From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΔοξάζω, to have an opinion, to judge, to suppose; the verb of δόξα.
- In the CharmidesThree times in two passages: “if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it” (159a), and the opinion of opinions that would opine none of the things other opinions are about (168a).
- In this edition“Have some opinion”, “are opinions about”, “has no opinion about”.
- A place to read167e–168a.
- English renderings
- δοξάζειν, doxazein, “have some opinion”; δοξάζουσιν, doxazousin, “are opinions about”; δοξάζουσαν, doxazousan, “has no opinion about” (with μηδέν)
Use in the book
The verb, like the noun, marks the start of the inquiry and the procession of powers. At 158e–159a it is the boy’s capacity: εἴ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν, if temperance is present in him, Socrates tells him, “you have some opinion about it” (158e–159a; see δόξα; πάρειμι). The opinion has an object, περὶ αὐτῆς, “about it”.
At 168a the verb is used twice to describe the opinion Critias will not allow, an opinion of opinions and of itself which “has no opinion about” any of the things the other opinions are about (168a; see δόξα). The plural δοξάζουσιν says what opinions do, the participle μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν what this one would not. An opining that opines none of the things that opinions are about would not be opining anything, and the verb shows the absurdity better than the noun: one cannot opine without opining something. The step from this to knowledge, which Critias says can be of nothing but knowledge, is the one the dialogue leaves to be tested (168a–169a).
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
Translation in this edition
Ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν (159a1) is “you have some opinion about it”, the English rendering the Greek’s “you are able to” by “you have”. At 168a ὧν δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι δοξάζουσιν μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν becomes a relative clause, the participle rendered “has no opinion about” and the plural verb “are opinions about”. Περὶ αὐτῆς (159a1) is the reading of B and of a later hand in T; T has αὐτήν (apparatus, a1).
Elsewhere in Plato
The principle that opining is of something is stated in the Theaetetus. Whoever sees, sees some one thing, and a thing that is; whoever hears, hears some one thing; “and whoever opines, does he not opine some one thing?” “Necessarily.” “And whoever opines one thing, something that is?” Theaetetus grants it, and Socrates concludes that one cannot opine what is not (188e–189b). The Theaetetus also makes opining a kind of speech, the statement the soul makes to itself when it has done questioning (189e–190a; see αἴσθησις). On both accounts an opinion must be of something and must say something, and the opinion the Charmides rejects at 168a, which opines none of the things the other opinions are about, can be read as failing that test.