From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The phraseThe neuter plural of ἀγαθός, “good”: good things, goods, whatever benefits.
- In the CharmidesEight times in two places: in the Thracian’s teaching, that everything, “bad and good alike”, starts from the soul (156e), and in Critias’ first definition of his own, that what is one’s own is good and temperance is “the doing of good things” (163d–e).
- In this edition“Good”, “good things”.
- A place to read156e–157a and 163c–e.
- English renderings
- τὰ ἀγαθά, ta agatha, “good”; ἀγαθά, agatha, “good”, “good things”; τἀγαθά, tagatha, “good things”; τῶν ἀγαθῶν, tōn agathōn, “(of) good things”
Meaning
In Greek the good things, τὰ ἀγαθά, were the goods of life: health, wealth, beauty, birth, honour, and the goods of the soul, as Socrates lists them in the Euthydemus (279a–c; see εὐδαιμονία). To call a thing good was to say that it benefits, and the plural keeps that sense of things to be had and used.
Use in the book
The first use is a claim about causes. Zalmoxis says that the Greek doctors neglect the whole, “For everything, … bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes” (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω; ὁρμάω; τὰ κακά). The good things of the body, health above all, have their source in the soul, and so the soul is to be treated first (157a; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα). Good things here are what a man has, and the soul is where they start.
The second use is Critias’. From Hesiod he derives that things made finely and beneficially are works, that only such things are “appropriate to one”, and everything harmful “belonging to others” (163c; see ἀλλότριος; οἰκεῖος). Socrates restates him: “it is what is appropriate to one, and one’s own, that you call good, and the makings of good things that you call doings” (163d; see Πρόδικος). The good things are now what a man does and makes, and Critias’ definition follows: “temperance is the doing of good things” (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). The doctor who makes someone healthy makes something beneficial, both for himself and for his patient, and so does what he ought, and so is temperate (164a–b; see τὰ δέοντα).
The two uses can be read together. The Thracian’s good things flow from a soul in good condition, and Critias’ good things are made by a man who does his own business. Both tie temperance to good things, the first as their source, the second as their maker; and the argument will find that a man may make good things without knowing that he has, and that knowing which things are good is a knowledge other than Critias’ temperance (164b–c, 174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν).
Places to read
Every passage in which the plural occurs.
Translation in this edition
“Good” and “good things”, with “bad” for κακά beside them; the English keeps “good and bad” at each of the three joints where the pair appears (156e, 163e, 174b–d; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν). At 163e10 B omits ἀγαθῶν, “of good things”, which T and W have (apparatus; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the second book of the Republic Glaucon sorts the good things into three kinds: some we welcome for their own sake, not for what comes of them, like harmless pleasures; some we love both for themselves and for their results, like thinking, seeing and being healthy; and some we would not choose for themselves, but only for the wages and other things that come of them, like gymnastic training, being treated when sick, and the practice of medicine (2.357b–d). Socrates places justice in the second and finest kind (2.358a). Socrates’ own claim at his trial, that from virtue come wealth and all the other good things for men, is told elsewhere (Apology 30a–b; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα). The Charmides’ good things are the Thracian’s, which flow from the soul as the Apology’s come from virtue.