlative applied to the base person opposes the sacred standing of the good person. Attested: μιαρώτατον (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Oppositely — ἐναντίως (enantiōs)

ἐναντίως (enantiōs)

Oppositely. In the contrary way; describes the person opposed to the god whom it would be wrong to praise. Attested: ἐναντίως (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Praises — ἐπαινεῖν (epainein)

ἐπαινεῖν (epainein)

Praises. To commend or praise; praise of a person contrary to the god's goodness is included among the evaluative errors Socrates warns against. Attested: ἐπαινῇ (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Sacred — ἱερός (hieros)

ἱερός (hieros)

Sacred. Sacred or set apart for a god; the examples of sacred objects lead to Socrates' claim that the good human being is most sacred. Attested: ἱεροὺς (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Second — δεύτερος (deuteros)

δεύτερος (deuteros)

Second. The warning puts wrongs against divine human beings second after wrongs against gods, ordering the objects of religious caution. Attested: δεύτερον (318e). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Snakes — ὄφις (ophis)

ὄφις (ophis)

Snakes. Snakes, named with stones, wood and birds as recognized sacred things in the comparison with good human beings. Attested: ὄφεις (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

Wood — ξύλον (xylon)

ξύλον (xylon)

Wood. Wood or wooden objects, listed among sacred things before Socrates gives superior sacred standing to the good human being. Attested: ξύλα (319a). Praise, censure, piety, and discrimination.

In word and deed (contextual phrase)

318e: καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ. The paired datives cover verbal and practical wrongdoing against gods and divine people. Speech about Minos is therefore morally consequential within Socrates' warning. The phrase does not make a mistaken literary interpretation equivalent in every respect to every wrongful act; it broadens the field in which caution and correct discrimination are needed. See Praise and piety.

The one like himself (contextual phrase)

319a: τὸν ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον. In the warning about divine indignation, the reflexive refers to the god: the censured person is like the god. The subsequent explanation identifies that person as the good man. Taking the reflexive instead as the censurer's likeness would change the moral account. The point grounds respect in goodness, not simply in the fame or age of the person discussed. See Praise and piety.

Use in the book

Socrates warns against praising the beloved before winning him. Praise, especially when it “builds up” its recipient, fills beautiful boys with pride and boastfulness and makes them harder to catch.

The objection is local and practical: Hippothales’ manner of praise works against his own aim. It is not a blanket ban on favorable judgment. The opening calls Miccus an admirer of Socrates, using the related noun ἐπαινέτης, without condemning him. Later Socrates’ treatment of Lysis supplies a pointedly different conversational method.

Places to read

1. 206aοὐκ ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον — he does not praise the beloved.

Use in the book

Asked why he resents criticism, the attributed Empedocles answers that otherwise he would not enjoy praise. The force lies in treating both responses as expressions of one receptivity to public valuation. It is not a recommendation to seek every compliment or retaliate against every insult, and it does not prove that the historical Empedocles was unusually thin-skinned. In the wider Life, reputation repeatedly matters: civic honors, divine claims, and Timaeus’ accusation of self-love all involve how the figure is seen. Those parallels explain why the saying fits the received persona, but fitness is not authenticity. The gnomological form can attach a plausible ethical observation to a famous name without preserving an original occasion. The passage is best used as a compact reception text about the costs of caring for reputation.

Places to read

1. A 20 (reception)Paris Gnomology. Makes pleasure at praise and pain at blame mutually dependent.
2. A 1 §§ 64–66 (polemical)2Diogenes Laertius VIII 66, reporting Timaeus. Provides a distinct critical judgment of boastfulness and self-love.

Translation in this edition

The edition praises the saying as a genuine argument, but soundness or psychological plausibility does not authenticate its attribution. No date or interlocutor is supplied.