Δ Delta

give a plain definition

διορίζομαι

Critias’ plain definition · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΔιορίζω, to draw a boundary through, to divide off; to determine, distinguish; in the middle voice, to set out distinctly, to define.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, in the definition Critias gives after taking over the argument: “I give you a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things” (163e).
  • In this edition“I give you a plain definition”.
  • A place to read163d–164a.
English renderings
διορίζομαι, diorizomai, “I give you a plain definition” (with σαφῶς)

Meaning

A ὅρος is a boundary-stone, and ὁρίζειν is to mark a boundary, and so to define. The prefix διά, “through, between”, makes the boundary one that separates: to διορίζειν is to set one thing off from what lies next to it. The middle voice makes the definition the speaker’s own act: Critias does not report a definition, he lays one down.

Use in the book

Socrates has asked for one. Critias has explained his own business as the making of good things, and Socrates, recalling Prodicus’ distinctions between words, allows him whatever names he likes (163d; see δίδωμι; Πρόδικος), and asks him to go back to the beginning and define it more plainly, ὅρισαι: is it the doing, or the making, of good things that he says temperance is (163d–e; see ὁρίζω)? Socrates’ verb is the simple ὅρισαι; Critias answers with the compound and the adverb Socrates had asked for. The man who makes bad things is not temperate, he says, and the man who makes good things is: “I give you a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things” (163e; see ἀγαθός; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; σαφής).

Between the request and the definition Critias tries to turn the question back: “And don’t you think so, my good fellow?” Socrates will not let his own view be examined (163e; see ἐάω). The definition is Critias’ alone, and plain in its words. Its trouble begins at once and is not in the words. A doctor who heals someone does what he ought, and so acts temperately by Critias’ account, yet he need not know when his treatment benefits and when it does not; so a man could be temperate without knowing that he is (164a–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). Critias would sooner take back some of what he has agreed than accept that consequence (164c–d), and at 165b gives up everything said before (see ἀφίημι).

The plainness Socrates asked for was plainness about what each word is applied to (163d; see δηλόω). The definition meets that request and still fails, which can be read as the dialogue’s judgement on definitions made by drawing lines between words: a boundary drawn plainly does not yet show that the man inside it knows where he stands.

Places to read

The passage in which the verb occurs, with Socrates’ request before it and the first objection after it.

  1. 163d–eSocrates allows Critias any names he likes, and asks him to go back to the beginning and define more plainly.
  2. 163eCritias: the man who makes good things is temperate; I give you a plain definition, temperance is the doing of good things.
  3. 164a–c2A doctor acting beneficially does not always know that he has, and so would be temperate without knowing it.

Translation in this edition

Σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι (163e11) is “I give you a plain definition”: the English turns adverb and verb into adjective and noun, so that “plain” answers Socrates’ “more plainly”, σαφέστερον, of 163d7. His ὅρισαι there is “define it”.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the first book of the Republic Socrates puts the same demand to Thrasymachus, who has accused him of arguing in bad faith: so that nothing of the kind happens to them again, let him define in which sense he speaks of the ruler and the stronger, the one so called in ordinary speech or the one in the strictest sense. Thrasymachus chooses the ruler in the strictest sense (341b). As with Critias, the definition is asked for to stop an argument from turning on a word, and in both dialogues the more precise definition is the one that is then refuted.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon says that Socrates thought those who knew what each thing is could also explain it to others, and never stopped examining with his companions what each of the things that are might be; to go through all the things he defined, διωρίζετο, would be a long task.1

Source note

1. Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.6.1.