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necessity, must

ἀνάγκη

The bond of an oath, and the bond of an argument · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἈνάγκη is necessity: constraint, what cannot be otherwise, and in conversation a strong form of assent, “Necessarily”.
  • In the CharmidesNine times. Socrates “must obey” the oath he swore to the Thracian (157c); temperance, if present, “must give rise to some sense” (159a); Socrates asks whether a doctor “must” know when his treatment is beneficial (164b); Critias answers “Necessarily” and “Absolutely necessary” to the steps about the greater and about hearing (168b–d), and “Necessarily” again of the examiner of doctors (171b); sight that sees itself “must have some color” (168d); and Socrates asks “what necessity is there” that someone who has a knowledge that knows itself should know what he knows and what he does not know (169e).
  • In this edition“Must”, “Necessarily”, “Absolutely necessary”, and “necessity” at 169e.
  • A place to read169d–170a.
English renderings
ἀνάγκη, anankē, “must”, “necessity”, “Necessarily”; πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, pollē anankē, “Absolutely necessary”

Meaning

Ἀνάγκη (anankē) is the constraint that cannot be resisted or talked away. It is the force of circumstance and of nature, the hold of a bond such as an oath or kinship, the compulsion of a master, and the necessity of a conclusion. In dialogue the bare noun is an answer, Ἀνάγκη, “it must be so”, and πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, literally “much necessity”, is an emphatic yes. The verb ἀναγκάζειν and the adjective ἀναγκαῖος are of the same family (see ἀναγκάζω; ἀναγκαῖος).

Use in the book

The first necessity in the dialogue is not logical at all. Socrates has explained the Thracian’s order not to treat the head before the soul, and he binds himself to it: “So I—for I have sworn him an oath, and I must obey—I shall obey” (157c; see ὄμνυμι). The Greek is ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι, and πείθεσθαι, “obey”, is the passive of “persuade” (the edition’s note at 157c): Socrates is under necessity to be persuaded, by an oath he chose to swear.

The second sets the method of the first inquiry. If temperance is present in the boy, it “must give rise to some sense” from which he would have an opinion about it (159a; see αἴσθησις). The third is a necessity Critias refuses: asked whether a doctor “must” know when his treatment is beneficial, he answers, “Perhaps not” (164b; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). Had he said yes, his definition would have escaped this objection.

In the long examination of things that relate to themselves the word passes to Critias, as his assent. The greater must be greater than something smaller: “Necessarily.” If something were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself: “Absolutely necessary, Socrates.” Hearing that hears itself will hear itself as having a sound: “Absolutely necessary” (168b–d; see ἀδύνατος; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). Socrates adds the same necessity in his own voice, that sight seeing itself “must have some color” (168d). Critias grants the steps one after another, twice with the emphatic “Absolutely necessary”, and each step brings nearer the conclusion that a knowledge of knowledge is impossible or doubtful.

The turning point is a question about necessity. Socrates has granted for argument’s sake that a man who has a self-knowing knowledge will know himself; he then asks, “But what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?” (169e; see ἀμφισβητέω). Critias answers not with a necessity but with an identity: “this is the same as that” (170a). The rest of the argument separates what Critias declared the same.

Read together, the uses divide the necessities of the dialogue between its two speakers. Socrates binds himself only by the necessity of his oath; the necessities of the argument he states, asks after and tests. Critias says “Necessarily” to steps that bind him, and “Perhaps not” to the one step that would have blocked the objection.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 157cSocrates has sworn an oath to the Thracian and must obey.
  2. 159aIf temperance is in the boy, it must give rise to some sense, from which he would have an opinion about it.
  3. 164bSocrates asks whether a doctor must know when his treatment is beneficial; Critias says perhaps not.
  4. 168b–d2Critias answers “Necessarily” and “Absolutely necessary” to the steps about the greater and about hearing; sight that sees itself must have some colour.
  5. 169eWhat necessity is there that someone with a self-knowing knowledge should know what he knows and what he does not know?
  6. 171bThe examiner of a doctor must judge whether what is said is true and what is done is right: “Necessarily.”

Translation in this edition

The noun is “must” where it governs an infinitive (157c2, 159a1, 164b7, 168d10), “Necessarily” where it stands alone as an answer (168b9, 171b10), “Absolutely necessary” for Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη (168c3, 168d8), and “necessity” in Socrates’ question at 169e8, τίς ἀνάγκη, where the English keeps the noun because the question is about necessity itself. At 168d10 Burnet prints T’s ἀνάγκη, where B has ἀνάγκην.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Republic Glaucon draws a distinction that can be read as implicit in the Charmides. When Socrates says that the men and women among the guardians, living and exercising together, will be drawn to union “by an inborn necessity”, and asks whether he seems to be speaking of necessities, Glaucon answers: “Not geometrical ones, but erotic necessities, which are likely to be sharper than those at persuading and drawing the mass of the people” (458d). The Charmides can be read as setting out from an erotic necessity, Socrates on fire at the sight inside the boy’s cloak (155d), and arguing by geometrical ones.

In the Timaeus the dialogue’s chief speaker, Timaeus of Locri, makes mind and necessity the two sources of the world, and persuasion the way the one rules the other. Having described what was made by mind, he turns to what comes about through necessity: the world was born of a mixture of the two, “mind holding sway over necessity by persuading it to steer the greater part of what comes to be toward the best”, necessity being overcome by wise persuasion (47e–48a). The first necessity of the Charmides, Socrates’ necessity to be persuaded by his oath (157c), can be read as a small likeness of that order.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle lists the senses of “necessary” in his Metaphysics: what one cannot live without; what is needed for a good to come about or an evil to be avoided, as drinking the drug is necessary in order not to be ill; what is forced, which goes against impulse and choice and is therefore painful, so that necessity “is thought, and rightly, to be deaf to persuasion”, since it opposes motion according to choice and reasoning; and, the sense on which the others depend, what cannot be otherwise, to which belongs the necessity of what has been demonstrated.1 The Charmides can be read as touching most of them: the remedy for the head, the force of its last page (see βιάζομαι), and the necessity of a conclusion, the only one Socrates tests. His oath is a necessity of another kind, one he laid on himself.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a20–b9.