Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion

Use in the book

After Socrates asks whether law is a perception, revealing, or finding, the companion answers with the familiar “these resolutions and decrees” (314b). He appears to return from the proposed explanatory categories to identifiable civic acts. His summary, “a resolution of the city,” is an answer about institutional source and authoritative decision.

Socrates immediately reformulates it as political opinion, and the companion assents (314c). The reformulation lets the discussion assess law by truth and falsity in a way that “measure passed by vote” alone does not invite. One should therefore retain both speakers' wording. It is the companion who supplies the civic account, and Socrates who turns the verbal relation into a bridge toward an epistemic account.

The following exchange accepts that law is fine and good, then distinguishes decent resolutions from base ones. A resolution cannot be law simply because the city resolved upon it. This objection attacks the sufficiency of the proposed definition; it does not deny that cities issue resolutions or that some resolutions can meet the required standard. Nor does the text introduce a historical technical distinction by which one Athenian procedure always yields nomoi and another yields psēphismata. Its argument is broader and evaluative.

Socrates remains attracted to opinion “of some kind,” but makes the next step conditional: if law is opinion, it is the decent opinion. The true-opinion account inherits that condition. Treating the initial dogma–doxa move as a completed proof would hide one of the dialogue's exposed transitions.

At 317a the city returns as the object of a craft, and law as the writing of competent statesmen and kings. The relevant source is now knowledgeable rule rather than the bare fact that a city has decided. At 320e doxa returns as reputation: poets influence what people think of Minos. The full work therefore explores both the possibility of true opinion and the vulnerability of public opinion to persuasive representation. It never makes civic popularity a guarantee of truth.

Places to read

1. 314bΤὰ δόγματα ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίσματα — The companion names familiar public decisions
2. 314cδόγμα πόλεως εἶναι — His whole-class definition
3. 314cΔόξαν, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγεις πολιτικὴν τὸν νόμον — Socrates restates the definition as political opinion
4. 314eὅτι νόμος ἐστὶ δόγμα πόλεως — The formula rejected as too simple
5. 314eδόξα γέ τις καὶ αὐτῷ μοι καταφαίνεται ὁ νόμος εἶναι — Socrates retains some kind of opinion as a plausible account
6. 320eοἱ γὰρ ποιηταὶ μέγα δύνανται εἰς δόξαν — The later power of poets over opinion

Translation in this edition

“Resolution,” “decree,” and “opinion” stay distinct. The note connects dogma with the language of what seemed good to a deciding body. The common English “opinion” at the end keeps visible the recurrence of doxa, while the context distinguishes a person's reputation from the proposition “law is political opinion.”

City — πόλις (polis) · πόλεως (314c).

πόλις (polis)

City. The civic body to which the companion attributes the resolution proposed as law. Attested: πόλεως (314c). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion.

Decrees — ψήφισμα (psēphisma)

ψήφισμα (psēphisma)

Decrees. Measures passed by vote in the companion's second answer about law. Attested: ψηφίσματα (314b). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion.

Looks as though — κινδυνεύειν (kindyneuein)

κινδυνεύειν (kindyneuein)

Looks as though. The companion's tentative conclusion that law is a resolution of the city; no physical danger is meant. Attested: κινδυνεύει (314b). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion.

Opinion — δόξα (doxa)

δόξα (doxa)

Opinion. Socrates' reformulation of the civic resolution, preparing the question of its truth. Attested: Δόξαν (314c). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion.

Political — πολιτικός (politikos)

πολιτικός (politikos)

Political. Qualifies the opinion Socrates says the companion has offered as law. Attested: πολιτικὴν (314c). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion.

Resolutions — δόγμα (dogma)

δόγμα (dogma)

Resolutions. The civic decisions offered by the companion as law, later divided into decent and base. Attested: δόγματα (314b). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion.

So simply — ἁπλῶς (haplōs)

ἁπλῶς (haplōs)

So simply. The insufficiency of answering without qualification that law is a civic resolution. Attested: ἁπλῶς (314e). Resolutions, decrees, and political opinion.

It looks as though (contextual phrase)

314b–c: ὥστε κινδυνεύει … νόμος, δόγμα πόλεως εἶναι. Here κινδυνεύει expresses a tentative appearance or likelihood, translated “it looks as though.” It does not mean that law faces physical danger. The companion's second proposal is presented as an emerging account, then recast by Socrates through the related word “opinion.” Its tentativeness should survive a paraphrase. See Resolution and opinion.