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be well made by nature

εὖ πέφυκα

The boy’s nature, the question Socrates puts before the argument begins · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo be well formed by nature, gifted, of good natural parts; the perfect of φύομαι, “to grow, to be born”.
  • In the CharmidesOnce with εὖ: Socrates calls the boy invincible “if where his soul is concerned … he is in fact well made” (154e). The same perfect returns at 158b, “if, as Critias here says, you are also well enough endowed for temperance and the rest”.
  • In this edition“Well made”, “well enough endowed”.
  • A place to read154d–155a and 157e–158c.
English renderings
εὖ πεφυκώς, eu pephykōs, “(in fact) well made”; ἱκανῶς πέφυκας, hikanōs pephykas, “(you are) well enough endowed”; πέφυκεν, pephyken, “is by nature”

Meaning

Πέφυκα, the perfect of φύομαι, “to be born, to grow”, means “to be by nature”: what one has grown into, as against what one has been taught or has chosen. Εὖ πεφυκώς is “well grown, of a good nature”, said of plants, bodies and minds; the adjective εὐφυής, “naturally gifted”, is its companion. The perfect also serves as a plain “is by nature”, as when Critias says that the knowledge he is defining “is not by nature like” the others (165e).

Use in the book

The phrase is Socrates’ first question about Charmides’ soul. Chaerephon has praised the boy’s face and figure, and Socrates swears by Heracles that he would be invincible “if he has just one little thing more” (154d; see ἄμαχος; Ἡρακλῆς). Asked what, he answers: “If where his soul is concerned … he is in fact well made. And he ought to be, Critias, coming from your family” (154e; see ψυχή). The one little thing is the soul, and the verb asks whether it was born good. Critias answers with the social formula, “he’s thoroughly beautiful and good … in that respect too” (154e; see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός), and Socrates proposes to strip the soul and look (see ἀποδύω).

The perfect returns when the praise of the family is complete. After recounting Charmides’ ancestors, Socrates says that he falls short of none of them in looks (Madvig’s conjecture, which Burnet prints, as the edition’s note at 158b explains), and goes on: “And if, as Critias here says, you are also well enough endowed for temperance and the rest, then blessed is the child, my dear Charmides … your mother bore” (158b; see μακάριος). The natural gift is again assumed on Critias’ word, and the charm is offered as a test of it (158b–c; see ἐπῳδή). The dialogue never settles whether the boy is well made in soul; Socrates’ verdict at the end is conditional, that if he has temperance he is blessed (175e–176a). The phrase can be read as the question the whole dialogue is spent failing to answer about him.

Places to read

The phrase’s place, with the perfect’s return at 158b; its other uses are told under φύω.

  1. 154eThe boy would be invincible if his soul were also well made.
  2. 158bIf the boy is well enough endowed for temperance, blessed is the child his mother bore.

Translation in this edition

“If where his soul is concerned … he is in fact well made” for Εἰ τὴν ψυχήν … τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς (154e1), with “in fact” for τυγχάνει; “well enough endowed” for ἱκανῶς πέφυκας (158b3), T’s reading, where B has πεφυκυίας, with “for temperance and the rest” following T and W, where B has καὶ πόρρωθεν σωφροσύνην καὶ; “is not by nature like” for οὐ … ὁμοία … πέφυκεν (165e3–4); “is by nature able to have” for πέφυκεν ἔχειν (169a4). In that last line Burnet brackets πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, “except knowledge”, after Schleiermacher.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic gives the gifted nature a warning. Every seed or plant that lacks its proper nourishment, the stronger it is, falls the further short; so the most gifted souls, badly brought up, become outstandingly bad, for the great wrongs and undiluted villainy come not from a paltry nature but from a spirited one spoiled in the rearing, and a weak nature will never cause anything great, either good or bad (491d–e). The parts of the philosophic nature themselves, when it meets with bad nurture, are in a way the cause of its falling away from philosophy, and so are the so-called goods, wealth and all such equipment; and from such men come those who do the greatest harm to cities and to private men, and the greatest good, if the current happens to carry them that way (495a–b). The reader of the Charmides, who knows what became of Critias and Charmides (see βιάζομαι), can read the passage as their story. In the Meno Socrates argues that if the good were good by nature there would be people able to recognise the good natures among the young, and the city would keep them under guard on the acropolis, sealed up more carefully than gold, so that no one could corrupt them (89b). Theodorus’ praise of Theaetetus as the best-natured boy he has met is told under δυσμαθία (Theaetetus 144a–b).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle sets out the phrase in an objection he means to answer. Someone may say that a man’s aim at the end is not of his own choosing: he would have to be born with something like eyesight, to judge finely and pick out what is truly good, and the man so endowed would be well-natured, εὐφυής, since to be well and finely made by nature in this, εὖ καὶ καλῶς πεφυκέναι, would be the full and true good nature. Aristotle answers that on this view virtue would be no more voluntary than vice, and that we are ourselves in some way joint causes of our states.1 The Charmides asks of the boy the question the objection would leave to birth alone, whether his soul was born well; Aristotle will not let birth settle it.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1114a31–b25.