From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordTo bring forth, to grow; in the perfect, to have grown so, to be by nature. The root of φύσις, “nature”.
- In the CharmidesFour times: the boy “in fact well made” in his soul (154e) and “well enough endowed” for temperance (158b); Critias’ knowledge “not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge” (165e); and whether anything “is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself” (169a).
- In this edition“Made”; “endowed”; “by nature”.
- A place to read154e and 168e–169a.
- English renderings
- πεφυκώς, pephykōs, “made”; πέφυκας, pephykas, “endowed”; πέφυκεν, pephyken, “is by nature”
Meaning
Φύω is growth: what a plant puts forth, what a child is born with. Its perfect, πέφυκα, “I have grown”, means “I am by nature”, and is a common way Greek says what something is born to be or do. The noun φύσις, nature, does not occur in the Charmides; the perfect of the verb carries the idea instead, and it divides between the nature of the boy and the nature of knowledge.
Use in the book
In the prologue the verb is about the boy: Socrates asks whether his soul is “in fact well made” (154e), and later whether he is “well enough endowed for temperance and the rest” (158b); both places are told under the phrase (see εὖ πέφυκα). The question of the dialogue is put as a question of nature: whether the boy was born with what temperance needs.
In the argument the verb is about knowledge. Critias objects that his knowledge “is not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge, any more than they are like each other” (165e; see ὅμοιος), and so need not have a product. Socrates turns the claim into a question of nature: it would need a great man to determine “whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else” (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ; πρὸς ἄλλο). Critias appealed to the special nature of his knowledge; Socrates asks whether such a nature is possible at all, and leaves the question to someone greater.
The two uses can be read as one inquiry. The boy’s nature is praised and then tested; the knowledge’s nature is asserted and then doubted. The dialogue ends with both undecided: the boy does not know whether he has temperance (176a), and no one has shown that a knowledge can be by nature of itself. What a thing is by nature is the one thing the conversation could not settle by agreement.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 154eSocrates asks whether the boy is in fact well made in his soul.
- 158bIf the boy is well enough endowed for temperance, blessed is the mother who bore him.
- 165eCritias: this knowledge is not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge.
- 169aWhether anything is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself needs a great man to determine.
Translation in this edition
“Well made” renders εὖ πεφυκώς (154e1), with τυγχάνει, “in fact” (see τυγχάνω); “well enough endowed” ἱκανῶς πέφυκας (158b3); “is not by nature like” ὁμοία … πέφυκεν (165e3–4); “is by nature able to have” πέφυκεν ἔχειν (169a4), after which Burnet, following Schleiermacher, brackets the words πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, “except knowledge” (apparatus; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). The adverb ὑπερφυῶς, “extraordinarily”, is from the same root (see ὑπερφυῶς).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Republic’s warning about the best natures badly reared, which the dialogue’s first readers could apply to the boy and his guardian, is told elsewhere (6.491d–e; see εὖ πέφυκα).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle begins his account of nature in the Metaphysics from the verb. Nature, φύσις, is said in one way of the coming to be of things that grow, as if one pronounced the υ long; in another, of the first thing present in a growing thing from which it grows; and again of the source of the first motion in each thing that is by nature, present in it as itself.1 His third sense can be read as the one the Charmides’ question at 169a reaches for: whether a knowledge could have in itself, by nature, a power directed at itself.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.4, 1014b16–20.