From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΟἰκεῖος, from οἶκος (oikos), "house", is what belongs to the household: one's own people, and what is proper to a thing. Οἰκείωσις is the Stoic word for nature's attachment of a living being to itself and to what is proper to it. Ἀλλότριος, from ἄλλος (allos), "other", is another's, and so alien; ξένος is the stranger.
- In the MeditationsAffinity widens from philosophy (1.6) and men (3.9) to nature (3.2.3), and at last to events: "everything that happens comes into affinity with God or man" (7.68). Almost nothing is "alien one to another" (7.9); the one thing Marcus calls alien is "the wrong done" (12.26), and the stranger is "he who is astonished at anything whatever that comes about in life" (12.13).
- In this editionΟἰκείωσις is "affinity" and οἰκειοῦσθαι "come into affinity with"; οἰκεῖος is "proper", and of persons "kin", "intimates" or "akin"; ἀλλότριος is "another's" before its noun and "alien" in the predicate; ἀνοίκειος is "foreign"; ξένος is "stranger" and "strange".
- A place to read10.31, where Marcus is to stay with what he flees until he brings it into affinity with himself, as the vigorous stomach does with everything.
Meaning
Οἰκεῖος (oikeios) belongs with οἶκος (oikos), "house": it is what is of the household, a man's kinsmen and intimates, then whatever is one's own and proper to a thing. Οἰκειοῦν (oikeioun) is to make one's own or akin, and its middle and passive οἰκειοῦσθαι (oikeiousthai) to come into affinity with; the noun οἰκείωσις (oikeiōsis) is the Stoic term, which the edition's note at 3.9 explains as "the process by which a creature comes to treat itself, and then others, as its own". Ἀλλότριος (allotrios), from ἄλλος (allos), "other", is another's, and so foreign; the Stoics set ἀλλοτριοῦν (allotrioun), "to estrange", against οἰκειοῦν. Ἀνοίκειος (anoikeios) is what does not belong. Ξένος (xenos) is the guest-friend and the stranger, and ξενίζεσθαι (xenizesthai) is to be struck by something strange. Marcus uses the school's noun once (3.9); his verb reaches beyond the self, where the school began, to philosophy, nature and everything that happens.
Use in the book
Affinity enters the book as a debt: from Diognetus, his painting master, Marcus had "to have come into affinity with philosophy" (1.6; see Philosophy). The noun comes once, in a promise made by the faculty of forming opinions: "And this promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men, and following the gods" (3.9; see Assent and judgement). The objects widen. Many sights in nature "will strike only the man who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works" (3.2.3; see Natural beauty). Marcus lays down "that I stand in some affinity to the parts of one kind with me", and draws his social action from it (10.6.1–2; see Whole and part); the things that are "stand in affinity with all that exist" (9.1.1; see Truth and falsehood). The widening ends with events: "For everything that happens comes into affinity with God or man, and is neither new nor hard to handle, but familiar and easy to work" (7.68; see Tranquillity).
Affinity is also work. The compound verb names assimilation: a bright fire "makes its own whatever is heaped on it" (4.1; see Impulse). Of what he flees Marcus asks, "what are all these but exercises for a reason that has seen exactly …?", and goes on: "Stay, then, until you bring these too into affinity with yourself, as the vigorous stomach brings everything into affinity with itself, as the bright fire makes flame and radiance out of whatever you throw into it" (10.31). In the school nature draws a creature to what is already its own; Marcus' affinity can be read as the reason's work on what is given, which it makes its own by using it.
What belongs to a thing by nature is "proper". Man and God and the universe bear fruit, "each … in its proper seasons" (9.10), and what is according to nature for each "is more proper to it, more native to it, and indeed more agreeable" (8.12; see Human work). The proper can be mistaken. It is cruel not to allow people an impulse towards "what appears to them proper and advantageous"; to the objection that it is not so, the answer is "Then teach and show, without being indignant" (6.27; see Anger). Man himself is "the thing most proper to us, in so far as one must do good to them and bear with them", and becomes a thing that makes no difference in so far as some stand in the way of "my proper works" (5.20; see Obstacle and reservation).
Against the proper stands the alien, in two senses. Before its noun ἀλλότριος is "another's", and marks a boundary. "What is bad for you does not subsist in another's ruling centre" (4.39; see Harm); Marcus is not to "look round at others' ruling centres" (7.55; see Ruling centre), and he asks himself whether he does not want "to leave others' turnings to those who turn them and are turned" (7.58). Standing alone it is "alien", and then Marcus mostly denies it: "almost nothing is alien one to another" (7.9; see Interconnection), and he is not to form the impression that the lion's jaws and poison are "alien to that which you revere" (6.36; see Natural beauty). One thing he calls alien: whoever is aggrieved has forgotten, among other things, "that the wrong done is alien" (12.26; see Mind and reason). The man who does it is not alien. Whoever is exasperated with those who stand in his way deserts his post as surely as the man who shrank back, "made alien towards him who is by nature kinsman and friend" (11.9; see Kindness and correction). The line between the proper and the alien runs neither between Marcus and the world nor between him and other men, but round each ruling centre, whose acts and wrongs are its own.
The stranger is the man to whom the world is new. "How ridiculous and a stranger is he who is astonished at anything whatever that comes about in life" (12.13). If he is "a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it", no less a stranger is "he who does not know what happens" (4.29; see Citizenship); and if at the exit Marcus honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will "cease being a stranger to the fatherland, and being astonished at the things that come about day by day as unexpected" (12.1.2; see Death). It is "shameful to think it strange if the fig tree bears figs", and so "if the universe bears such and such things as it is fruitful of" (8.15); those to whom the same things happened "were annoyed, thought them strange, blamed", and are nowhere (7.58). If the man he meets has such and such principles about good and bad, "it will not seem astonishing or strange to me if he does such and such things" (8.14; see Principles and reminders). Book II calls life "a war and a stranger's sojourn" (2.17.1; see Soul), and Book XII can be read as answering it: the stranger is not the man passing through but the man who is surprised, and affinity, which makes what happens "familiar" (7.68), is the cure.
Places to read
Every chapter in which οἰκείωσις, οἰκειοῦσθαι or ἐξοικειοῦν (exoikeioun), οἰκεῖος or its adverb οἰκείως (oikeiōs), οἰκειότης (oikeiotēs), ἀνοίκειος, ἀνοικείωτος (anoikeiōtos), ἀλλότριος, ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι (allotriousthai), ξένος or ξενίζεσθαι occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided. Φιλοίκειος (philoikeios), "love of family" (1.14.1), is left out (see Love and affection), and the places of ἴδιος (idios), "own", are given in its sub-entry.
- 1.6GreekAmong Marcus' debts to Diognetus are to have come into affinity with philosophy and to have written dialogues as a boy.
- 1.17.1GreekFrom the gods Marcus had good grandfathers, parents, a sister, teachers, good people about him, kinsmen and friends.
- 2.17.1GreekIn the summary of human life, life is a war and a stranger's sojourn, and fame after death oblivion.
- 3.2.3GreekMany such things, not convincing to everyone, are for the man alone who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works.
- 3.7GreekThe man who has chosen his own mind and daimon before all else is cautious throughout his life of one thing only, lest his understanding be in a turning foreign to an intelligent, civic living being.
- 3.9GreekThe faculty of forming opinions is to be revered, for it promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men and following the gods.
- 4.1GreekAs a bright fire makes its own whatever is heaped on it, what rules within makes material for itself of whatever is brought in to replace what it aimed at.
- 4.29GreekIf he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, no less a stranger is he who does not know what happens.
- 4.39GreekWhat is bad for Marcus does not subsist in another's ruling centre, but where that is in him which forms opinions about bad things.
- 4.45GreekWhat follows comes on what went before in a way akin to it, and the things that come to be show not bare succession but a wonderful kinship.
- 4.46GreekOf the sayings of Heraclitus of Ephesus, the philosopher of about 500 BC, Marcus is to remember that what men meet every day seems strange to them.
- 5.2GreekIt is easy to push away and wipe away every impression that is vexing or foreign, and at once to be in complete calm.
- 5.12GreekThe comic poet's line can properly be added to what the many take for goods, as it could not be to wisdom, self-control, justice and courage.
- 5.14GreekReason and the art of reasoning set out from their proper starting point and travel to the end set before them.
- 5.20GreekMan is in one respect the thing most proper to us, in so far as one must do good to men and bear with them, but indifferent in so far as some stand in the way of Marcus' proper works.
- 5.31GreekMarcus is to ask how he has behaved up to now towards gods, parents, brothers, wife, children, teachers, tutors, friends, kin and household slaves.
- 6.19GreekIf something is possible for a man and proper to him, Marcus is to believe it attainable by himself too.
- 6.27GreekIt is cruel not to allow people an impulse towards what appears to them proper and advantageous; if it is not so, one is to teach and show without being indignant.
- 6.36GreekEven the lion's jaws and poison come from the common ruling centre, and Marcus is not to form the impression that they are alien to what he reveres.
- 6.51GreekThe lover of fame takes his own good to be another's activity, the lover of pleasure his own being acted upon, the man who has a mind his own action.
- 7.9GreekAll things are woven together, the bond is sacred, and almost nothing is alien one to another.
- 7.18GreekNothing can come to be without change, and nothing is dearer or more proper to the nature of the whole.
- 7.55GreekMarcus is not to look round at others' ruling centres, but straight at what nature is guiding him to.
- 7.58GreekThose to whom the same things happened were annoyed, thought them strange and blamed; Marcus asks whether he does not want to leave others' turnings to those who turn them, and be intent on how to use them.
- 7.66GreekSocrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by, among other things, whether he received nothing allotted from the whole as something strange.
- 7.68GreekEverything that happens comes into affinity with God or man, and is neither new nor hard to handle, but familiar and easy to work.
- 8.12GreekTo render social actions accords with man's constitution, and what is according to nature for each is more proper to it, more native to it and more agreeable.
- 8.14GreekIf Marcus knows a man's principles about good and bad, it will not seem astonishing or strange that he acts accordingly.
- 8.15GreekAs it is shameful to think it strange that the fig tree bears figs, so it is if the universe bears what it is fruitful of, or for a doctor or a helmsman to think a fever or a contrary wind strange.
- 8.31GreekThe court of Augustus, the first emperor, with his wife, daughter, kinsmen, intimates and friends, is the death of a whole court.
- 9.1.1GreekThe nature of the whole is the nature of the things that are, and the things that are stand in affinity with all that exist.
- 9.9.1GreekWhatever shares in the common intelligent nature hastens towards what is kin, and the better it is, the readier to blend with what is proper to it.
- 9.10GreekMan and God and the universe bear fruit, each in its proper seasons, and reason has fruit both common and its own.
- 9.42.3GreekMarcus asks what strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated.
- 10.6.1GreekMarcus lays down that he is a part of the whole governed by nature, and that he stands in some affinity to the parts of one kind with him.
- 10.6.2GreekIn so far as he stands in some affinity to the parts of one kind with him, Marcus will do nothing unsocial and will lead every impulse towards what is of common advantage.
- 10.31GreekWhat Marcus flees is material and occasion, exercises for reason, and he is to stay until he brings it into affinity with himself, as the vigorous stomach brings everything into affinity with itself.
- 10.33.1GreekDoing, in the material that presents itself, the things proper to the constitution of man is to be for Marcus what luxury is to those who live delicately.
- 10.36GreekDying, Marcus is to go away kindly to those who want him gone, dissolved as from those akin, yet without being pulled the other way.
- 11.9GreekWhoever is exasperated with those who stand in his way deserts his post as much as the coward, made alien towards one who is by nature kinsman and friend.
- 11.13GreekNothing is bad for Marcus if he is now doing what is proper to his nature, a man stretched towards what is of common advantage.
- 11.18.3GreekOne must first learn much before pronouncing with a firm grasp on another's action.
- 11.18.5GreekMildness, not rage, is manly, for the more akin it is to freedom from passion, the more akin to power.
- 11.24GreekThe Spartans at the spectacles set the seats for strangers in the shade, and sat themselves wherever they happened to be.
- 12.1.1GreekMarcus is to let neither another's vice impede him, nor opinion, nor voice, nor the sensation of the poor flesh.
- 12.1.2GreekIf at the exit Marcus honours only his ruling centre and the divine in him, and fears never having begun to live according to nature, he will cease being a stranger to the fatherland and astonished at what comes about.
- 12.13GreekHe is ridiculous and a stranger who is astonished at anything that comes about in life.
- 12.26GreekWhoever is aggrieved at anything has forgotten, among other things, that the wrong done is alien.
- 12.30GreekThe breaths and the underlying things are without affinity to one another, though held together, while understanding, in a way of its own, joins with its kindred stock.
Translation in this edition
Οἰκείωσις is "affinity" at its one place (3.9), and οἰκειοῦσθαι "come into affinity with" (1.6, 3.2.3). The compound ἐξοικειοῦν (exoikeioun) is "makes its own" (4.1), "come into affinity with" (7.68) and "bring into affinity with" (10.31 twice). Οἰκεῖος is "proper" (5.14, 5.20, 6.19, 6.27 twice, 9.9.1, 9.10, 10.33.1, 11.13), in the comparative "more proper" (7.18, 8.12) and in the superlative "most proper" (5.20); of persons it is "good people about me" (1.17.1), "kin" (5.31), "intimates" (8.31) and "those akin" (10.36), and where the sense is kinship the comparative is "more akin", rendered twice for one Greek word (11.18.5). The Glossary keeps "proper" apart from "own", ἴδιος (idios). Ἴδιος is "own", and with the genitive of the kind it marks out "peculiar to" (3.16.2, 5.6.2, 7.22, 7.55, 8.26 twice, 8.41, 8.46, 11.1.1, 11.1.2 twice), with "nothing is anyone's own" (12.26) as its recorded exception; it is "individual" in "individual circumscriptions" (12.30), and its adverbial dative ἰδίᾳ (idiāi) and κατ' ἰδίαν (kat' idian) are "individually" (5.8.5, 6.44.1) and "on its own" (3.2.2). The adverb ἰδίως (idiōs) is "in their own way" (3.2.1), "specifically" (4.10) and "in a way of its own" (12.30), and with ποιός (poios) "individually qualified" (9.25, 10.7.3, 12.30). The adverb οἰκείως is "in a way akin to it" (4.45) and "properly" (5.12 twice), and with ἔχειν (echein), which with an adverb means to be in some way, it is "stand in affinity with" (9.1.1) and "stand in some affinity to" (10.6.1, 10.6.2); οἰκειότης is "kinship" (4.45). Not every "kin" or "kinship" in the English renders this family: συγγενής (syngenēs) and συγγένεια (syngeneia) are "kin", "kinsman" and "kinship" (see Kinship and cooperation), and ὁμόφυλος (homophylos) is "the kindred stock" (8.26, 12.30). Ἀνοίκειος is "foreign" (3.7, 5.2), kept apart from "alien", and ἀνοικείωτος "without affinity" (12.30). Ἀλλότριος is split by construction, as the Glossary records: before its noun "another's" (4.39, 6.51, 11.18.3, 12.1.1) or, in the plural, "others'" (7.55, 7.58); in the predicate "alien" (6.36, 7.9, 12.26). The participle of ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι is "made alien" (11.9). "Another's" also renders ἄλλος: its genitive at 2.8 and 9.20, and ἐπ' ἄλλῳ (ep' allōi), "in another's" power, at 8.17 and 8.56; "others'" at 4.48.1 renders ἄλλων (allōn). At 10.7.1 the manuscripts have ἀλλοτρίωσιν (allotriōsin), "estrangement", where J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, prints ἀλλοίωσιν (alloiōsin), "alteration", the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor. Ξένος is "stranger" (4.29 twice, 12.1.2, 12.13), "a stranger's" (2.17.1) and "strangers" (11.24), and as an adjective "strange" (4.46, 7.66, 8.14, 9.42.3); ξενίζεσθαι is "think strange", with its object: "thought them strange" (7.58) and "think it strange" (8.15 twice). Φιλοίκειος, "love of family" (1.14.1), has its sub-entry in Love and affection.
Greek forms and English renderings
What belongs to a man and what is another's · Meditations
οἰκείωσις, oikeiōsis, "affinity"; οἰκειοῦσθαι, oikeiousthai, "come into affinity with"; ἐξοικειοῦν, exoikeioun, "make its own", "come into affinity with", "bring into affinity with"; οἰκεῖος, oikeios, "proper", "more proper", "most proper", "good people about me", "kin", "intimates", "those akin", "more akin"; οἰκείως, oikeiōs, "in a way akin to it", "properly", "stand in affinity with"; οἰκειότης, oikeiotēs, "kinship"; ἴδιος, idios, "own", "peculiar to", "individual", "individually", "on its own"; ἰδίως, idiōs, "in their own way", "specifically", "in a way of its own", "individually"; ἀνοίκειος, anoikeios, "foreign"; ἀνοικείωτος, anoikeiōtos, "without affinity"; ἀλλότριος, allotrios, "another's", "others'", "alien"; ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι, allotriousthai, "be made alien"; ξένος, xenos, "stranger", "a stranger's", "strangers", "strange"; ξενίζεσθαι, xenizesthai, "think strange"
Epictetus and the Stoics
Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, whose seventh book sets out the Stoic doctrines, reports the doctrine from the first book of On Ends by Chrysippus, the school's third head. Nature makes the living being akin to itself from the beginning, οἰκειούσης αὑτῷ τῆς φύσεως (oikeiousēs hautōi tēs physeōs), and the first thing proper to every living being is its own constitution and its awareness of it. It was not likely, the argument runs, that nature would estrange, ἀλλοτριῶσαι (allotriōsai), the living being, nor that, having made it, she would make it neither estranged nor akin; it remains that, having constituted it, she made it akin to itself, and so it thrusts away what harms it and admits what is proper to it.1 The animal's first impulse, they say, is to preserve itself, because of this attachment; reason, which supervenes in rational beings as the craftsman of impulse, belongs to the same account (see Impulse). Cicero, the Roman orator and statesman of the first century BC, gives the doctrine in Latin in the third book of his On Ends, where Cato the Younger, the Stoic senator, speaks for the school: as soon as an animal is born it is attached and commended to itself, conciliari et commendari, to preserve itself and to love its own condition and whatever preserves it, and estranged, alienari, from destruction and whatever seems to bring it; the proof is that the young seek what is healthy and spurn the contrary before pleasure or pain has touched them.2 Man's first attachment, conciliatio, is to the things that accord with nature; but once he has a notion, which the Greeks call ἔννοια (ennoia), and has seen the order and, so to speak, the concord of the things to be done, he values it far above all he first loved. As a man commended to another often comes to value the one he was commended to above the one who commended him, so we are first commended to wisdom by the beginnings of nature, and later wisdom itself grows dearer to us than the things that brought us to her.3 Marcus' debt to Diognetus, "to have come into affinity with philosophy" (1.6), can be read beside this. From parents' love of their children Cato draws the fellowship of the human race (see Kinship and cooperation). Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, uses the verb when he says that every living being is bound to nothing so closely as to its own advantage (see Friendship). He also says that all things are full of friends, first gods, then men, "by nature in affinity with one another", φύσει πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾠκειωμένων (physei pros allēlous ōikeiōmenōn), and some of them must be present to one another and some depart, glad of those who are with them and not vexed at those who go.4 Of the man who grieves when a friend goes abroad he asks why he thought what was another's, τὰ ἀλλότρια (ta allotria), his own.5 Marcus' "I am dissolved as from those akin" (10.36; see Death) and his rule that another's ruling centre is another's can be read beside both.
ἀλλότριος
Attested: ἀλλοτρίῳ (allotriōi; 4.39), ἀλλότρια (allotria; 6.36, 7.55), ἀλλοτρίαν (allotrian; 6.51), ἀλλότριον (allotrion; 7.9, 12.26), ἀλλοτρίας (allotrias; 7.58, 11.18.3), ἀλλοτρία (allotria; 12.1.1). Belonging to another; foreign, alien. Attributively, "another's ruling centre" (4.39), "others' ruling centres" (7.55), "others' turnings" (7.58), "another's action" (11.18.3), "another's vice" (12.1.1); predicatively, "almost nothing is alien one to another" (7.9) and "the wrong done is alien" (12.26). Lemma: ἀλλότριος.
ἀλλοτριόω
Attested: ἀλλοτριωθείς (allotriōtheis; 11.9). To make another's, to estrange; in the passive, to be made alien. Those who give in from dismay and those who are exasperated with men who stand in their way "are equally deserters of their post, the one who shrank back, and the one made alien towards him who is by nature kinsman and friend" (11.9). Lemma: ἀλλοτριόω.
ἀνοίκειος
Attested: ἀνοικείῳ (anoikeiōi; 3.7), ἀνοίκειον (anoikeion; 5.2). Not one's own, unfitting, foreign. "Every impression that is vexing or foreign" (5.2). At 3.7 the man who has chosen his mind and daimon before all else is cautious only that his understanding should be "in any turning foreign to an intelligent ⟨and⟩ civic living being", where "and" is the supplement of Johannes Stich, whose Teubner text appeared in 1882, and P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, has ἔν τινι τῶν οἰκείων (en tini tōn oikeiōn), "in any of those proper to", for ἔν τινι ἀνοικείῳ, as Leopold reports. Lemma: ἀνοίκειος.
ἀνοικείωτος
Attested: ἀνοικείωτα (anoikeiōta; 12.30). Without affinity. The breaths and the underlying things "are insensible and without affinity to one another", though held together, while understanding "stretches towards the kindred stock and joins with it" (12.30; see Substance), where "stretches" is the correction of Adamantios Coraes, the Greek scholar of the early nineteenth century, which Leopold prints. Lemma: ἀνοικείωτος.
ἐξοικειόω
Attested: ἐξῳκείωσεν (exōikeiōsen; 4.1), ἐξοικειοῦται (exoikeioutai; 7.68), ἐξοικειώσῃς (exoikeiōsēis; 10.31), ἐξοικειοῖ (exoikeioi; 10.31). To make wholly one's own, to assimilate. "A bright fire very quickly makes its own whatever is heaped on it" (4.1); "everything that happens comes into affinity with God or man" (7.68); "Stay, then, until you bring these too into affinity with yourself, as the vigorous stomach brings everything into affinity with itself" (10.31). Lemma: ἐξοικειόω.
ἴδιος
Attested: ἰδίου (idiou; 1.16.5, 3.4.1, 8.31, 11.1.1), ἰδίαν (idian; 1.16.5, 3.2.2, 4.3.2, 4.29, 4.32.2 twice, 5.25 twice, 6.16.2, 6.44.1, 6.51 twice, 7.71, 7.75, 8.28, 8.56, 9.42.4, 10.33.1, 10.33.2), ἴδια (idia; 1.16.6, 4.49.2, 8.18, 8.26, 8.41, 11.1.1), ἰδίας (idias; 2.8, 3.6.2, 4.4, 6.16.5, 6.35, 11.5, 11.21), ἴδιον (idion; 3.2.2, 3.6.2, 3.11.1, 3.16.2, 5.1.1, 5.3, 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 6.51, 7.22, 7.55, 8.26, 8.46, 9.10, 9.41, 9.42.4, 10.36, 11.1.2 twice, 11.16, 12.26), ἰδίᾳ (idiāi; 4.25, 5.3 twice, 5.8.5, 8.11, 8.45, 8.50), ἰδία (idia; 6.3, 12.23), ἰδίαις (idiais; 12.30); the adverb ἰδίως (idiōs; 3.2.1, 4.10, 9.25, 10.7.3, 12.30 twice). One's own, private; with the genitive, peculiar to. Of what belongs to a man: the good man is "content with his own just action and kindly disposition" (4.25), and the man who has a mind takes "his own action" for his good (6.51). Of what marks out a kind: "It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble" (7.22); "peculiar to a man is goodwill towards the kindred stock" (8.26). Once Marcus denies it of everything: "nothing is anyone's own" (12.26). With ποιός (poios) the adverb gives the Stoic "individually qualified" thing (9.25, 10.7.3, 12.30; see Substance). At 9.32 the manuscripts have ἴδιον where Leopold prints ἀίδιον (aidion), "everlasting", the correction of Meric Casaubon, the seventeenth-century English scholar. Lemma: ἴδιος.
ξενίζω
Attested: ἐξενίζοντο (exenizonto; 7.58), ξενίζεσθαι (xenizesthai; 8.15 twice). To receive as a guest; in the passive, to be struck by what is strange, to think strange. Those to whom the same things happened "were annoyed, thought them strange, blamed" (7.58); "it is shameful to think it strange if the fig tree bears figs" (8.15). Lemma: ξενίζω.
ξένος
Attested: ξένου (xenou; 2.17.1), ξένος (xenos; 4.29 twice, 12.1.2, 12.13), ξένα (xena; 4.46), ξένον (xenon; 7.66, 8.14, 9.42.3), ξένοις (xenois; 11.24). A guest-friend, a stranger, a foreigner; as an adjective, strange. "Life is a war and a stranger's sojourn" (2.17.1); "a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it" (4.29); "How ridiculous and a stranger is he who is astonished at anything whatever that comes about in life" (12.13); the Spartans "set the seats for strangers in the shade" (11.24). As an adjective: what men meet every day "seems strange to them" (4.46, from Heraclitus), and "what new or strange thing has happened" (9.42.3), where "new" is the correction of A. J. Kronenberg, whose notes on Marcus appeared in the Classical Review in 1905, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' κακόν (kakon), "bad". Lemma: ξένος.
οἰκεῖος
Attested: οἰκείους (oikeious; 1.17.1), οἰκείας (oikeias; 5.14), οἰκειότατον (oikeiotaton; 5.20), οἰκεῖα (oikeia; 5.20, 6.27 twice, 10.33.1), οἰκείοις (oikeiois; 5.31), οἰκεῖον (oikeion; 6.19, 11.13), οἰκειότερον (oikeioteron; 7.18, 8.12, 11.18.5), οἰκεῖοι (oikeioi; 8.31), οἰκείῳ (oikeiōi; 9.9.1), οἰκείαις (oikeiais; 9.10), οἰκείων (oikeiōn; 10.36); the adverb οἰκείως (oikeiōs; 4.45, 5.12 twice, 9.1.1, 10.6.1, 10.6.2). Of the household; one's own; proper, fitting; of persons, kin and intimates. "Each bears it in its proper seasons" (9.10); "what is according to nature for each is more proper to it, more native to it, and indeed more agreeable" (8.12); "man is the thing most proper to us, in so far as one must do good to them and bear with them" (5.20), where "bear with" is the correction of Wilhelm Xylander, the first editor, which Leopold prints; "I am dissolved as from those akin" (10.36). The adverb with ἔχειν: "I stand in some affinity to the parts of one kind with me" (10.6.1). At 6.27 Leopold prints "proper and advantageous" the second time with P and A, the Vatican manuscript; editors before him had dropped the "and". Lemma: οἰκεῖος.
οἰκειότης
Attested: οἰκειότητα (oikeiotēta; 4.45). Kinship, close relation. The things that come to be show "not bare succession but a wonderful kinship" (4.45; see Cosmos and order). Lemma: οἰκειότης.
οἰκειόω
Attested: οἰκειωθῆναι (oikeiōthēnai; 1.6), ᾠκειωμένῳ (ōikeiōmenōi; 3.2.3). To make one's own or akin; in the passive, to come into affinity with. From Diognetus, "to have come into affinity with philosophy" (1.6; see Philosophy); "the man who has come into genuine affinity with nature and her works" (3.2.3; see Natural beauty), where the verb before these words, "will strike", is Gataker's correction, which Leopold prints. Lemma: οἰκειόω.
οἰκείωσις
Attested: οἰκείωσιν (oikeiōsin; 3.9). Affinity, the making of something one's own; in the Stoics, nature's attachment of a creature to itself and to what is proper to it. The faculty of forming opinions "promises freedom from rash assent, affinity with men, and following the gods" (3.9; see Assent and judgement). Lemma: οἰκείωσις.
Source note
1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.85.
2. Cicero, On Ends 3.16.
3. Cicero, On Ends 3.21 and 3.23.
4. Epictetus, Discourses 3.24.11.
5. Epictetus, Discourses 3.24.4.