Μ Mu

prophet

μάντις

The prophet: the god at Delphi speaks like one, and the happy man of the dream might be one · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordA seer, diviner, prophet; the word is related to μαίνομαι, “be mad”.
  • In the CharmidesThree times: the god greets those who enter “as a prophet would, rather riddlingly” (164e); temperance sets up “the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future” (173c); and Critias’ happy man may be “the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet” (174a).
  • In this edition“Prophet”.
  • A place to read164d–165a.
English renderings
μάντις, mantis, “a prophet”; μάντεις, manteis, “prophets”; τὸν μάντιν, ton mantin, “the prophet”

Meaning

The μάντις read the signs the gods sent, in the flight of birds, in sacrifices and in dreams, or spoke under inspiration, and his speech was characteristically dark. Oracles came in riddles that needed interpreting, and an interpreter might be a different person from the one inspired. The Charmides uses both sides of the figure: the prophet who speaks obscurely, and the prophet who knows the future.

Use in the book

The first use is Critias’. The inscription “Know thyself”, he says, is the god’s greeting to those who enter his temple, and means “Be temperate”: “But he says it, as a prophet would, rather riddlingly” (164e; see αἰνιγματώδης; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Σωφρόνει). The later dedicators, who took the maxim for advice and set up “Nothing too much” beside it, can be read as the hearers who misread the prophet (165a; see Μηδὲν ἄγαν). Critias puts himself in the interpreter’s place and claims to know what the god meant.

At the end the prophet returns as a knower. Temperance in the dream sets up “the true prophets” (173c; see μαντική), and Socrates asks whether the man Critias calls happy is “the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet. Do you mean him, or someone else?” Critias answers, “Him … and another as well” (173e–174a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; τὰ μέλλοντα). The prophet, whose riddling speech at 164e called for an interpreter, is at 174a a candidate for the happiest of men, and the argument shows that his knowledge would not make him so without the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The two figures can be read as one judgement: Critias is willing to interpret the god’s riddle and to call the foreknower happy, and in neither case does he ask what the knowledge is good for.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 164eThe god speaks as a prophet would, rather riddlingly.
  2. 173cTemperance would set up the true prophets as foretellers of the future.
  3. 174aCritias’ happy man may be the prophet, who knows all that is going to be.

Translation in this edition

“Prophet” renders μάντις (164e7) and τὸν μάντιν (174a1), and “prophets” μάντεις (173c6); “as a prophet would” is ὡς μάντις (164e6–7), where the Greek is the comparison alone.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Timaeus separates the prophet from the interpreter. Having said that judging prophecy belongs to the temperate (71e–72a; see μαντική), Timaeus explains why the law sets up the class of foretellers, προφῆται, as judges over inspired prophecies: some call these men prophets, μάντεις, not knowing that they are interpreters of what is spoken and shown in riddles, and not prophets at all; they would most rightly be called foretellers for those who prophesy (72a–b; see προφήτης). In the Apology Socrates says that the poets make what they make not by wisdom but by a kind of nature and inspiration, like the god-inspired seers and the oracle-singers, who say many fine things but know nothing of what they say (22b–c), and the Ion adds that the god takes away their minds and uses them as his servants, so that we who hear may know that it is the god himself who speaks through them (534c–d). The Charmides’ “true prophets”, with knowledge of the future, are a hypothesis of the dream; the inspired seers of the Apology, the Ion and the Timaeus speak without knowing, and even the Laches allows the seer only a knowledge of signs (195e–196a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος).

Other ancient sources

Herodotus gives the classic case of a riddling oracle and its misreading. Croesus, having lost his kingdom, sends to Delphi to complain, and is answered that he blames the oracle wrongly: Loxias, as the Pythia calls Apollo, foretold that if he marched against the Persians he would destroy a great empire, and he should, if he meant to deliberate well, have sent again to ask whether his own empire or Cyrus’ was meant; not having grasped what was said or asked again, let him declare himself to blame.1

Source note

1. Herodotus 1.90.4–91.4.