From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordBeauty, chiefly of body and face; the noun of καλός.
- In the CharmidesFour times: Socrates asks whether any of the young men are “outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both” (153d); the boy is “a marvel of stature and beauty” (154c); his father’s house is celebrated “for its outstanding beauty and virtue” (157e–158a); and Critias’ principle, “when he has beauty, beautiful” (169e).
- In this edition“Beauty”.
- A place to read153d–154d.
- English renderings
- κάλλει, kallei, “(in, for its) beauty”; κάλλος, kallos, “beauty”
Meaning
Κάλλος is beauty: the beauty of a body or a face first, then the loveliness of things, of a horse, a garment or a city; in Plato also the beauty of souls, of ways of life and of kinds of knowledge (Symposium 210b–d), and beauty itself (Phaedrus 250e). Where the adjective καλός is shared between bodies and acts (see καλός), the noun stays for the most part with looks, and the Charmides uses it so.
Use in the book
The noun frames the prologue. Socrates’ question about the young men of Athens sets the terms of the scene: whether any of the young men “had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both” (153d; see σοφία ἢ κάλλος). Critias answers about beauty at once (154a), and the question about wisdom has to wait for the boy to talk. The boy’s entrance gives the noun its sight: “All the same, at that moment he struck me as a marvel of stature and beauty” (154c; see θαυμάζω), the size of a body with its beauty. Socrates’ praise of the boy’s house then joins beauty to virtue in the poets’ manner: celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon “for its outstanding beauty and virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness” (157e–158a; see ἐγκωμιάζω; εὐδαιμονία).
In the argument the noun is an example. Critias, defending the step from knowledge of itself to knowledge of oneself, appeals to the principle that “when he has beauty”, a man is “beautiful”, and so whoever has knowledge of itself will know himself (169e; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; γνῶσις). The noun that named the boy’s distinction becomes the plainest case of having and being: beauty is seen in whoever has it, and Critias assumes that knowledge of itself would be the same.
Places to read
Every passage in which the noun occurs.
- 153dSocrates asks whether any of the young men are outstanding in wisdom, or beauty, or both.
- 154cThe boy strikes Socrates as a marvel of stature and beauty.
- 157e–158a2The father’s house, celebrated by poets for its beauty and virtue.
- 169eCritias: whoever has beauty is beautiful, as whoever has knowledge of itself will know himself.
Translation in this edition
“Beauty” at each place. The dative κάλλει is “in beauty” at 153d4 and “for its outstanding beauty” at 157e7, with διαφέρουσα. At 169e3 the English keeps the pair κάλλος, καλός as “beauty, beautiful”.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Phaedo can be read as turning Critias’ principle into a theory of cause. If anything besides the beautiful itself is beautiful, Socrates tells Cebes, it is so through nothing but its share in that beautiful; and if anyone explains a thing’s beauty by its bright colour or its shape, he bids such explanations goodbye and keeps, plainly and perhaps naively, to this alone: what makes the thing beautiful is the presence of that beautiful, or its communion, or however it comes to be there, for on the manner he no longer insists, only that it is by the beautiful that all beautiful things become beautiful (100c–d).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle puts beauty in magnitude. Greatness of soul, he says, is a matter of greatness, “as beauty needs a large body: the small may be pretty and shapely, but they are not beautiful”;1 and in the Poetics, “beauty lies in magnitude and order”, so that neither a tiny creature nor one of vast size could be beautiful.2 The boy’s “stature and beauty” (154c), τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, can be read as Aristotle’s pair.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1123b6–8.
2. Aristotle, Poetics 7, 1450b34–1451a4.